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NOTICE TO READERS: All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.
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Central European Initiative Adopts Statement

LD0503172894 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 5 Mar 94

[Text] A two-day meeting of the foreign ministers of the 10 countries of the Central European Initiative [CEI] ended in Trieste in northern Italy today with the adoption of the document on political and economic issues.

In the document the ministers welcomed the recent Washington agreement between the Croats and Muslims as a positive step toward achieving a global solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ministers also welcomed the latest developments around Sarajevo and confirmed their support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the economic document, the ministers expressed satisfaction at the implementation of some approved projects but at the same time stressed that the CEI's economic consolidation needed more effective work by the individual working groups.

Ethnic Minorities Discussed

LD0503190294 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 5 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Foreign ministers of the Central European Initiative [CEI] member states ended their two-day meeting in the Italian city of Trieste today. Here is our special correspondent Klara Stejskalova with a summary of what happened at the conference.

[Stejskalova] [passage omitted] Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec emphasized that the Czech Republic is interested in deepening cooperation in the area of migration and in contributing to the shaping of pan-European migration policy. [passage omitted]

More controversial was, as usual, the question of ethnic minorities, which was brought to a head mainly by the Hungarian side. In this connection, Slovak representative Jozef Prokes emphasized that the Council of Europe session in Vienna did not reach any agreement on ethnic minorities. He reminded of the absence of a comparative study of the position of Central European minorities, something that is needed for an overall solution to this problem. At the same time, he firmly refused to accept that this problem is specific to our region.

Josef Zieleniec stated his belief that the minority issue—and other political problems—should be dealt with by appropriate bodies, such as the Council of Europe. The CEI should rather concentrate on concrete economic cooperation. [passage omitted]

'Bosnian Federation' Supported

LD0503213894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2122 GMT 5 Mar 94

[Text] Trieste, March 5 (TANJUG)—A two-day session of the foreign ministers of the countries of the so-called Central European Initiative ended on Saturday evening, after lending all-out support to the Washington agreement between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims and expressing hope that the Bosnian Serbs would join the "Bosnian Federation."

Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic and his Bosnian Muslim counterpart Irfan Ljubijankic informed the chief diplomats of Italy, Austria, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) that the Croat-Muslim agreement was "open to the Serbs, too."

Representatives of the Bosnian Croats, Muslims and the Republic of Croatia signed in Washington on Tuesday, under strong pressure from the U.S. Administration, a preliminary agreement on a federation of the two peoples in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a subsequent confederation with neighbouring Croatia.

The U.S. peace negotiator for the former Yugoslavia Thorvald Stoltenberg, who attended the session of the Central European Initiative, set out that there was no reason to believe that the Serbs were not ready for a peaceful solution, and underscored that no lasting solution was possible without the Serb side.

Meksi Views Army Reform, Military Cooperation

AU0403190894 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Promotion, graduation, and oath-taking ceremonies for new officers and the start of school activity at the Defense Academy of the Republic of Albania were held in one of the halls of the Military Academy this morning. [passage omitted]

Prime Minister Meksi conveyed the greetings of Sali Berisha, president of the Republic and commander general, to those present. He wished them success in their new, sacred task of defending the country. Among other things, Meksi said:

[Begin Meksi recording] Today is a remarkable day for you and the Army. Your promotion and graduation, as well the start of the school process in the Defense Academy, which is completely reformed and restructured, constitute an important achievement. All this is being held at a historic moment of special importance, at a time when real democracy is being consolidated in our country and when, on the international level, Albania's position has been improved and recognized through its numerous education activities in many important international institutions.

Consequently, even our Army, with its reformation, has already broken the framework of long isolation by cooperating with many armies of Western and other democratic countries, thus aiming to be converted into a qualitative, modern, and contemporary army. These prospects become more certain due to the approach to NATO as well as the signing of the Partnership for Peace initiative, which will naturally integrate Albania into the bosom of the NATO alliance. However, the road to membership passes through the difficult but indispensable road of efficiency, increased military and contemporary knowledge, high discipline, and a very high state of alertness. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Prosecution Efforts in Nano Trial Criticized

AU0703151894 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 6 Mar 94 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report on first day of trial of Socialist Party Chairman Fatos Nano in Tirana on 5 March: "The Albanians Again Say No to Violations of Human Rights and Freedoms, Manipulation, and Political Persecution; The State Is Determined To See Fatos Nano Sentenced and in Prison; Fatos Nano Accuses, Prosecutors Qeleshi and Gjokutaj Fall Silent and Sweat"]

[Text] Because of the situation created in Tirana the day before yesterday [4 March], with its associated tension, panic, anxiety, and terror in the hearts of those in power, the Tirana Court on Durres Street, before the start of the trial of Fatos Nano, Socialist Party [PS] chairman and parliamentary deputy, was surrounded by hundreds of uniformed policemen, dozens of members of the special rapid deployment forces, and high-level officers from the Public Order Ministry armed with shields, blue helmets, bulletproof vests, rubber truncheons, Kalashnikov rifles, and of course their whistles and handcuffs. This was all to guarantee what President Berisha promised: openness, judicial independence, and the enforcement of legal standards and procedures in the trial of the opposition leader.

According to announcements, the trial was to take place in open court but with admission by invitation issued by the Tirana Court because of the size of the hall. Shaqir Vukaj, deputy chairman of the Albanian parliament, was not allowed entry to the courtroom to follow the proceedings. Meanwhile, dozens of policemen who were not on escort duty were present in the court.

Judge Agim Bendo opened the session at 0900. The case's prosecutors were Arben Qeleshi and that strange little fellow Genc Gjokutaj. Facing them in the dock were opposition leader Fatos Nano, Sokrat Plaka, Hasan Allkja, and Robert Gjini. After presenting the bench of judges to the court, Mr. Bendo turned to the defendants and asked whether they recognized the court. Fatos Nano then read the statement we publish under the title, "Even Though You Do Not Have the Civil Courage to Face Up to Us, I Agree To Stand Before You, Because the Law Stands Between Us." Defense counsel Perparim Sanxhaku then spoke, making a detailed summary based on individual articles and laws of the Penal Code, describing all the violations of procedure committed from PS Chairman Fatos Nano's arrest to his imprisonment and the rejection as inadmissible of the submissions of Fatos Nano and his lawyers. The lawyers of the other defendants also protests procedural violations. The lawyer Sanxhaku called for the court to threat Nano's case separately from those of the other defendants, to return the files to the prosecutor, and to commute Nano's arrest. The other defendants' lawyers made the same requests on behalf of their clients. Prosecutor Gjokutaj then asked for one hour to reply to the lawyer's requests. After one hour he replied in his own way; i.e., he gave no reply. The bench then withdrew to decide on the lawyers' requests. At 1500, Judge Bendo seemed to repeat Prosecutor Gjukotaj's reply. He rejected the lawyers' requests, with the exception of commuting Sokrat Plaka's arrest. After this decision, Deputy Fatos Nano stated that he was breaking all relations with the bench. Lawyer Tirana supported and explained Mr. Nano's legal decision and asked for the court to remove Mr. Nano and his two lawyers from the court. Mr. Bendo considered this an unreasonable attitude on the part of the lawyers, and gave them 10 minutes to reconsider. However, it seems that these 10 minutes were less for the lawyers to reconsider than for Mr. Bendo himself. Mr. Bendo opened the session, asking Prosecutor Qeleshi to read the charge. For 25 minutes, Qeleshi reread for the umpteenth time the State Control Commission's report published by Blerim Cela. After this, Mr. Bendo asked the accused whether they accepted the charges. Opposition leader Fatos Nano repeated his stand in his statement, "I Have Broken All Relations With the Court."

Lawyer Sanxahku reminded Mr. Bendo of the need for 10 minutes' break, but the latter interrupted him, saying that the court's decision could not be opposed at this moment. The defendants did not accept the charges. Mr. Bendo closed the session, to reopen it at 1000 today with the questioning of opposition leader Fatos Nano.

Courtroom Incidents

Prosecutor Genc Gjokutaj bellowed instead of giving a reply to charges of violations of procedure by the Prosecutor's Office during the investigation of the Nano affair.

From the manner in which he read, it was clear he was not reading his own writing.

Meanwhile, in contrast to his junior colleague Gjokutaj, Chief Prosecutor Arben Qeleshi, whom Fatos Nano called a puppet prosecutor required by the state solely to sign arrest warrants, showed himself able to read fluently a typed charged sheet that bore the signature of his deputy Dervishi at the end.

The presiding judge Agim Bendo tried to maintain the seriousness of the court, and succeeded when he was reminded of the Arsidi trial and his trip to Paris with Ilir Hoti, who is now in prison. At this moment, cameras flashed in the courtoom to preserve on celluloid the expression of his face.

At the end of the first session, Mr. Bendo broke a taboo of trials under the dictatorship by allowing the defendants to meet those of their relations who were in the courtroom.

Kurt Kola, chairman of the Association of Former Political Prisoners and Victims of Persecution, was the most attentive person in the hall. Who knows what ideas swirled through the mind of this martyr of democracy as he heard the denunciations of the violations of the human rights to which he and his association are so attached, exceeding in their dedication even the Meksi Government and the former Communist President Sali Berisha. Let us remember how Kola once let off his revolver in Kavaje as a sign of understanding and conciliation among Albanians and then wiped the barrel before thrusting it back in his belt.

Fatos Nano Addresses the Bench: "Even Though You Do Not Have the Civil Courage To Face Up to Us, I Agree To Stand Before You, Because the Law Stands Between Us"

Your honor, this is a political trial, because it has been seriously prejudiced by the attitudes, statements, and public and private activities of persons associated or not with the judicial process, from the head of state, the chairman of the People's Assembly, the chairman of the ruling Democratic Party, the chairman of the Association of Former Political Prisoners and Victims of Persecution,, the president of the Appeal Court, etc., down to the most recent chairman of the Democratic Party Youth Forum.

Of course, at the appropriate time, I will ask for their well- documented public pressure on the judiciary to be taken as evidence of the political character of the trial, and will call on these persons, together with their "minion," as witnesses to this and to other private acts.

Because of these circumstances, and because I do not identify justice with individual names, I am indifferent to the selection and composition of your bench. This indifference extends to yourself as presiding judge, despite the substantial and strong evidence that compromises your position as an independent judge such as the law demands. I will mention here only one piece of evidence. The state is using against you "the Paris Charter," by which I mean not the well-known Paris Charter on democratic principles recognized throughout the world, but the one connected with the "Arsidi affair," and your involvement in this scandal, in tandem with Hoti, on the side of citizen Berisha. The latter, in his capacity as president and chairman of the Supreme Coucil of Justice, quashed your last moral stand when you submitted your resignation to this Council, of which you are still a member. The tandem has now become a quartet, and, as on other occasions, you are coming to this trial after meetings last Monday [1 Mar] and between 0900 and 1300 yesterday with President Berisha, at which P. Martini, A. Qeleshi, and F. Dervishi were also present, in Villa Number Four near the Palace of Brigades, where the Supreme Council of Justice now meets to discuss the "Nano affair" and many others. Thus, you are prisoners in a villa-prison, while we are free, as you also see from the press.

In conclusion, even though you do not have the civil courage to face up to us, I agree to stand before you, because the law stands between us.

Thank you.

Fatos Nano, PS chairman, People's Assembly deputy.

Aleksandrov Denounces Rakovski Budget Petition

AU0703105394 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 1 Mar 94 p 1

["Open Letter by Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov in Connection With the Petition Signed by Officers of the Bulgarian Army, and Organized by Certain Members of the Rakovski Bulgarian Officer Legion"]

[Text] Democracy in the Armed Forces has its limits. Certain activists of the Rakovski Bulgarian Officer Legion crossed these limits. Already, on several occasions petitions were initiated and signed by officers of he Bulgarian Army, something that contradicts the Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria, Article 104, Chapter 5, and the following paragraphs, according to which petitions, proposals, and complains can only have a personal character. Those actions contradict the basic postulates regarding relations between the Ministry of Defense and the Rakovski Officer Legion, according to which mutual activity must be based on the steady observance of the Constitution, the country's laws, the military charters, and the principle of one-man-command.

Those who seek an increase in the military budget through petitions and publishing opinions at this very difficult period for the country, speculate with the common interest of the military personnel, and push the Army toward destabilization and politicization. In their striving to protect their own interests the organizers and initiators of the petition are prepared to trigger a confrontation between the Army and society. As a minister of defense, I have only one choice in anything related to the military budget: To accommodate the Army within the budget adopted by the National Assembly through painful but prudent decisions.

With its actions, the leadership of the Rakovski Bulgarian Officer Legion inflicted a blow on the authority of the Legion, which as established in order to increase the status and prestige of the officers, rally the officer corps, and assert the Bulgarian Army's values and traditions.

There can be no instigation in the Bulgarian Army, and such a situation will not be tolerated.

Those who think that the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria could be directed through petitions from the bottom to the top are deceiving themselves.

U.S. Interests in B-H Air Incident Examined

AU0703093694 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 1 Mar 94 p 12

[Goran Gotev commentary: "NATO Crossed War's 'Sound Barrier'"]

[Text] The report begins with bombs and sounds like a bomb. For the first time since NATO was formed in 1949, its Air Force took part in a combat operation in Europe, outside the range of the North Atlantic Alliance. Another "first"—for the first time since the beginning of the ethnic and religious conflict in Bosnia, foreign forces interfered in the conflict. Such were the initial assessments of the political observers after it was reported that U.S. F-16 aircraft belonging to NATO's allied Air Force, took off from the base in Aviano and shot down four "Galeb" aircraft in the Banja Luka region, which is controlled by the Serbs.

The report marked a new date in the history of the longest and bloodiest military crisis in Europe since the end of World War II. Until now, even the famous NATO ultimatum of 9 February did not cause an escalation, however, the air action of the U.S. fighters in Bosnia crossed the border at which things become unpredictable and dangerous.

One was not surprised by the explanation given by NATO headquarters. The UN Security Council resolution that envisages a "clear sky" over Bosnia, i.e. a ban on military flights that have not been authorized by the United Nations Protection Forces [UNPROFOR], has been violated. The truth is yet to be established, but a fact is well-known. The three fighting sides have violated the ban on flights since the day the resolution was adopted. Periodically one of the sides accuses the others of utilizing helicopters or combat aircraft. Nevertheless, NATO's "AWACS" intelligence aircraft have not accused any of the sides of violating the resolution, nor has UNPROFOR publicly warned any of the fighting sides.

Without justifying the actions of those who violated the resolution, and regardless of whether the airplanes were Serbian or not, it is obvious that NATO's operation comes at a very inappropriate moment—precisely when the world public sighed with relief that the ultimatum did not prompt a bombardment and even directed the developments toward peace. The air operation contradicted the conclusion of the "Blue Helmets" commanders, who said that the cease-fire was generally observed, and the opinion of the political figures that the Sarajevo model of peacemaking must gradually be expanded to include all of Bosnia.

The first military intervention of NATO in Europe must evoke great concern. It demonstrated that contrary to Butrus-Ghali's assurance, the commanding center of the military operations in Bosnia is not in the UN glass skyscraper in New York, but in the Pentagon, and that Washington deliberately seeks an escalation in the conflict to prompt a new division of Bosnia's territory. It is not very hard to establish that the attack against the four airplanes in the Banja Luka sky, which was peaceful since the beginning of the war, was directly related to the tripartite talks in Washington on establishing the Croatian-Muslim federation. The U.S. plan practically eliminates the EC plan on dividing Bosnia into three parts. On

the other hand, it envisages a much greater territory for the future federation than the Bosnia Serbs would be willing to concede.

Consequently, NATO's air fist had the important goal of demonstrating power to force the Serbs to make territorial concessions under the threat of military intervention. An unidentified Russian diplomat demanded an explanation from NATO regarding the air operation and said: "What happened is what we feared most and warned against frequently."

If one adds to this alarming sensation the intention of UNPROFOR to allow the "Blue Helmets" who accompany the humanitarian relief convoys, to open fire in order to clear the way, even without informing the fighting sides about this, it becomes clear that Bosnia is heading toward a new military escalation. They say that this corresponds to the interests of the Muslims and their protectors, the Americans. This could be so. However, it does not correspond to the desire of Bosnia's population for peace and the efforts of the world community to stop this shameful butchery.

Havel: Moscow 'Cannot Decide' for Czech Republic

LD0703192794 Rome RAI Televideo Teletext in Italian 1734 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] There are tones in Russian foreign policy that are beginning to cause concern. The Czech Republic wants to enjoy a good relationship with Moscow, but "Russia cannot decide on our behalf which international organizations we can or cannot join."

The statement was made by Czech President Vaclav Havel, who was speaking at a news conference in Rome on the Moscow veto on any Central and East European country joining NATO. Havel then said that the West "had been too slow" in understanding the problems of East Europe. Earlier, the Czech president had been received by the pope and by President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro.

Polish Sejm Speaker on International Contacts

AU0703170094 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 2 Mar 94 pp 1, 23

[Interview with Polish Sejm Marshal Jozef Oleksy by Marta Stolarova and Jan Zizka in Prague on 1 March: The Polish Coalition Is Not Threatened by a Collapse"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] During the talks with Prime Minister Klaus, you mentioned that the West could learn a lot in Poland and the Czech Republic. Could you be more specific?

[Oleksy] It sounds rather conceited, but we can say that Poland and the Czech Republic should not only take from Europe; they also have something to give. There is the potential ability to develop, for instance. The Western countries are facing recession, unemployment, and overproduction. I partially subscribe to the thesis that dynamic development is not to be expected in the West but, rather, in Central and East Europe. It is also a question of a certain orthodoxy, which is quite pronounced in our countries because the transformation requires it. This can be linked to the transparency of our politics and its suitable interpretation. We can also prove how strong the bond is between social intentions and the pragmatic decisionmaking in the economy. Finally, there is also the phenomenal experience with the system of real socialism. This experience is not only bad but also good, in the sense that we know how it should not look.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Would you care to comment on the proposed solution of the Polish debt to the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic?

[Oleksy] It is a debt of $85 million, of which $65 million is the share of the Czech Republic. Prime Minister Klaus gave his support to the concept that these funds will be used on the basis of a jointly drafted plan for the development of the infrastructure and ecology in those regions of the Czech Republic that border Poland. I consider that very reasonable.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] The Polish ambassador to Prague comments very favorably on the "economization of Czech foreign policy." What do you think?

[Oleksy] It could be referred to by another term, too—the subordination of foreign policy to economic goals and interests—and that is something I have been trying for in Poland for a long time. I believe that, after 1989, there was a period in Polish foreign policy when it was necessary to concentrate on building a new "contractual infrastructure." We have succeeded in this task. Today Poland needs politics to serve, above all, economic interests. Every country—and it applies even more to the small ones—must be able to calculate its economic interests and advocate them in the framework of the worldwide economic game. [passage omitted]

[Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech on 2 March on pages 1 and 12, in a similar interview, adds:

(Petr Janyska, LIDOVE NOVINY) How do you perceive the Czech left wing, and what contacts do you have with it?

(Oleksy) Negligible—we meet with the social democrats only at international actions. We have not had any contacts with your communists for a long time. However, we do have very close contacts with Peter Weiss's party in Slovakia.]

ODS Official Comments on Foreign Policy

AU0803122094 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 2 Mar 94 pp 1, 22

[Interview with O. Vychodil (ODS), head of the parliamentary mission to the North Atlantic Assembly, by Nada Adamickova; place and date not given: "The World Does Not Perceive the Controversial Statements by Our Representative All That Dramatically"]

[Text] [Adamickova] Do you agree that, in foreign policy and related matters, party interests should not dominate?

[Vychodil] I agree absolutely. As a matter of fact, if the party interests dominated somewhere, which is not the case, I would consider it fatal for our foreign policy.

[Adamickova] So, you do not consider the big ado regarding Foreign Committee Chairman J. Payne, when even the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] itself had significant objections to his statements but defended him on the outside because his "recall was demanded by the opposition," to be a promotion of party interests?

[Vychodil] I will take the liberty of answering this direct question diplomatically because what you are referring to is actually diplomacy. The matter in question is really a parliamentary experiment with a coexistence of fire and water, with the provision that the fire must not be extinguished and water must not be heated up very much. Hence, it is a certain type of art, which man must learn to command. He has to learn in what area and on

what topic he is to comment. Regarding the statements by colleague Payne, then, I know his views because he is a friend and colleague of mine, one of the most diligent people in this Chamber. What has been published does not completely correspond to his opinions.

[Adamickova] Nevertheless, at the session of the Foreign Committee, at which Payne was explaining his trip and statements he made in the United States, a detailed recording was heard of the meeting with compatriots, including precisely the phrases that appeared in the Czech press.

[Vychodil] Unfortunately, I did not take part in this session because I was abroad. Therefore, I cannot comment.

[Adamickova] Would you not agree that the Foreign Committee chairman should be more careful with what he says because he could possibly damage the interests of the Republic abroad?

[Vychodil] The question is how the statements by our politicians are perceived in the world—namely, I do not believe that statements made by the representatives of our parliament are perceived as neuralgically as we imagine. That is hardly the case. I believe that it is rather an internal affair. It is certain, however, that, given certain circumstances—i.e., if there were some hostile feelings against our Republic, it cannot be ruled out that the effect of some statements could be used against us. In this instance, however, it certainly did not happen.

[Adamickova] Do you believe it proper that your committee dealt with Payne's statements?

[Vychodil] I believe that the Foreign Committee is an autonomous body of the Chamber and can deal with whatever it sees appropriate. This right cannot be questioned. As far as my personal opinion goes, I do not believe it good if it deals with the statements of its chairman in his absence.

[Adamickova] The second time around, however, your committee dealt with the statements in the presence of its chairman, who declared that they should deal with foreign policy rather than matters of personnel....

[Vychodil] I repeat again that the committee can deal with whatever it considers appropriate. It is simply a question of majority democracy. If the opposition holds a majority on the committee, it is a different matter entirely.

[Adamickova] How do you feel about our foreign policy suffering the malady of dearth of coordination?

[Vychodil] Of course, I am of the opinion that foreign policy should be coordinated and clear-cut. We have to realize one thing, however: Disparate statements by different representatives of the same state are nothing unusual. That is again overestimating something on our part. Let us take a specific example of the North Atlantic Alliance ultimatum to Bosnia, for instance. It is possible that, in statements for the press, various sides of the same problem are emphasized. One more, one less. Thus, it depends on what is more important from the point of view of that representative. Personally, I do not see it as a tragedy, and it is not perceived dramatically in the world. On the other hand, I must say frankly that our Republic is judged from a different perspective. What is only recorded in the instance of traditionally democratic countries is occasionally dramatized in our instance. Fortunately, this trend exists only here.

[Adamickova] Excuse me, but I cannot agree with you regarding the specific example of the Bosnia ultimatum when you speak about the unequal emphasis. The difference between the statements by the president and the prime minister certainly was not one of emphasis but of a completely different stance.

[Vychodil] Allow me to polemicize. We have here the resolution adopted by the Foreign Committee on the situation in Bosnia. When you read it, you will find that both aforementioned views fit in there, and it really is just a matter of emphasis. It is one thing if we emphasize the force of the ultimatum, and another the bombing itself. We know that it is a dangerous thing, and the consequences can hardly be imagined.

[Adamickova] How do you, as the head of our parliamentary mission to the North Atlantic Assembly, view this problem?

[Vychodil] I do not believe that the conflict in Bosnia was brought there from without but, rather, that it is a problem that was dormant there. It is a very complex issue, where the Catholic civilization meets with the orthodox and the Muslim ones. The entire local history is very complex, and I see it as a conflict of cultures. I believe that the conflict cannot be solved in simple terms, and, to be frank, I do not know a responsible person who could imagine such a solution. I am convinced that the conflict cannot be solved from without. In any instance of a simplification, it may result in a threat to the security of not only that region but also the entire Balkans and, by extension, Europe. And we are only a six-hour drive from there. We must realize this and be very careful with various strong and unqualified statements.

[Adamickova] Do you believe that, if I accept your theory of different emphases, Czech interests could not have been damaged?

[Vychodil] It certainly was recorded, but just as certainly it will not damage our interests.

[Adamickova] Several days ago, your committee dealt with the preparations of a trip to Germany. This occurred after the parliamentary delegation began its visit to the German Parliament last December in a rather awkward way. Do you not believe it late to prepare a trip at the time when a faux pas takes place?

[Vychodil] I believe that preparations for a trip should be a matter of fact. Nevertheless—and do not take this as an excuse but, rather, as a statement of fact—we learn certain things by the hit-and-miss method. The misses are sometimes painful; at other times they are not.

[Adamickova] In a RUDE PRAVO interview, former Foreign Minister Dienstbier criticized some of our politicians for their opinion that what is happening east of us should not be at the center of our attention. Do you agree?

[Vychodil] I am deeply convinced that what is happening east of us must be at the center of our attention rather than not. Not to care about it could be fatal. I insist on this, regardless of what the politicians Dienstbier mentioned are like.

[Adamickova] At the same time, Dienstbier said that we had the opportunity to become the country we claim to be on the occasion of Bill Clinton's visit, but we did not use it. What is your opinion?

[Vychodil] Our country gained respect by the U.S. President's choice of it as the place to go. That speaks for itself. Regarding the respect per se, it is necessary to follow foreign press and statements by foreign politicians, who tend to agree that the Czech Republic is the best off of all of the postcommunist countries. That, I believe, is the best evidence. Moreover, I cannot imagine how we could prove this respect. By a one-time act or a declaration? After all, the world is not moved by opinions but, rather, by people and their cooperation, if I am to phrase it in a somewhat elevated manner.

[Adamickova] Do you agree that the belief that if someone is admitted to NATO, it would be the Czech Republic first, and no one will joint the Alliance without it is exaggerated? I am referring to Payne's statements made in the United States.

[Vychodil] I am not talking about entry into NATO but, rather, an integration of world security structures. If countries are to join, they must know everything it involves. That is not just having a protecting umbrella. It also means a certain economic burden and, especially, a certain way of assuming responsibility. In other words, if countries want to join the Alliance, they must be democratic and economically stable, and membership can be built on that. I emphasize again that it is not some act or declaration but a process.

[Adamickova] You have not answered my question....

[Vychodil] I tried to answer it fully. Regarding your question, it is possible that we will be first to join NATO. It is also possible that it will be someone else. I would applaud him and certainly not envy him.

German Report on Increased Espionage Denied

LD0703204494 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1900 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] The Czech foreign intelligence service—that is, the Office for Foreign Relations and Information—does not work against the interests of other countries and is not engaged in either political or economic espionage. Jan Subert, press spokesman of the Czech Ministry of the Interior, said this today in response to reports published in the Berlin-based newspaper DIE WELT, according to which the activities of espionage services of East European countries—above all, the Czech Republic—have increased of late.

According to Subert, the intelligence service gathers information about foreign activities that might endanger the security of the Czech Republic. In cooperation with partner intelligence services, it is oriented toward the areas of global risks against civilization—such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and the illegal transfer of arms.

Property Fund Statistics on Privatization

LD0703225894 Prague CT 1 Television Network in Czech 1830 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Summary] According to officials of the National Property Fund, the overall receipts from the privatization of both small-size and large-size companies has amounted to 90.5 billion Czech korunas [Kc]. The revenues from the privatization of large-size companies in 1993 amounted to approximately Kc24.405 billion. Since the Fund came into existence, this has amounted to approximately Kc50.937 billion. Overall receipts from the privatization of small-size companies amounted to Kc36.085 billion.

Regarding privatization of large-size companies, foreign investors have invested more than Kc22 billion up to the present, which is almost 44 percent of the capital that has been invested overall. On 31 December 1993, more than Kc43 billion remained on the National Property Fund account after the deduction of all expenditures connected primarily with writing off the debts of the privatized companies. Out of this amount, Kc20 billion has been deposited with the Czech State Savings Bank. The interest from this long-term deposit will be used for the privatization of the health service.

There have also been problems with the repayment of money of the already privatized assets. At present, the Fund has taken to court a total of 93 subjects who have failed to repay money owed, which amounts to Kc2 billion. The court has so far resolved only five cases.

RDP Group Outlines Production Plans

AU0703153794 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 3 Mar 94 pp 1, 6

[Article by Robert Zelenka: "Jan Vlcek: The RDP Group Has Not Arranged Tank Deliveries"]

[Text] The reports about the possible export of modernized Russian-made T-72 tanks to Iran by the Czech RDP Group arms consortium are imprecise. This statement was made by RDP Group Director General Jan Vlcek at yesterday's news conference in Prague. He added that the "consortium rejects any suggestions that it would act at variance with the state's interests."

According to Director Vlcek, the RDP Group has not asked for permission to export modernized tanks or for a license to export equipment to Iran for repairing tanks; the company was merely "mapping out the market." The modernized tank, if it is exported, will not, according to him, be oriented toward regions engaged in conflict. The consortium will always consult the Foreign and Trade and Industry Ministries on the export of all military materials.

The fact that representatives from these ministries and the Defense Ministry have free access to each board meeting also contributes to the "transparency" of the company's commercial and manufacturing activity. The consortium has already concluded agreements abroad for certain orders, while others are being negotiated. Vlcek refused to specify them, however, in view of commercial confidentiality. The three-year stoppage has not benefited Czech arms exports on foreign markets, and many orders were canceled; nevertheless, the customers have remained aware of their quality.

The main objective of the RDP Group, however, is not exports but coordinating production activity, conducting research and development, securing new projects, financing them, and, last but not least, holding a dialogue with the Czech Army.

In this connection, the consortium's representatives criticized the Army's inadequate approach to its rearmament program, whose implementation has constantly been postponed. The RDP Group is trying to make sure that as many Czech enterprises as possible are involved in this state order. "We will produce whatever Czech industry can produce in the Czech Republic. Whatever it cannot produce will be guaranteed by linking up to a foreign partner," said Vlcek. If transferring production to the Czech Republic is unsuitable, the RDP Group will endeavor to agree upon countershipments at the same cost.

A number of projects, the criteria for which are price, high standards, and quality, have been prepared for the Czech Army. Modernizing the existing hardware will be one of the most comprehensive projects; new types of wheeled vehicles (including a licensed product from Avia Letnany, which is already being tested by the Interior Ministry) are also being prepared. Other projects involve hand weapons, including antitank missiles, the development of new ammunition, including intelligent ammunition, and communications systems. The projects should be put forward in the very near future. Cooperation with the Army, however, is not proceeding as the producers, who need to sell as much as possible in the shortest time possible, had hoped.

The Topfin banking hous, which is, in fact, a consortium of banks involving, for example, the Investicni banka and the Ceskoslovenska obchodni banka, is prepared to provide finance for the projects. The company also has links to banks in Paris and Washington and is organizing representation in Moscow.

Complains About Army Cooperation

AU0703144794 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 3 Mar 94 pp 1, 12

[Article by "(gag)": "The Engineers' Ambitions and Plans Are in Contrast to the Army's Dilatoriness"]

[Text] Prague—The 40 companies affiliated in the RDP Group now account for 60 percent of arms production in the Czech Republic, said Jan Vlcek, the consortium's director general, to reporters. Coordinating production, pooling resources and capacities, and importing advanced technologies are not the consortium's only aims; it is also interested in offering to quickly and economically reaarm the Czech Army with equipment compatible with that of NATO. In reply to a question on how the RDP Group Board explains the inactive cooperation with the Army, the director general of LIAZ, Jablonec, said the following at yesterday's news conference: "We are still seeking our place in relation to the state institutions; apart from this, the Army is going through comprehensive transformation, which also involves conceptual changes in procuring equipment. There is a dialogue between us. Otherwise, it is impossible—armies throughout the world have an important position with regard to domestic industry. After all, it is financed from the state budget and from taxpayers' money." Modernizing weapons and logistics, new types of wheeled vehicles (from a jeep that is being tested by the Interior Ministry to heavy tractors), a modular system of hand weapons, antitank missiles, intelligent ammunition, and effective communications systems are among the RDP Group's key projects.

The RDP Group would like to discuss its projects with the Army in the next few days. The director general of Avia Praha, which will manufacture 200 special jeep-type all-terrain vehicles this year, said that the Army still does not have a rearmament program, which has a severe affect on the development and production capacity of the engineering enterprises.

"The concept for the Army's rearmament was made public in the middle of last year, with the proviso that it should be ready in January," added Director Vlcek. "However, it will not be submitted until the second half of the year, and then only in general form." According to Vlcek, this is a common problem between a businessman and a customer. Apparently, what is worse is that the RDP Group is losing out on a qualified expert in the Defense Ministry, with which it could be holding talks.

Oil Leakage Reported in Northern Border Area

LD0703162194 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Excerpt] A whole system of submersible walls has had to be built against oil leakages at River Olse in the border area from Jablunkov in the direction of Bohumin. More from our reporter Frantisek Tvrz, who is in the affected area:

[Tvrz] At the moment, investigators and ecology inspectors are investigating how many tonnes of the crude oil product leaked from the fuel area of the Czech railways at Jablunkov yesterday. According to this morning's statement by the breakdown commission, the nonspecialist estimates suggest a leakage of approximately six to seven tonnes.

The whole system of submersible walls was built immediately below Jablunkov but also at the brook at Navsi and then lower down, toward the confluence of the Olse border river to the Odra River, via Trinec, Cesky Tesin up to Bohumin-Vernovice. [passage omitted]

Meciar on Elections, Ministerial Posts

LD0403213894 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 4 Mar 94

["Regular" Friday interview with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by correspondent Martin Bartisek; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Bartisek] The work aimed at gaining the necessary 350,000 signatures required to call a referendum on early elections ended last week. It appears that more signatures than required have been obtained and that all of the documents still have to be checked. But time is seemingly against this endeavor.

Prime Minister, you have proposed 25-26 June as the date of the election. But this means that the elections will have to be officially called on 2 April at the latest. With regard to the demanding nature of the measures that will have to be implemented, this date appears to be virtually unrealistic. Do you still think that elections can take place on this date?

[Meciar] Yes, I do. First, Mr. President does not have to wait the whole 30 days. He could speed up his decision. Equally, there is always a chance that the political entities represented in the National Council [of the Slovak Republic] might reach an agreement on holding elections earlier. After all, opposition parties have been calling for early elections the entire year, and now, when they have a chance, they scream that they are not ready.

There are two criteria that should be considered. The basic criterion is what is the interest of the state. The interest of the state is to resolve this parliamentary crisis as soon as possible because the economic and social effect of this crisis on citizens and on the state is very serious. If we consider the interest of the state to be a priority issue, nobody should hesitate as to whether elections should or should not be held in June. If, on the other hand, we take into consideration the interests of political parties, the elections will take place as late as possible.

We would act irresponsibly toward our state if we were to subordinate the interests of the state to people like Mr. Knazko, the chairman of the Alliance of Democrats, Mr. Cernak, the chairman of the national democratic faction in the Slovak National Party, and former Deputy Prime Minister Roman Kovac until they have built up their parties. We would act irresponsibly if we were to let the economy and the social sphere be tossed around in uncertainty, if we let the name of our state be questioned abroad. Here we can see a line dividing us from those who apply their past attitude toward the state to current conditions.

No matter what the election result, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia will have to lend its support to the interests of the state and to give utmost priority to this interest, while the movement's election results and interests should take second place. Others should do the same thing, and this would then clarify the election date issue. [passage omitted]

[Bartisek] I do not think we have reached any significant positive turning point since our last interview, when we agreed that the internal political crisis had deepened in a certain way. The failure to fill two ministerial posts in your Cabinet continues to be alarming and, for the present Slovakia—I will put this openly—it is to a certain degree disadvantageous. You have said that somebody who is good enough to be a deputy prime minister is good enough to be entrusted with the post of a foreign minister. Can you clarify your statement a little?

[Meciar] To put it clearly, I would be at fault if my failure to put forward proposals resulted in not having ministerial posts filled. However, in fact, we have to share responsibility also with the person who failed to accept my proposals, without giving any reason for doing so.

The fact that President Michal Kovac expressed a lack of confidence in Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Prokes, supporter of European integration, whom he had considered acceptable [as a deputy prime minister] and whom he refuses now to consider acceptable as a foreign minister, is a matter of political and ethical dimension. It is not restricted to a legal dimension—the field where the law does not oblige the president to give any reasons for his actions.

The selection of a new foreign minister is now being discussed in our talks with other political subjects. The issue is whether, in the period until the elections, the Cabinet should be joined by members of other parties. Talks are under way. We should be clear about the fundamental stance on 7 March. Once we are clear about our stance, we can take further decisions to solve this burning problem.

I am alarmed by the fact that, after having a crisis introduced in the parliament, the failure to meet each other halfway on personnel issues is also being introduced in the Cabinet. However, we will not allow this to have an impact on the way the Cabinet functions. This will not happen. The Cabinet functions and works as responsibly as possible.

[Bartisek] New candidates should emerge following coalition talks between the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Slovak National Party. [passage omitted]

[Meciar] I would wait before drawing any conclusions. There is no doubt that, as far as the privatization post is concerned, the candidate will be generally acceptable. As far as foreign affairs are concerned, I will take into account not only the coalition talks between the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Slovak National Party because one or two other partners are being considered, too. Perhaps the Foreign Affairs Ministry

will be the post where we reach an agreement to widen [the range of the Cabinet]. [passage omitted]

[Bartisek] Coexistence Chairman Mikulas Duray made a rather important statement addressed to Slovak political parties when he said: Some government coalition statements have created a political configuration that might be described as representing fascism with a human face.

This image literally creates fear. Therefore, I would ask you for clarification coming from you as the coalition representative.

[Meciar] Mr. Duray should own up to responsibility for his statements.

He has already called the government fascist. This is nothing new in his vocabulary. He repeats such statements. Following the first accusation, the authorities began criminal proceedings, but, because he is a deputy of the [former Czechoslovak] Federal Assembly, it is not clear who has the power to strip him of parliamentary immunity. If this is done by the Slovak National Council, it would mean that by doing so they accept all deputies of the Federal Assembly as full members of the representative body. This is why the affair came to a standstill and they have asked the Constitutional Court for interpretation. This is preventing the bodies that are responsible for dealing with such statements and that are drawing conclusions regarding personal responsibility from concluding the matter.

Let me present some facts. No one can doubt the fact that the Slovak Republic has been recognized abroad. The signing of the association agreement means the recognition of the Slovak Republic's democratic regime. The fact that we have gained access to the Council of Europe means recognition of our democratic regime. We have joined Partnership for Peace—without the recognition of a democratic regime there is no partnership.

We have to stop this self-damaging, self-degrading, and self-destructing carried out by Slovak Republic citizens, regardless of their nationality. Elections have to take place, among other reasons, to give our citizens a chance to tell those who are engaged in this self-destruction, who are tearing our society apart: We have had enough of you; we do not want you anymore; go somewhere else—do not do these things from inside the parliament. This is why I think that a purification through elections will also help regarding this aspect. [passage omitted]

Parties Discuss Early Elections

LD0703164394 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Excerpts] [Announcer Lydia Mrazova] The parliamentary Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] held talks with the nonparliamentary Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS] this morning. [passage omitted]

At a news conference held at midday today, Peter Weiss and Jaroslav Volf, the chairmen of the two parties, reported on new elements in the relations between these two parties. Ludmila Bulakova returned from the news briefing only a few minutes ago. Good day to you.

[Bulakova] Good day.

[Mrazova] I presume that issues relating to parliamentary elections and the solution of internal political crisis topped the agenda, especially because, in the interview broadcast by Bratislava radio yesterday, SDL Chairman Peter Weiss did not rule out the possibility of forming a coalition with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. What do the social democrats think of it?

[Bulakova] First of all, Jaroslav Volf said that forming a temporary government would be a risky business. Replying to the specific question as to what they would think if the SDL joined Vladimir Meciar's government, Volf said, and I quote, this move would not promote stabilization in Slovakia and would amount to a denial of the idea of the government of broad coalition. [passage omitted]

[Mrazova] According to Pavol Kanis [SDL deputy chairman], the SDL is prepared to discuss the date of early elections today. At the same time, it is not against any date because it wants the present situation to calm down. But, as is known, Jaroslav Volf thinks that the elections should be a tool through which political entities could acquire a definite shape. Because of this, he thinks that the June date is very questionable. Was this also discussed?

[Bulakova] As far as this disputed point is concerned, Mr. Volf said that it was tabled at the talks with the SDL. The two parties then discussed their positions and felt that a realistic date for elections is the end of September or the beginning of October. [passage omitted]

But, to wind it all up, the whole news conference and the pronouncements made there ended with a statement made by SDL Chairman Weiss, who said that the SDSS views would be taken into consideration in the PDL's talks with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. The SDL described the SDSS as its strategic partner.

[Mrazova] Let us assume that the HZDS and the SDL will not reach an agreement today. Will the SDL initiate a dismissal of the government?

[Bulakova] Peter Weiss's answer to this was that the word "never" does not exist in politics. One has to consider all of the available options. One of the options is to form a reconstituted coalition government of experts. He did not rule out any of the options, however.

Talks Held on Possible Broadening of Coalition

LD0703162394 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Representatives of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the Slovak National Party

[SNS] met today for their regular Monday talks. Their talks were likely to contain a new topic: the possibility that the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] will join the coalition.

At a short press briefing, today's talks were described first by Vladimir Meciar and then by Jan Slota, chairman of the Slovak National Party.

[Begin recording] [Meciar] The coalition talks concentrated on finding support in parliament from other political parties and movements for passing important decisions, such as the date of the elections, what to do before the elections, and the stabilization of the government. Then we discussed which party we should consider. It is, however, still too early to say more.

[Unidentified correspondent] We have heard that you are to hold talks today with the SDL. Can you reveal the topic of your talks?

[Meciar] The talks with the SDL are to be held this evening. We have informed the SNS about the likely course of these talks and our position. It is, however, premature to reveal anything because this is to be the first official meeting of this nature.

[Correspondent] What does your coalition partner think about these talks?

[Slota] The SNS sees clearly that political stabilization has priority. This means it wishes for early parliamentary elections to be held as soon as possible. For this reason, it will support all of the HZDS's steps.

[Correspondent] Would the SNS agree with an election coalition between the HZDS and the SDL, knowing that the SDL presidium said that it would be willing to get together with the SNS but without its chairman?

[Slota] I do not know the exact words they used. I doubt that anybody would formulate it in this way because Slota is not everything. A party is a party and Slota is Slota. In my view, the Slovak part of the SDL is aware that, in particular with regard to the economy, it is necessary to hold the elections in June.

[Correspondent] Mr. Prime Minister, have you discussed personnel issues, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Meciar] We analyzed the situation arising from the nonacceptance of Mr. Prokes by the president. He can be deputy prime minister but not minister. This is slightly paradoxical. Personnel issues will also be discussed tomorrow.

[Correspondent, in Czech] Mr. Prime Minister, would you be willing to change the date of the elections should an agreement be reached on other issues—as an exchange for something else?

[Meciar] For God's sake, we cannot make this into a market place. Citizens have made a decision through a petition that calls for a referendum. This should be implemented within 90 days from the date decided by the president—that is, by the end of June 1994 at the latest. [passage omitted]

Bank Officials Negotiate Japan Exim Bank Loan

LD0703231194 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1830 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Slovak National Bank Governor Vladimir Masar and Marian Jusko, vice governor of the bank, returned from Japan today. The main aim of their trip was signing an agreement with the Exim Bank of Japan about the loan to the value of approximately $42 million.

The first installment of this loan will be transferred to Slovakia as early as 9 March. It will be used for the support of small-scale and medium businesses. The first repayment of the loan has been set for 15 February 1998.

Representatives of the National Bank of Slovakia also held talks with the Japanese bank about the possibility of support in financing large investment projects. They include, above all, development of railway and river transport, development of the Bratislava airport, and transportation of gas and oil. [passage omitted]

Party Officials React to Radio Dismissals

LD0403220294 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Excerpts] The leader of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] parliamentary group [Ferenc Kulin] does not consider it probable that the government will start any sort of inquiry into the dismissals of radio staff for it has no right to do so. Levente Sukosd reports from Ferenc Kulin's press briefing.

[Begin recording] [Kulin] We consider and have to consider this endeavor on the part of the vice president as being totally obvious, since we in the Cultural Committee in 1991 were the ones who very resolutely requested and demanded from the then presidents of radio and television the implementation of a radical cut in staff.

[Sukosd] The list of names published today was a surprise for Kulin, he did not know the content of it until today, he said. He considers that this was not a politically motivated decision. [passage omitted] Kulin said that he believes [radio vice president] Laszlo Csucs could if necessary also convince public opinion that he has only dismissed editors who violated the radio's ethical code. Parliament is unable to deal with the matter properly until the media bill is adopted, however the parties' consensus would be needed for this. [passage omitted]

The government and the government party are not responsible for the situation, said Kulin. The dismissal of the vice president, according to the law on appointments adopted in 1990, can only be initiated by the employer, that is the prime minister. According to Ferenc Kulin's information, Prime Minister Peter Boross does not intend to take this measure. [passage omitted]

Because of the dismissals at the radio, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] has appealed to Prime Minister Peter Boross to initiate the release of Laszlo Csucs and Gabor Nahlik, vice presidents of radio and television respectively. Ivan Peto, party chairman, gave an interview in Nyiregyhaza to Miklos Nagy.

[Begin recording] [Peto] The manner of the dismissals, that is that they are released from work with immediate effect and that they are not allowed to work during the period of notice, makes it perfectly unequivocal that these are not austerity measures. The government wants to silence the still existing multi-colored voice of radio. The fact is that the Government wants to make a propaganda institution out of the radio, as has already been done to television. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Announcer] According to the deputy chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats [Fidesz], the radio dismissals threaten the functioning of the institution. Edit Schranz reports.

[Schranz] Fidesz Deputy Chairman Tamas Deutsch does not believe that one can sincerely talk of rationalization in connection with the dismissals at Hungarian radio. At a news briefing, Deutsch said the following: Laszlo Csucs has been in office, vested with full presidental power, for a year. If he believes that radio staff have to be made redundant for economic reasons, just when the government submits the new version of the Media Bill, which is to regulate the operation of radio, then something is not right; either that the vice president is competent in what he is doing, or that there is no political cleansing behind the dismissals. You can hear Tamas Deutsch:

[Begin Deutsch recording] The political intent behind the decisions is unacceptable for me. I am very sad because Hungarian radio's capability of functioning may be endangered, and just in a special period, in the midst of the election campaign. This measure has a particularly unfavorable and negative effect on the election campaign. But it also has a direct effect: Since it is a step which becomes a political scandal and a political stumbling block, it will obviously divert the election campaign, possibly for weeks, from the path—which is normal to my mind—of parties talking about their programs. The whole affair which is taking place at television and radio—now especially at radio—does influence the elections. However, politicians of the governing parties: do not entertain hopes! The past four years will not be forgotten. This in itself will not significantly increase the chances of the government parties. [end recording]

[Announcer] The Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP] considers the dismissal of leading radio staff, en masse and for an outright political reason, to be an open attack against democracy and press freedom. Kata Peli Nagy reports on the HSP's stance.

[Nagy] The leadership of the HSP is calling on Laszlo Csucs to revoke his decision. Party Chairman Gyula Horn today rang the radio vice chairman to get information on the backdrop to the dismissals. In Horn's view, the individuals in question have always served independent broadcasting. According to the HSP, the vice president's measure unfavorably influences the elections. They are afraid that radio, similarly with television, will become a mouthpiece of the Government. In the HSP's opinion, the Government is also responsible for the situation which has emerged, since everything happened with the support of the Cabinet. Yesterday they even provided money for the dismissals.

What will the HSP do in this situation? Gyula Horn said the following:

[Begin Horn recording] If this decision is not revoked, and the HSP enters Government as a result of the elections, the HSP will immediately take steps to reinstate these generally esteemed experts in their position. [end recording]

[Announcer] The Presidium of the National Association of Hungarian Journalists [MUOSZ] has received the

news about the radio dismissals with indignation. MUOSZ agrees with there being a review of the radio's financial situation and with the absolutely necessary redundancies. However, the MUOSZ cannot accept the radio leadership sacking people for an outright political reason; by doing so it makes the provision of multifaceted and objective information impossible. These dismissals, which are unprecedented in the profession and which are happening just before the elections, threaten democracy to an extent which cannot be indifferent to anybody, the MUOSZ statement says.

Editorial Criticizes Dismissals

AU0803102494 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 5 Mar 94 p 3

[Unattributed editorial: "Canton"]

[Text] Some people thought that they would not dare do it, because it is equivalent to trampling upon the freedom of the press. Some people thought that they do not want to do it. They have done it. This is the biggest clear-up in the Radio since 1956. The MTI statement "Dismissals at the Hungarian Radio" in which this was officially published, is a historical document of this age. The statement formulated by Deputy Chairman Laszlo Csucs is a rare example of cynicism and hypocrisy. He, who has been working on, caressing, and polishing up the list of names for weeks, knows very well how much truth is in this statement: "The dismissals—contrary to the published accusations—were made on the basis of professional and ethical points of view, rather than political ones." It is enough to examine the list of names to understand what Csucs—who with one stroke "streamlined" and beheaded the "168 ora" program—means by professional and ethical viewpoints. Csucs's right to refer to ethics is well shown by the fact that he justified the "streamlining" by referring to the National Audit Office's [ASZ] investigations. The only unpleasant factor is that the chairman of the ASZ protests strongly against this.

A few weeks ago, Istvan Csurka's Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP] was ready to support Laszlo Csucs as a parliamentary candidate. This was the only party he could definitely rely on. Now it is much easier to understand the reason: Csucs has indeed implemented Csurka's program in Hungarian Radio. Presumably, others also encouraged him to do this. Some people in the Hungarian Democratic Forum would like nothing better than to build bridges toward the Hungarian Way Circles, to "prove themselves," and to gain votes from Csurka's supporters. It will be an expensive bridge but, cost what it may, there are not any free votes left anywhere else.

The question, of course, is what the cabinet and the biggest governing party say about the "slaughtering on Friday" [4 March]. So far—unofficially—we could hear that the prime minister is unfortunately in a trap, because, although he could relieve Csucs, what would come after that? The parties are unable to agree on a successor.... And: Due to the circumstances, the government is not responsible for Csucs's actions. Naturally, it is conceivable that [Prime Minister] Boross was serious about this. However, this will not improve his position: Those people, who will demonstrate on the eve of 15 March [Hungarian National Day]—which is also the day of the freedom of the press—people, who are justifiably concerned about the cleanness of the elections, will not be writing to Csucs. No one wants to correspond with Csucs, who wanted to have the police remove his colleagues from the Radio building in Sandor Brody street. It is a waste of stamps. The addressee of the protest letters will be Peter Boross. There will not be many people either in Hungary or abroad who will believe that he and his colleagues—the government members—could not have done anything. Only to mention one factor, if more than 100 million forints from the tight budget had not been voted for partly financing severance pay then the dismissed people could not have been sent away. Naturally, after all this, we will not have a media law, and we fear that the consensus on certain issues on which there was a hope for reaching it, will also be endangered. If it has been difficult to escape from the trap up to now, it is twice as difficult now: it is a double trap.

Finally, Csucs's statement also contains the weighty argument that the "radio in Canton prepares seven programs with 600 employees for 60 million people." It will be interesting to observe if the government that so steadfastly advocates joining Europe will be able or willing to do anything to prevent the complete cantonization of the public service media.

Official Interviewed on Law on Former Agents

AU0403111494 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 3 Mar 94 p 3

["L.K."-signed interview with Fabian Jozsa, political state secretary at the Interior Ministry; place and date not given: "Former Agents Need Not Expect To Face Legal Consequences Regarding Employment"]

[Text] Prior examination of a person's political past cannot be a condition for his employment because this would be anticonstitutional. Therefore, if it later comes to light that a civil servant had, for example, cooperated with the agents of Department III/III [former secret service], the sanction can only be public humiliation, said Fabian Jozsa, whom we interviewed on the implementation of the bill on examining the political past of people in certain important positions.

[Jozsa] The government does not intend to issue an order on executing the law on agents because the law precisely regulates the steps of examination. However, regarding certain technical details of the procedure, instructions will have to be issued, but these will only help the work of the committees. The premises, the necessary equipment, and the fees for the participants will have to be ensured. Naturally the government will bear the costs. It

is worth mentioning that the law on the legal standing of civil servants has to be applied in the case of the committee members who will carry out the examinations—who will be judges elected by parliament for a limited period—because the service conditions of the judges will be suspended during this time.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Do I understand correctly that many committees will operate?

[Jozsa] Yes, as a result of a deputy's proposal, the bill makes it possible for the necessary number of committees to operate to fulfill the tasks. Parliament will have to decide this issue.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] The original proposal contained the names of people to be examined in order of importance, thus determining the order of the examinations at the same time. Therefore, the parliamentary deputies will be first, followed by the president of the republic and the government members, while certain heads of state-owned banks and insurance companies will be examined last of all, this being the last point on the list.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] When will the bill come into force?

[Jozsa] According to the plans, only the rules on forming the committees and their activities will come into force when the law is announced; the other rules will come into force on 1 July.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Does this mean that we cannot expect any examinations before the elections?

[Jozsa] It would be technically impossible to begin the examinations earlier. However, this will not be a problem because the examinations will have to be started right after the new Parliament is formed. The law does not actually extend to the parliamentary candidates, therefore, this cannot influence the decision of the voters.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] In what period of time does the examination of these people have to be completed?

[Jozsa] The law stipulates one year; all these people have to be examined during this period. The same will happen if someone takes up his position later; his examination will have to be completed within one year of his taking up his position. The law will remain in force until July 2000; therefore, the Parliament formed after the 1998 elections will also be examined.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] The bill does not envisage the application of sanctions, but can people who are found to have cooperated with the III/III service expect to face legal consequences as far as their employment is concerned?

[Jozsa] No, but this would be out of the question in the case of people in elected positions. The law stipulates public humiliation as the only sanction. I believe that this will make everyone think, and former agents will voluntarily leave after—or even before—the examination. It is worth mentioning here that, in addition to former III/III members, the law also applies to all those people who regularly received agents' reports because of their position, namely the former secretaries of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee, the former members of the Political Committee, and former prime ministers, interior ministers, and defense ministers.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Are you planning to examine the candidates before filling positions that fall under the government's sphere of authority?

[Jozsa] The law does not give authority for this. Prior examination cannot be a condition for employment because this would be against the Constitution. Therefore, if someone is later found to have, for example, cooperated with Department III/III, public humiliation can be the only sanction in this area, too. At the same time, naturally, the person who makes the appointments will try to find people with immaculate past records in other ways; for example, a statement by the candidate could be a solution. However, a false statement cannot have legal consequences as far as employment is concerned.

New Commander Views Army Tasks, Development

AU0403123994 Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 5 Mar 94 pp 45-46

[Interview with Janos Deak, newly appointed commander of the Hungarian Army, by Andras Peto; place and date not given: "Our Eyes Were Opened Too Late"]

[Text] [Peto] It seems that since the beginning of last week the world has again become bipolar: International conflicts cannot be settled without Russia. Will all this affect Hungary's military role in the Yugoslav crisis?

[Deak] Russia has always been and will continue to be a great military power. We soldiers can only rejoice that the air attack in Bosnia failed to materialize and that the two previously opposing great military powers are now engaged in dialogue. This has also been noticeable from a military viewpoint lately and it has perhaps contributed to easing the Yugoslav tension. Our crisis prevention and crisis management concepts were approved by our prime minister and president at the end of 1991, and at the end of 1993, starting with the defense law and the constitutional modifications, the president again approved the concepts presented by Prime Minister Boross. The essence of our concept is that the Hungarian Republic should stay away from the Yugoslav conflict. Such a position was reaffirmed after Yugoslav bombs were dropped at Barcs in November 1991. Since then, we have maintained a steady, correct, but distanced contact with both the Yugoslav and Croatian military leadership; we do not yet have Bosnian contacts. The most tense period was perhaps the second half of 1991 and the first half of 1992, when we had to apply a larger

number of troops and expenses to strengthen our air defense and to deploy radar units. There is no direct threat on our borders now. Until the the NATO deadline expired, we strengthened our preparedness. Our air force units are on constant alert, and we can even increase this alert in tenser periods by increasing the level of combat readiness of one or two aircraft. Regarding our ground forces we will strengthen the surveillance units and services at some bases if necessary, and we will increase the efficiency of leadership; this means that, if necessary, we will keep the individual operational groups within individual headquarters. Obviously, it is important to have cooperation and contacts with the countries in question, including Yugoslavia.

[Peto] Would the Hungarian military approach to the Yugoslav crisis have been different if NATO had shown greater readiness to accept the Hungarian request to join the organization?

[Deak] This is a political question, not a military one. From a military viewpoint, we can only advise our state leaders to proceed from the interests of our small country.

[Peto] In one of your recent statements you said that the Hungarian officers are not leftist in their political orientation. How can one draw this conclusion in the Hungarian Army, which is so sensitive about its apolitical character?

[Deak] In accordance with the new defense law, the officer corps of the Hungarian Army cannot carry out party policy activity, and officers cannot be members of a political party. This was the desire of most of our officers. The Hungarian officers are neither leftist nor rightist in orientation; they are Hungarian military officers. Regarding the composition of our officer corps, it is quite different from the eight or 10 years ago. At the moment, there are 13,500 officers serving in the Hungarian Army; some 5,500 have retired, moved into the reserves, or taken up a different job since the change of regime. There has been a complete change of personnel in army headquarters, and the heads of main army groups and heads of army groups today are people who did not serve in these positions before 1989. Among the middle-level commanding officers, no one served as army corps commander or brigadier general before. And some of the old political officers left the army and some of them are working in various professional positions. The lieutenants and first lieutenants who are coming into the service now began their military studies in 1989. I do not even want to know who means what by leftist or rightist; it is pointless to deal with this issue in the army. I do not believe that our officers think about their political affiliations. It is another matter that the officers are rather sensitive socially. This is understandable when you consider that a lieutenant's pay is about 17,000-18,000 forints.

[Peto] However, many people think that the Hungarian army officers have been given a strong ideological training.

[Deak] One can make someone hate ideology through training. Otto Habsburg said that he has travelled a lot throughout the world and when he met an anti-Soviet man in Africa, the man probably graduated from Lumumba University in Moscow; if someone does not like the Americans, he probably studied in America. Besides, the number of hours dedicated to the study of Marxism-Leninism at the military academies fell well short of the number of similar hours in the civilian universities. In my opinion, most officers have always served in the army because they liked being soldiers, and party membership was almost an automatic prerequisite for this job. That time is past. We did not know the situation and we did not have information. If I want to describe things simply and shortly, I must say that our eyes were opened too late. We lived in isolation, in army barracks and in housing developments, and we read the official newspapers; people who had a different television aerial and could watch a different program came under special surveillance. After all, everyone made sure they kept the rules of the game if they wanted to stay in the army.

[Peto] In 1989 the army was separated from the Defense Ministry in order to formalize its apolitical character. With the new defense law, this situation has been practically reversed: the defense minister has the right to give orders to the army commander. And the minister has just become a party chairman and the Defense Ministry public administration state secretary is also the military expert of the same party; and the same party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], provides the political secretary too. One cannot exclude the possibility that, after the elections, the Defense Ministry will come under similarly strong control of another party. Do you think that, by this, the army has become an instrument of party interests and its character as a national institution has ceased?

[Deak] We are completely independent of the parties, and we want to stay independent. I must say that the separation of the Defense Ministry and Army Headquarters in 1989 was done in a very brutal way. A lot of administrative and ministerial tasks remained with army headquarters. On the basis of the new defense law, the army is controlled from various sides: the president of the republic, Parliament, the government, and the minister. Without going into detail, I must conclude that the authority of both president and Parliament has become stronger. As he himself used to say, on entering the ministry building, the minister ceases to be a party man, and the army commander continues to have his former authority. The army is led by its commander. The ruling defense minister can only give orders to the army commander, and he can only ask for a report from the army commander. Any order has legal consequences, and this means that an order can only be issued on something that has legal conditions. The essential thing is that the

defense minister manages his ministry on the basis of the law and regulations; he must accept responsibility for the budget and supplying the army, and he must supervise distribution and consumption; the ministry is also the army's legal representative, but the minister is not a commander. This is the difference compared with the old ways. The administrative state secretary cannot have any control whatever over the army and its headquarters.

[Peto] In any case, regarding the legal status of the state secretaries, the law says that the professional activity of the ministry is directed by the administrative state secretary, although some of the military leadership's tasks have been placed under the ministry's control.

[Deak] The Defense Ministry will most probably be a special ministry. The bloc within the ministry that will make up the country's actual military leadership will have to fulfill at least three tasks, namely to coordinate the military professional parts of the ministry, carry out the classic strategic and tactical planning activities of headquarters, and operate as a military command. The aforementioned tasks of the state secretary cannot apply to the military bloc in the ministry.

[Peto] At your parliamentary hearing, you said that it was not a good idea to include elements of an economic organization in the defense budget. What do you think would be the right thing, and what can be done with the funds available?

[Deak] We are in a very difficult situation. For us to be free of economic difficulties, our budget would neet to be a few billion forints bigger. The budget envisages a compulsory income of 8 billion forints for us, but presumably we will not be able to fulfill this because no one wants to buy our deserted barracks and we have no weapons to sell.

[Peto] Thinking of the Lupis [investment] scandal, the circulation of money does not seem to be a definitely military virtue.

[Deak] The army should definitely keep away from such activity. Even if it happens at other ministries, the Hungarian Army should not be obliged to generate income. The budget should cover our expenses! Maintaining the technical level of our equipment is at least as important as providing housing, clothing, food, and training for our soldiers. Without the latter, lives could be endangered. We have often declared our priorities: air defense, leadership, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. In addition, we have tasks originating from the recent partnership for peace program and peacekeeping activities. According to the new budget, we can spend 160-170 forints a day on food, but the soldiers have to be housed and given books to read, television to watch and tape recorders, as well as training. One cannot stress enough the importance of training, and all this costs a lot of money. For example, this year we cannot take our aircraft to the Baltic Sea to shoot live ammunition because we do not have the necessary 200 million forints. For example, a small portable air-defense missile costs 800,000 forints. Of course, it would be cheaper to train on simulators in the long run, but these simulators also have to be purchased, and they are very expensive too. A tank simulator costs 30 million forints, and an anti-armor missile costs more than 100,000 forints. But let me not only complain: A pilot flies 80 hours a year, and this is more than in any country in our neighborhood; we are training the MIG-20 squadron and placing it in operation; we carry out subunit exercises with live ammunition too; and we are continuing to train of commanders. I find the battalion- level exercises very important, but all this costs a lot of money and we are using our reserves. As the State Auditing Office showed us, we must reexamine our budget and administrative systems. Besides, any activity that has no connection with military life is quite alien to me. In any case, I hope the recent financial affair was a big lesson, and the consequences must be born by the relevant people.

Socialist Party Issues Election Program

AU0803110994 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 4 Mar 94 pp 10-11

["The Election Program of the Hungarian Socialist Party"]

[Text] Hungary is again facing elections. It will decide whether to give four more years of rule to those who turned incompetence into a government policy and who lectured the people instead of serving them. Hungary will decide whether to keep in power those who further deteriorated the economic situation and brought the economy to the verge of collapse, people whose failure is reflected in an unemployment rate of almost 1 million, the fall of the middle classes, massive poverty, the hopeless situation of Hungarian agriculture, and the spread of corruption. Hungary will decide whether to continue to give credit to those who kept breaking their promises.

Contrary to its promises, this government has not become a government of freedom, because it is constantly attacking the institutions of freedom, and especially the press. It has not become the nation's government because, instead of cooperation, it caused a fateful division. It has not become a European government, because its policy is antiquated and it propagates ideas that have been obsolete in the better part of our continent for half a century, and it opened the way to extreme right-wing efforts. It has not become the government of economic change either; instead, it has become a government of wasted opportunities. This government is responsible to the voters for all this.

According to the socialists, it is the government that failed, and not democracy and the market economy. We are facing difficult years, because the wasted confidence and time and the wasted goods and resources cannot be regained. The situation is not hopeless only because there is a choice. This country can be led out of the crisis

and the conditions for national prosperity can be created with an honest and competent policy supported by society. The Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] offers such a policy to the voters.

Our program aims at Hungary's economic and social modernization. We want a modern society based on an efficient economy, one connecting economic rationality with social solidarity, social care and modern education that reduce inequalities of chances, protection of human rights and universal human values, and the protection of nature and the environment.

We believe that there is no way back! Hungary cannot be led back into the deadend of either five or 50 years ago. We must again take the road that the nation set out on with full consensus in 1989- 1990, a road from which the nation was diverted by the coalition. We do not promise a new change in the regime; instead, we promise a foreseeable future that will again lay the foundations for the people's lost faith. We want a change, not chaos.

A Change in the Economy! [subhead]

We offer an economic policy that will halt the decline within two years and will lead us out of the crisis and create the conditions of a lasting growth of 1-3 percent annually. We offer firm legal frameworks, predictable economic conditions, and venture-oriented financial possibilities. Our program protects Hungary from an unforeseeable increase in our domestic and foreign debt and from rampant inflation. We will force the decline of the forint to between 15-20 percent within four years.

The essence of our economic policy is to reduce our economy's lack of capital, reduce its technological backwardness and, thus, increase its competitiveness. We will encourage projects, investments, and savings accordingly. We are determined to halt state waste and limit government expenditures. We will increase the pace of economic restructuring and will create the necessary legal and economic regulations as well as the institutions that are still missing.

We will attribute special attention to broadening the foreign markets of Hungarian products, especially rebuilding some of the lost East European markets.

Our economic policy program pays particular attention to the budget reform, the modernization of the Hungarian banking system, the development of infrastructure, the revival of agriculture, the structural reorganization and modernization of our processing industry, and to tourism.

We are striving to develop a political, legal, and economic environment in which an active capital of at least $1-1.5 billion annually will flow into Hungary, a capital essential for laying the foundations of economic growth and servicing our foreign debt. Our goal is that foreign capital should primarily serve the spreading of modern technology as well as the modernization of our infrastructure, including transportation, telephone services, public services, and settlement development.

An Honest and Efficient Privatization

We want an economy based on the decisive role of individual and partnership private property, one that guarantees the equal rights of various forms of property. We believe that the economy functions efficiently through the interest of natural owners.

We want to get rid of the current privatization practice. We will continue to privatize the state property, but for the benefit of increasing economic efficiency, preserving the domestic market of competitive Hungarian products, and securing technological development and employment. We will eliminate the State Property Managing Company Ltd and will restore parliamentary control over the State Property Agency. We will use the funds originating from the selling of state property to improve the viable companies, create new jobs, and cover the debts of state enterprises.

We support the participation of small investors and employees in the privatization process, but we oppose the free distribution of property. We will provide an active property to the local self- government bodies and forms of public foundations to educational, cultural, scientific, and sports institutions. We want to prevent large-scale dismissals and production reductions with guarantees stipulated in the privatization contracts.

We reject the distribution of property and positions to compensate for political services, but we respect property acquired through privatization, as any legally-acquired property. We will take a stand against abuses connected with privatization and corruption through publicity and with every legal means.

Agriculture: Market and Production Security!

We want to put an end to the disintegration of the agricultural sector. Our program serves the foundation of a modern and competitive agriculture and of a secure future for peasants. We will conclude the process of compensations. We will reexamine the debts of agricultural farms and will temporarily halt the land tax.

Our agricultural policy is in favor of agricultural cooperatives; at the same time, it creates identical rights and conditions and provides identical defense to all agricultural producers and owners. In the course of privatization, our program provides an opportunity for domestic producers to become owners both in processing and marketing. Our program limits the emergence of monopolies.

Our program would eliminate the chaos prevailing on the producers' market and will offer improving incomes to producers. In a short time, we will halt the decrease in agricultural production and will lay the foundations for an annual growth of 3-5 percent.

By gradually stabilizing the standard of living, we will halt the drop in domestic consumption, including the drop in food consumption. We will improve the competitiveness of our food production. For this, we will introduce a market defense used in the West, and we will initiate the broadening of the framework of the agreement signed with the European Union and an improvement in the marketing conditions of Hungarian products.

Unemployment: Human Tragedy and Economic Shackles

We cannot promise the complete elimination of unemployment. Not even a spectacular economic growth is capable of eliminating the current unemployment rate of almost 1 million; on the contrary, unemployment itself becomes the main obstacle to economic growth. We can only change this situation by counting on our society's resources and solidarity.

We want to prolong the training and instruction period so that young people can seek employment later and with better chances. We will gradually assert the right to the first job. We want to free jobs by introducing part-time employment and a flexible retirement system.

We offer an economic policy that also considers employment factors in order to save jobs. We support the creation of jobs through a new investment policy, the development of infrastructure, and public utility work. In the course of this activity, we will pay particular attention to helping the backward areas to catch up.

We will reduce the number of unemployed people to about 500,000 by 1998 by means of coordinated economic decisions. We will encourage the unemployed to find jobs by providing adequate unemployment benefits and active employment help, without forcing people. We will make their situation more bearable by means of a humane administration.

Legal Security and Democracy in the Employment Field!

It is only possible to solve the economic and social crisis on the basis of a broad social agreement. In preserving social peace, we attribute a key role to the coordination of interests of the employers, employees and the government and to the active system of social partnership. We regard the trade unions as natural allies in the implementation of our program.

We want to strengthen legal security in the employment field. We will guarantee increased labor rights to women, people raising small children, and people with reduced working capacity. We will encourage collective agreements with political and legal means.

A Proper Human Environment! Help for Backward Areas To Catch Up!

The value of environmental protection expenditures is extremely low in Hungary. The deterioraton of the natural and built environment is so big that it threatens the healthy human life and the quality of work. Our program will increase the environmental protection expenditure threefold in the next four years. We want to cover the expenses from public funds, but the correction of new environmental damages will be paid by the polluters themselves. We want to focus our resources on halting the pollution of our air and waters, saving the forests, and spreading environmental protective and energy-saving technologies. We will initiate the legislation of modern and strict laws for the protection of nature and the environment; we will particularly support the information and educational programs connected with environmental protection.

We regard the development of backward areas and the easing of problems of village areas with critical employment and supply conditins as basic tasks, and we also attribute great importance to avoiding the extreme division of the country. We will set up institutions of regional coordination in charge of working out local and regional development programs. We want to create a harmony between initiatives based on local resources and efforts and the central development programs. We will initiate the legislation of a law on regional conditions and tasks as soon as possible.

A Just Distribution of Public Burdens and A More Thrifty State Budget!

We think it is just when everyone shares in public burdens in accordance with one's ability. Within the tax system, we want to reduce the burden of personal income tax and increase the percentage of consumer taxes. This would make it more difficult to avoid taxes. We will considerably increase the corporate tax, and we will make the invested incomes free of tax; however, we will tax the accumulation of property. We will eliminate the tax on the interest on forint and hard currency saving accounts and the minimum tax, and we will restore the tax exemptions encouraging the foreign investors. We will reduce the exceptions and benefits. Along with reducing the central taxes, we will increase the right of local government bodies to levy taxes.

Today two-thirds of the income is taken by the budget. This is an unbearably high percentage, but it can only be reduced gradually. We want to pay particular attention to the reform of state administration and to the reduction of expenses, deficit, and income withdrawal. We will primarily save on wasteful and inefficient political, state power and administrative expenses.

We want to stabilize the tax system in order to create a predictable economic environment. It will be impossible to carry out a considerable tax reduction in the next four years, but it is possible to avoid the increase in taxes. The social security payments that seriously burden wages can only be reduced gradually, along with the reorganization of the welfare system and the development of supplementary insurance.

A Stronger Social Security!

The source of the most severe tensions in the coming years is that welfare expenses can only increase slightly. However, the burdens of the most helpless strata of the society cannot be increased any more. Therefore, we need a reorganization of the welfare system in which help really reaches those eligible to get such help.

Instead of the humiliating eligibility investigations, the conditions of social welfare must be regulated by laws and local rules. By modifying the welfare law, we want to increase the basic social rights and expand the circle of recipients. Within the welfare expenses, we will curb the bureaucratic administrative and supervision expenses. We want to encourage the welfare activity of various civil organizations (associations, foundations, church services, and so on) by tax exemptions.

We want to preserve the real value of family allowances among the low and middle strata of the population. We will make the child- care benefits a citizen right, and an active grandparent who accepts the rearing of a child will also be able to get such benefits. We think that it is correct for the families to receive support, rather than the institutions, if these families enroll their children in nurseries and kindergartens.

We intend to take preventive measures for the benefit of children and youngsters living in an endangered environment. We will strengthen both the legal and institutional background of the bodies in charge of this and of the follow-up care.

The social security self-governing bodies are the independent and responsible organizations of social security. We will strengthen their role by providing them property and broadening their rights.

We want to make sure that pensions at least increase simultaneously with the net average salaries. We will guarantee income supplements as citizens' rights to people over 70 years of age who totally or partially lack any care. We will gradually introduce a widows pension supplement. We will introduce delaying measures for the benefit of women most affected by the increased retirement age. We will work out a flexible system of retirement, so that the people in question can choose the most favorable of the given alternatives.

We are fighting against poverty, not against prosperity. However, the process of pauperization can be halted at the end of the next government period at the earliest. Poverty that humiliates human dignity is everyone's shame. The economy cannot get into such a situation that anyone starves or freezes in the street. We regard the need for the society to jointly and obligatorily help its fallen members as a minimum of human solidarity.

Everyone has the right to basic health care. We want to guarantee the circle and quality of services within the compulsory health insurance by law. It is essential to settle the financial situation of health-care institutions and the wages of health workers. We will help the creation of private practices and the operation of other health and welfare ventures with adequate credits and tax exemptions. We will initiate a national cooperation in preventing illnesses leading to early death or physical impairment and in encouraging and spreading a healthy way of life.

A Chance for Sports!

We regard physical exercise as an important part of a healthy way of life. Therefore, first of all, we want to settle the legal situation and ownership of the sports associations in order to save the competitive sports, the student, and leisure-time sports. We suggest that the sport clubs receive the facilities they use in the form of public foundations. We suggest that both private persons and economic units be able to deduct their support for sports from their taxes.

We initiate the legislation of a sports law that will put the entire issue in a uniform framework and will create institutional conditions for the development of competitive sports, student sports, and leisure sports.

Housing Also for People With Low Incomes!

We will work out a system of housing support that will provide two-thirds of the relevant state funds to low-income families. We will help the construction of new housing projects with full reimbursement of value added tax.

We suggest that the state should provide support to local government bodies for the development of plots with public utilities suitable for housing construction and for the construction of social housing. We will help young people acquire their first housing with new and advantageous credits. We find it extremely important to spread the housing management ventures in towns, something that serves the mobility of the population. We want to support the construction of family houses that guarantee several generations living together. We will encourage this program with adequate credits, tax benefits, and proper inheritance rules.

A Modern and Democratic Education!

As a basic condition of modernization, education is one of the breaking points where we must focus the available resources. In the wake of the state administration reform, we will halt the decrease in the real value of educational expenditures by 1996, and we will gradually increase it later.

We want to increase the duration of the general and uniform basic education, and provide increasingly broader chances for secondary education. With the introduction of new training forms, we want to guarantee studies in vocational institutions and institutions of higher education for an increased number of young people older than the compulsory schooling age.

We want to stabilize the schooling system. We will support new institutional forms that exclude the need for an early career and school choice, reduce the division of families according to their financial situation, and guarantee the progress of talented children. It is our basic goal to provide school textbooks free of charge to children in a disadvantageous situation. We will take measures to expand the supply of cheap catering for students. In higher education, we will provide social scholarships and exemption from tuition fees for students in need.

We support the extension of the freedom of instruction. According to the social demands, needs, and support, we regard the strengthening of church and private schools as important. At the same time, we think it is the obligation of the state to guarantee an ideologically-neutral education. We oppose the instruction of religion or any other organized activity based on ideology in state schools.

We will eliminate the Educational District Instruction Centers, and will restore the independence of public education institutions, colleges and universities. We will make sure that the state can only appoint leaders to the state institutions who enjoy the support of most of the teachers and most of the council members of the respective college or university. We regard the ability of the educational institutions to use their own property freely as a guarantee of the autonomy of higher education. We regard the improvement in the training, retraining, and living and working conditions of the teachers as essential. We will assert the rights of student bodies by creating the necessary conditions.

National and Universal Values in Culture!

We want to serve Hungary's spiritual prosperity and the preservation of our national culture. Our goal is to develop a spiritual environment and social public mood in this country that is favorable to the acceptance of an intellectual role suitable for a modern society at the turn of the century, namely to contribute to the financial and spiritual prosperity of the entire nation by enriching culture in the widest sense of the word, to make it open to anything new and thus help laying the foundations of our prosperity, and to constantly signal the disturbances in the functioning of the society and the mistakes of the prevailing government.

We want to guarantee the complete freedom of culture, namely of knowledge, research, arts, religion, publication, and creation. The state cannot interfere in the culture as a guider in any way whatsoever. However, it is the task of the state to maintain the national institutions, guarantee their operational conditions, and work out the legal regulations regarding cultural activity. Cultural centers, libraries, and some of the other institutions engaged in the spreading of culture have preserved their ability to function so far. It is also a task for the state and the local bodies to continue to maintain these institutions and to restore and save those in danger. We are urging, and we will encourage with tax benefits, the contribution of local government bodies, public foundations, civil organizations, private persons, and economic units in supporting culture.

We regard the freedom and independence of scientific and technical research as a natural condition. We support the independence and democratic structural reorganization of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

The Hungarian Radio and the Hungarian Television will continue to play a special role in informing, educating, entertaining the population, and in exercising a democratic control over the government. On the basis of the bitter experience of the past two years, we think that a law separating the mass media from the prevailing government, political forces and balance of power will guarantee an objective, multilateral, and clear information. We find state ownership over the press incompatible with the freedom of the press.

Independent Churches and Free Religious Life

Spiritual freedom means the freedom of religious people and non- religious people alike. We respect the independence of the churches: They should be independent of the state and should not engage in the political struggle on either side.

We highly appreciate the role of the churches in supporting the ill, the old, and the fallen, and we acknowledge their activity in education. The churches must also receive budget support for this.

We fully accept the rights of the churches to have their property restored. Our goal is to see to it that that this process takes place as soon as possible, to the extent of public support and actual church activity, with the consideration of material and financial conditions, and by coordinating the different interests. We want to assert the spiritual and religious freedom and the peaceful coexistence of believers and non-believers in everyday practice in cooperation with the churches.

Public Security

We find it particularly important that the citizens feel that they, their families, and their property are safe. The defense of life and values precedes every other task. For this, it is essential to increase the number of policemen, improve their professional training and technical equipment, and provide financial appreciation of the police staff.

We need a firm, but not a violent, police. It is expedient to shift some of the tasks related to public road control and administration to the local government bodies and give them rights with which they can influence and control the activity of the police. The aforementioned changes can only lead to results if society supports the cause of public safety and the various civil organizations help this cause.

A More Complete Democracy and a Cheaper State!

There is no, nor can there be, political interest for us the assertion of which could precede the values of parliamentary democracy. We consistently defend the principles of a constitutional state, the democratic institutions, and the human, national minority, social, and cultural rights. We want a firm bourgeois democratic regime. We want to formulate the foundations of such a regime in a new constitution that expresses the requirements of a social constitutional state.

We will attribute greater role than hitherto to the direct forms of democracy, to the participation of citizens and their communities in the decisions. In accordance with the requirements of social partnership, we will systematize public dialogue in the legislative process. We want to create a system of public supervision and control over public foundations created by the government.

We want parliament to play a genuine role in supervising the government and we want to strengthen the Parliament's character of shaping policy. We want to declare the assertion of ministerial responsibility in the form of a law.

We want to broaden the role of the president of the republic, and we find it necessary to create his independent tasks and authority. We suggest to eliminate the uncertainty prevailing in the president's constitutional status. We will initiate the direct election of major public figures by the citizens.

We find it essential to assert the independence of judges and of their power. We think it is correct if judges 'ecide on their leaders.

We want and offer a more thrifty, professional, and efficient government and public administration. We will limit the spreading of government bureaucracy. At the same time, we want to increase the freedom and responsibility of citizens and their communities, civil organizations, and self-government bodies. We will cut bureaucratic expenses considerably: We will initiate the elimination of compensation offices, decentralized government offices, and some ministries, or the reduction of their personnel. We will reexamine the position of minister without portfolio. However, we will strengthen the organization of justice administration, police, customs, and tax authorities.

We need non-party-affiliated public servants independent of government changes, civil officers who deserve social and financial appreciation on the basis of their professional knowledge and honesty. We must finally do away with the property-hoarding personnel policy.

Our goal is to develop self-government bodies that serve the citizens. For this, we will initiate the modification of the law on self-government bodies. We find the direct election of mayors and the expansion of the authority of local referenda justified. We want to eliminate the regional institution of republic commissioner; a small county office is sufficient to replace the republic commissioner. At the same time, we want to strengthen the role of elected county bodies.

We will continue to play an initiative role in the assertion of the individual and community rights of national minorities living in Hungary and in the consistent implementation of the law on national minorities. We support the creation of national minority self- government bodies and a change in the national minority education. We will pay particular attention to supporting the relevant efforts of the Gypsy population.

We think that a smaller army than today is necessary, one gradually modernizing, an armed force respected and appreciated by the society, an army that carries out Hungary's defense with a well- trained staff free of politics and subordinated to the country's interests. Just as it is natural that the organizational order of the Army is based on strict discipline and relations of subordinates and superiors, the same way we can expect that human rights are fully implemented in the Army. We will attribute particular attention to supporting such efforts by the Gypsy population.

Rapprochement With Our Neighbors and Living As Hungarians in Europe

We offer a historical rapprochement and reconciliation to Hungary's neighbors. In our foreign policy, there is no place for reminding of historical grievances, a mission awareness, or ideological considerations. We are ready for clarifying debates and new initiatives in order to lay the foundations of good neighborly relations. We want to trade, rather than engage in litigations.

We think that the security and stability of Central and Eastern Europe can be strengthened by confirming the borders in the international law and fully asserting the rights of national minorities. We find it essential to mutually build confidence, develop bilateral relations and regional cooperation, and to make the borders open. We want to serve the full assertion of the rights of Hungarians living abroad and the acceptance of autonomy efforts in harmony with European norms with a firm and calm policy. We will continue to take a stand at international forums for the creation of an efficient system of national minority protection.

We can only guarantee the foreign resources and markets indispensable for the development of the Hungarian economy if Hungary becomes full member of the European Union. The domestic conditions for joining the European Union must be created as soon as possible. It is necessary to further develop Hungary's relations with NATO, but NATO-membership is not the only possible guarantee for Hungary's security. A referendum must decide on joining the European Union and NATO.

The Hungarian Socialist Party relies on the best traditions of the 1,100-year past of this nation, the lively political and spiritual heritage of the great figures of our nation, and on the current special historical possibility in

which the people can decide on their own fate. The MSZP wants to serve the citizens, and does not ask services from them. The MSZP promises, but does not keep promising.

In harmony with the aforementioned political program, we formulated our concrete, detailed, and professionally-founded ideas that could provide the basis of government activity. If we gain the voters' confidences, we will count not only on those who voted for us, because we need the support of every Hungarian citizen for solving the tasks of coming years. The next government will not receive a 100-day period of grace, because Hungary's situation demands immediate action.

We call for social peace. Crisis management needs consensus: on a clear agreement between the government and society on the goals to be attained, on the distribution of burdens, and on compensation to be given to those whose interests are hurt. We need a consensus between generations according to which the current generations will not be sacrificed on the altar of the future, and future generations will not become victims of the present either. We cannot promise exemption from difficulties for the young people, but we can promise a predictable future.

No government can work wonders. However, the Socialists would start this country on the road leading out of this crisis and we would get over the hard part by the end of the government period, by 1998. We promise an honest, professional, calm, and rational government that takes every citizen into consideration as an individual, and we promise protection to the fallen, reduction of uncertainty and helplessness, and the suppression of corruption.

The democratic left based on social democratic values is capable of achieving these goals. This political force simultaneously represents the freedom that creates democracy, equality of chances based on justice, and solidarity that expresses brotherhood.

The stakes are very high: Whether we will succeed in laying the foundations for Hungary's progress in the coming four years, or we will helplessly drift to the level of the third world. The MSZP does not promise salvation; it offers a solution. The MSZP Congress.

Border Cooperation Agreement Signed With Ukraine

LD0703171694 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1304 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Zamosc, 7 Mar—Today Colonel Andrzej Stasiak, head of the Provincial Civil Defense Inspectorate, said that an agreement has been signed in Zamosc on border cooperation between the civil defense services in Zamosc province and Volyn Oblast in Ukraine.

Using this opportunity, the Ukrainian side, represented by Anatoliy Arkhipov, head of the Civil Defense Headquarters in Volyn Oblast, and Mykola Tarasenko, head of the defense and extraordinary situations department, spoke for the first time about the border enterprises that have toxic industrial products and the nuclear power station in Rovno. The representatives of Zamosc province and Volyn Oblast decided that enterprises on both sides of the border no longer post any threats.

The agreement signed today anticipates the creation of information and warning systems in case of extraordinary dangers. Among other things, it envisages cooperation in the event of a breakdown at nuclear power stations, radioactive contamination, and natural disasters that put human lives in danger, and in eliminating the consequences of disasters. [passage omitted] A similar agreement with civil defense services in Lvov district is planned.

Cimoszewicz on Coalition, Constitution, Law

AU0803120794 Poznan WPROST in Polish 6 Mar 94 pp 13-14

[Interview with Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, deputy prime minister and minister of justice, by Piotr Gabryel and Marek Krol; place and date not given: "A Country of Anarchists"]

[Excerpts] [WPROST] Is there such a thing as an SLD-PSL [Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party] coalition?

[Cimoszewicz] Yes. If we are to survive in politics, we have to accept the coalition. But show me a government in recent years that did not have any internal conflicts. There is nothing unusual about the fact that, after several months in office, there is a need to reexamine various issues, which we do at meetings of the so-called directorate—in other words, an informal gathering of coalition representatives. We do not mind the fact that PSL and SLD politicians hold various views, including on the subject of forming a government and the kind of information policy it should pursue.

[WPROST] Can one describe this government as Pawlak's "own" government?

[Cimoszewicz] According to the Constitution, the prime minister has the power to reach the kind of decisions he has just reached in relation to the deputy prime minister [Pawlak fired him]. On the other hand, the present government is based on two parties and that determines its method of functioning. Unfortunately, the Constitution does not envisage such a thing as a Government Presidium. Providing the government leadership with prestige is quite another matter.

[WPROST] But an absence of detailed regulations make it easier to mollify coalition members and turn the entire coalition into an illusory body.

[Cimoszewicz] That depends on the way one interprets events. I think it is too soon to say that the coalition is illusory. Our coalition requires a consolidation of its structures. We want certain political provisions to be set in writing so that we might know who is responsible for what. Only if we prove incapable of creating proper mechanisms for the functioning of the coalition will there be a danger that the coalition is incapable of functioning efficiently.

[WPROST] A danger for whom?

[Cimoszewicz] If the coalition experienced problems with trying to survive, the SLD would be in a difficult situation because, on its own, it might not be able to act effectively and implement its preelection pledges. [passage omitted]

[WPROST] Is Poland a democratic country, as the Constitution says it is?

[Cimoszewicz] It is trying to become one. We will succeed in turning it into a democratic country, but the day that happens is a very long way off. This involves not so much legislation as social consciousness and the attitudes of politicians. The law is still regarded as a means to an end. Even in recent years, violations of the law have been excused on grounds of so-called necessity. The civic ombudsman says that, in 1993, there were more violations of civic rights than before. [passage omitted]

[WPROST] Do you agree that the establishment of a law-governed state will be very difficult without a new constitution?

[Cimoszewicz] Unfortunately, even the present parliament might have problems with it, and even if it satisfies the formal requirements. If Lech Walesa were to put into practice some of the things members of the Presidential Chancellery have been saying, he would be playing a destructive role. Nothing can justify using the Constitution for the purpose of pursuing a political contest. I would be happier if the government concentrated on social and economic policy this year because that is the main source of conflict. [passage omitted]

[WPROST] Either we have a law-governed country or one ruled by the fist of stronger groups who win privileges for themselves at society's expense.

[Cimoszewicz] I am very upset about what I would describe as an anarchistic, unimaginative approach

toward the affairs of one's own country. We are observing increasing egoism among professional groups that are convinced that they have to reap maximum benefits for the state. Frequently, we encounter the snowball effect—one group stages a demonstration for the sake of some benefit or concession and another sees this demonstration and follows suit. At the same time, we as a society fail to see that actions like this are suicidal for the state. We should consider which is better—a disintegration of what little resources we have, or the creation of a chance for the future.

[WPROST] How about a few examples?

[Cimoszewicz] Several years ago, a law on compensation for Stalinist persecution was passed. The lawmakers assumed that all affected persons would behave honorably and not make undue demands on the state's finances. But this year alone, 1.5 trillion zlotys has had to be allocated for compensation. It is the same with reprivatization. It costs trillions of zlotys just to restore property that was misappropriated in pursuance of the previous legislation. Every single claim involves material or legal interests. But the sum total of these interests is ruining the state.

Profile of SLD Deputy Prime Minister Candidate

LD0703193994 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1500 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Professor of Economics Dariusz Rosati is the official candidate of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] to the post of deputy prime minister and finance minister. Journalists were informed about this decision by the Alliance's press spokesman, Zbigniew Siemiatkowski.

[Reporter] The SLD leadership and that of the Polish Peasant Party, at a joint session on Saturday, gave their support to the candidature of Prof. Rosati, Zbigniew Siemiatkowski said. The deciding factors were the qualifications of the candidate, his wide experience, and the fact that he is well known in international economic circles.

On Saturday afternoon, the Alliance leader, Aleksander Kwasniewski, sent a letter regarding this matter to Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak. The prime minister is in touch with our candidate, Siemiatkowski said.

Prof. Rosati has spent the past few days in Warsaw. He is at present in Geneva, where, for the past three years, he has been working as an expert for the United Nations at the European Economic Commission.

Prof. Rosati is to return to Warsaw at the end of the week, Zbigniew Siemiatkowski said.

Now a few words about the candidate: He is in his forties, is not a member of any party, and had been a member of the Polish United Workers Party until its dissolution. He comes from Radom. He is married, with two children, and has outstanding qualifications and abilities for these posts, Zbigniew Siemiatkowski stressed.

Candidate Seeks Autonomy, Independence

LD0703210394 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2000 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Professor Dariusz Rosati is the candidate of the Democratic Left Alliance for the post of deputy prime minister and minister of finance. Monika Olejnik spoke to the professor, who is now working for the UN European Economic Commission in Geneva:

[Begin Rosati recording] I would like to have a sufficient degree of autonomy and independence in managing economic affairs, which would ensure the effectiveness of the economic policy. To put it briefly, the aim would be that the government should speak with one voice on economic affairs.

Second, I would like to have the approval of the prime minister and of those who will decide that it is I who should be looking after finances and economic affairs—an approval with respect to the general directions of economic policy—not just for three months but perhaps for a medium-term period. [end recording]

The coalition partners will discuss Prof. Rosati's candidacy on 8 March.

The president will decide whether to approve Prof. Rosati's nomination after his return to Poland, Andrzej Drzycimski, the president's spokesman, told PAP. Lech Walesa is returning to Poland tomorrow. Drzycimski said that the coalition should make decisions that are acceptable to the president. However, as to the question of whether the decision on Prof. Rosati's candidacy was acceptable to Walesa, Drzycimski only said: I do not know. Some time ago, the president said that he would not accept Rakowski [Poland's former communist prime minister].

Jaruzelski on Reforms, 1981 Martial Law, SLD

WS0703190094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 5-6 Mar 94 pp 11, 13-14

[Interview with General Wojciech Jaruzelski by Maciej Lukasiewicz; place and date not given: "Not All of the World's Sins; How Did It Happen?"]

[Text] *We continue with our exchange of opinions on the reality of the Third Republic. Did the shift to the left that occurred on 19 September of last year and the bitter defeat by Solidarity-derived parties result from mistakes by new political elites, were they a price that was paid for the radical reforms, or were they linked to broader processes occurring in postcommunist countries? What will Poland's political and economic future be like? What will happen next? And, above all, how did it happen that political parties deriving from the period of the Polish*

People's Republic [PRL] managed to return to power? These are the topics we would like to be the subject of common reflection.

So far, the following people have spoken out: Jerzy Holzer, Zdzislaw Najder, Tomasz Lubienski, Kazimierz Orlos, Jan Maria Rokita, Aleksander Hall, Stefan Bratkowski, Jerzy Surdykowski, Kazimierz Dziewanowski, Jozef Oleksy, Jerzy Giedroyc, Krzysztof Kozlowski, Aleksander Luczak, Slawomir Siwek, Aleksander Jerzy Wieczorkowski, and Marek Garztecki. Our interviewee today is General Wojciech Jaruzelski.

[Lukasiewicz] Did you expect a change of guard on 19 September of last year, and do you think that society, by voting, really was motivated by a yearning for the lost communist paradise?

[Jaruzelski] Let us begin with the paradise aspect. I do not know how it is up in heaven, but, as far as earth is concerned, nobody has ever succeeded in establishing a paradise here, nor will anybody succeed in doing so in the future. And that also applies to a capitalist paradise. It is precisely the illusion that the rejection of "communism" will make life better almost automatically for everybody and regarding everything that became one of the main reasons for social frustration and discontent. Disappointment is the kind of feeling that has the traits of a boomerang. But this time, it was a yearning not so much for the past as for the different. Nobody has any doubts anymore that the so-called real socialism is a closed chapter. To make it look better in an artificial manner, to try to erase mistakes, deformations, or anachronisms, would be both immoral and make no political sense. On the other hand, to ascribe all of the world's sins to real socialism would be false and opportunistic, and would also bring results that are the opposite of what had been intended—among other things, last year's 19 September election results are an example of that.

Every extremism must lose sooner or later. I knew that once the pendulum had made its move to one side, it was only a question of time before it began moving back to the opposite side—that is almost a regular phenomenon in democratic regimes. What I did not expect was that it was going to happen so quickly.

Was that, as you put it, a "change of guard"? Not quite. I would rather call it a half-turn. It is true that the current government is, as people often say, center-leftist. A center-leftist coalition has a big advantage in parliament. But there is also the president of the Republic of Poland who, although he tries to maintain a balance and be a patron to all Poles, clearly has been showing signs of being in favor of the "right-wing option," especially recently. Also, it is not the government or the parliament but the president who has a dominating impact on such key ministries as Defense, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs. One must also add to that the so-called fourth power—that is a majority of the mass media—which rather tends not to have the left wing in its good books, to put it in subtle terms. The future will show to what extent the current governing configuration will turn out permanent or constructive. That will also be a test of a feeling of responsibility for the country and of democratic manners by all participants of the political scene. I am hopeful that this Polish train of ours, although squeaking while moving and recently even with sparks flying, will eventually manage to avoid a derailing.

[Lukasiewicz] Postcommunists are returning to power also in other countries of the former Soviet bloc; their return is also expected in Hungary in the immediate future. What are the reasons for that phenomenon, and do you think the postcommunists will manage to bear responsibility for a consistent process of continuing with democratic and market reforms?

[Jaruzelski] The term "postcommunist" is currently a titular kind of phrase, one that is used more as an invective than as a substantive evaluation. The fact that somebody used to be a member of a communist party does not have to mean an uncritical "going back to the sources." Moreover, today many former members of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] are distancing themselves from the past in a vigorous manner. What is characteristic in that process is the spectacularity of the various personal transformations and conversions. As it turns out, a majority of them havealways been reform-oriented. That is perhaps not a nice thing from the perspective of political aesthetics. But, on the other hand, thanks to the wonderful nature of human memory, I think it is probably also frank. In that sense, it is also a positive phenomenon because the return to power of the so-called postcommunists is not something directly linked to political and economic systems. This is even more so because the leadership of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] derives in most cases from a reform-oriented trend within the former PZPR. My view is that the same, with modifications taking the party's nature into account, applies also to the leadership of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], which derives from the United Peasant Accord. After all, they are all definitely in favor of principles of parliamentary democracy, the market economy, and guaranteeing all civic freedoms. There is just the issue of the right instruments, the right proportions, and the rate of implementation of the process of political and economic transformations. By the way, from that standpoint, there are major differences also in the right-wing camp. On certain issues, some of the right-wing factions are outrightly populist and extremely left-wing.

The real left wing must be itself. There are certain socially universal, socialist values that are conformant with the spirit of a given time and that left-wing parties cannot abandon if they do not want to lose credibility or commit a historical discredit. The point is that, while implementing the necessary and, alas, painful economic reforms, while paying determinant attention to economic development, which means a prevalence of creative attitudes over ones that are about making claims, the point is to at the same time "keep your ear to the

ground," not to overdo it with the reforms, and to constantly have the supreme social goal in view. That is why I think it is precisely left-wing, or center-left-wing, forces that have the biggest chance for an effective implementation of the reforms. After all, the biggest problem is social resistance. By the way, that resistance is understandable. The joyous anesthetization of 4 June 1989 is over. The ongoing pain inflicted by the operation of reforms caused society to have rejected the "surgeons" in charge up to now, and also their elites, which, by the way, also suffered from infighting. Polish society has a great deal of grievance against the left wing, especially historical grievance. But society also knows that the left wing is, by definition and by virtue of the doctrines it is based on, at the same time more socially sensitive. That is why the West's reception of the election results was also quiet. For the West, the most important thing is stability in this part of Europe. It is precisely the center left wing that has the greatest chances to alleviate social unrest linked to the difficult process of transformations. A decomposition and a premature fall of the center left wing could bring various solutions to the surface, including extreme right-wing, populist, autocratic, or even exotic ones. Would that contribute to a widening of the social basis for the transformations and, consequently, to increasing the efficiency of the reforms? I doubt that.

[Lukasiewicz] But how would you assess, generally speaking, the four years of rule by the "surgeons"? What do you consider to be the biggest achievement of Solidarity-derived cabinets, and what do you think were their biggest mistakes? Also, could they really have avoided the mistakes, when you bear in mind that we were the first and that there had been no past cases of "leaving the [communist] system"?

[Jaruzelski] I do not want to sound grandiose or moralizing. I am a politician of the past, and I am aware of the very serious deficiencies of the past type of political and economic regime. I am also aware of my own responsibility, which I have never tried to evade, nor do I now. I appreciate the historical meaning of the changes that were accomplished during the four years. So much has been written about that, both in Poland and abroad, that it is not easy to say something original on the topic. Therefore, I will just mention two achievements that in my view are especially significant. In the social and political area, it is civic freedoms, broadly speaking. In the economic area, it is the convertibility of the zloty and the main consequences of that fact.

Words of my highest appreciation, though, go to the activity of the Tadeusz Mazowiecki government, which, in essence, was of a pioneer nature, and also to his personal contribution and his serious approach. I cannot imagine his making a statement that the communists ruined Poland more than the Nazis did, or showing the kind of doctrinal nonchalance toward social problems that was displayed by [former Prime Minister] Jan Krzysztof Bielecki. I also cannot imagine Mazowiecki being capable of waging the kinds of revenge-oriented emotions and file-checking brawls that were effected by the government of [former Prime Minister] Jan Olszewski. Finally, I also cannot imagine Mazowiecki displaying the kind of amazingly self-satisfactory frame of mind, faced with a difficult situation of social tensions, that was displayed by Hanna Suchocka's government.

On the other hand, my view is that, all in all, the biggest mistake by Solidarity-derived governments was this specific mixture of arrogance and naivete (by the way, from that perspective, these governments turned out to have a lot in common with many governments in the PRL). We all know the kind of message it was based on: We know how to do things best, there is no alternative to our ideas; only we, from the Solidarity-derived basis, have the right patent for reforms, and everybody else is genetically predisposed to be antireform; that is the line of thinking in a nutshell.

At this point, I would like to take a stand on the view that we [the Polish people] were the first, and there had been no past experiences of "leaving the system." As a matter of fact, we were the "second" in the years 1944-45, inasmuch as the events of 1917 had taken place before that. And it was precisely the transfer of those 1917 experiences that was the main reason for our failures, even if the extent to which those experiences were implemented in Poland was small and kept getting ever smaller. Still, recently, when we turned out to be "the first" this time around, the temptation of imitating someone else is what prevailed. True, the models were different and better this time, but still not all of them were implementable in Poland's situation. The syndrome of a "late comer" had its toll on the trend to imitate that I just mentioned, and also a desire to just skip some of the phases and achieve the standard of living and the way of life being applied in countries that are more developed than Poland—in particular, in economic terms. That is how all of the mindless following of somebody else came about—from Jeffrey Sachs's prescriptions to the clownery of Valentine's Day.

But it is not possible to ascribe all of the deficiencies exclusively to the governing elites. After all, these elites operate within the framework of a social and psychological situation, to the formation of which they also have contributed in some way—that must be said. And what was the situation like? Well, to use a columnist's style for a moment, the common bread-eaters expected luxury because, after all, the "communists" are no longer interfering this or that way, or stealing. Many people had the illusion that a moral revolution would take place in "our own house," that social pathologies would subside, and that people would just be better because, after all, the "communists" are no longer trampling on freedom, cheating, or showing bad moral examples to the nation. Many of the so-called independence-oriented activists were convinced that, once sovereignty was gained, one would be able to teach Moscow a lesson, while the West would take very good care of us in political, economic, and military terms.

But that did not materialize. It could not have. And that is one of the necessary costs of the systemwide transformation, of that "earthquake" that took place in this part of the globe. Was it possible to avoid these disappointments? Partially no, and partially yes. As far as I can recall, it was Schopenhauer who said that people who complain about their lot should remember that their fate was mainly shaped by stupid things they themselves did. It is beyond doubt an extreme view and one clearly biased toward polemics, but there is something rational about it. After all, how frequently all of us, former and current politicians, like to ascribe all failures to a difficult legacy, a disadvantageous domestic and foreign situation, and mainly to mistakes committed by our predecessors. And, although in many cases such a position is justified, it also has a demobilizing effect in a way and directs our attention to the past, not to the future.

[Lukasiewicz] I must ask you to provide some of your own reflections pertaining to your own role and activity: What do you consider the biggest achievement and the biggest failure in your own life story?

[Jaruzelski] Is turning 70 years of age not a success? When one has behind oneself the experience of September 1939, a deportation to Siberia, a long war-front road of a sniper officer, and, finally, all of the stress and burden associated with decades of military service and political activity, there are reasons to be able to say all of this is a success. But there is a personal dimension. As far as the greatest political achievement is concerned, which, by the way, was shared by both sides of the political barricade and also by church representatives back then, I regard the "Roundtable" as the biggest achievement. Finally, I treasure in particular my military achievements, including 15 years at the post of national defense minister. It is a source of pride for me that I commanded a good army. I think, even though it may be viewed as immodest, that I contributed to securing the Army's combat capability, taking into account the possibilities and needs back then. On the basis of that structure, in terms of personnel, training, and logistics, Poland's defense system is being built also today (even though the basis has been modified and adapted to contemporary political and international realities).

And now as to what I regard to be the biggest failure, or actually a life mistake—speaking in personal terms, it was my decision to join politics. That put an enormous burden on me, and it also brought a lot of bitterness. But I would like to expand my answer a bit here. In my view, in politics one can speak of defeat in historical dimensions, defeat in strategic dimensions, and defeat in tactical dimensions. The last kind of defeat unavoidably accompanies the activity of every government, to a lesser or greater extent. If a government does not commit too many of these defeats, and if they do not manage to become a negative process, they are, of course, not pleasant, but they still tend not to be a major danger. A historical defeat takes place when the defeat's all-national impact is of enormous importance and when it is first of all irreplaceable and also accompanied by a heavy bloodbath. My conscience is not stained with a defeat of this kind. And, finally, a strategic defeat: It does not always have to be linked to a specific decision, act, or fact. In my view, the fact that I failed to lead to a national agreement before 13 December 1981 is such a defeat. I said and wrote a lot about the reasons for that. Right now, I would just like to air what may be regarded as a controversial view, but it is one that has been confirmed by life practice: Martial law was a common defeat. But, however paradoxical that may also sound, martial law was also a common victory. I am saying that because, while not ignoring the tragedy that occurred at the Wujek coal mine or other painful issues and events, we are not divided by an insurmountable abyss. That made it possible, going step by step on a winding and rough road, to come to the "Roundtable" and sign an agreement. What turned out impossible for domestic and external reasons in 1981 became realistic in 1989.

[Lukasiewicz] I would like to return to martial law for a moment. You said during a conversation with THE NEW YORK TIMES last year that, if the situation of 13 years ago was repeated right now, you would prefer to commit suicide than introduce martial law again. Why is that?

[Jaruzelski] And tell me, would any sane person want to find himself again in the same kind of situation, with all of its nightmare, and be faced with the most dramatic decision of his life? My statement, which you cited, should be interpreted precisely in that sense. The statement was about personal and human aspects. As regards a political assessment of the decision to introduce martial law, I have presented it on many occasions, and I find no reason to change it now.

[Lukasiewicz] Some of your colleagues from the past have been proposing a thesis from time to time—in the context of the famous theory of "choosing the lesser evil"—that the "Roundtable" talks and the subsequent changes in Poland would not have taken place if it had not been for martial law. Do you share this view, and, if so, my question is: Could it not have been done sooner? Why did it have to take as long as eight years?

[Jaruzelski] Yes, I do indeed share the view you mentioned. After all, the view expresses a knowledge and an awareness of the fact that martial law prevented a multidimensional disaster. It is not my intention to diminish the evil—in particular, the personal harm—that martial law caused. But, on the other hand and objectively speaking, it also created a chance for the gradual development of the right conditions for fundamental changes that occurred later. Attempts to demonstrate that the introduction of martial law was accompanied by an idea of surrendering power and paving the way for capitalism in Poland would of course be ridiculous. But it is true that the extraordinary measures that were undertaken at the time made it possible to reduce the extremely high social tensions that were close to eruption, to maintain the indispensable leadership of the country, and to prevent economic destruction.

Various types of reform-oriented measures were undertaken to follow that. It is true that their extent was limited, but it was not a "black hole," nevertheless. In June 1989, not everything started from scratch. Also in previous years there were searches, experiences, embryos, and bridgeheads. We were a heretic island within the [socialist] bloc, in the "pre-Gorbachev" years. In the years of perestroyka, Poland became a testing ground for various tests and measures. Finally, the "Roundtable" and its consequences occurred as an incentive and a model for transformations throughout the region. So one can put it this way: Martial law froze the political and social arrangement that was formed in the 1980-81 period. It transferred the arrangement into a different historical time and a different geopolitical dimension, into a situation where the idea of national agreement became the only way to resolve Polish problems. After all, the "Roundtable" was, in essence, a repetition of the concept of the National Agreement Council, which I had suggested in the fall of 1981. Even what happened in Magdalenka was to a certain extent a reflection of the so-called initiating group that was supposed to come to agreement and suggest the council's structure and functions.

However, there is the question of whether it all could have been done earlier, faster, and better. It undoubtedly could have. Today I can see various mistakes and inconsistencies, setbacks, and delays more clearly. However, any "great leap," both for external and internal reasons, was not possible in that reality. If even today, in a new political and international reality, there emerge such great obstacles on the road of thorough economic transformations, one can imagine what the obstacles were in that period. Apart from that, we were very strict about the social duties of the state, which often took precedence over the economy. It is worth recalling how many apartments were built in the martial law period: in 1982, approximately 185,000; in 1983, over 195,000; in the years that followed, until 1989, the numbers were similar. At the same time, I still remember the charge that was leveled at me: One has to wait for an apartment as long as 30 years. Now that we build fewer apartments, such complaints have become less audible. However, I think that the people still remember various social solutions. In the last elections, the Polish people showed that certain achievements, which martial law also protected, are very close to them. I am not saying this from the position of "Now, what did I tell you?," but I am rather encouraging a quiet, *sine ira et studio* reflection on the entire complexity of the past road.

[Lukasiewicz] However, despite the fact that the governing administration has changed, the responsibility for imposing martial law is still a subject of constitutional proceedings. Do you not think that the so-called Suslov documents played a role here? I mean the documents that suggest that you did not rule out the possibility of requesting help from the "Soviet comrades". [Jaruzelski] I already discussed this topic in RZECZPOSPOLITA twice (25-26 September and 6-7 November 1993). No one has refuted the substance of those explanations. How many times must we recall the desperate efforts we made so that our Polish problems would remain ours? This is what happened. This is concrete and palpable proof; it is more important than any sensational news that is contrary to it.

It is worth noting that the order for them came from Poland. This was proved by its evident selectiveness and by taking advantage of it in the preelection period. The way the previous management of television used this topic was very significant; it allowed me to present my explanations only two weeks after the elections. The following fact is very important here: Unlike the case of many other documents from the already mentioned Archives, protocols signed by a secretary of the Central Committee [KC], the only pretext for this "sensation" was not a protocol, but an unsigned working note. The fact that the list of people participating in that session did not include the name of Mikhail Gorbachev is characteristic. In several interviews he stated that the Politburo of KC of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not take such things into consideration. There are also other arguments in this issue that I have already explained, among others, in RZECZPOSPOLITA. Their meaning has been strengthened by the recently revealed documents from the archives of the former German Democratic Republic. I think that similar materials can also be found in former Czechoslovakia.

I must recall again, however, that I never put the external factor in first place. I have often said, also in my book *The Martial Law. Why...* that it would have been below my dignity as an officer if I had used the pretext of some external disposition or directive. However, it is true that the awareness of the seriousness of the situation hung over us like a black cloud. Such was the logic of the geostrategic division of Europe and the world. Disregarding it would have meant playing with the fate of the nation and the state. Various accusers of the so-called authors of martial law are becoming ludicrous. They claim that we were not threatened by anything at that time; however, today, in a much more advantageous international situation, they feel great anxiety because of every other statement by Zhirinovskiy. We can also say the same about the very nervous reactions to the possibility of decreasing the gas supply from Russia for a time, even though this possibility was only slightly signaled in 1992. Now, how much more dangerous it all looked at the end of 1981. The Soviets almost delivered an ultimatum, announcing that they would drastically cut the supplies of gas, oil, and many other raw materials and commodities. The results would have been catastrophic.

Therefore, we must take an objective look at the past, primarily at our common Polish faults. At that time, we, both the authorities and Solidarity, were not mature enough to reach an agreement. Today many activists of the opposition of that time proudly call those events a rebellion, an insurrection. I feel respect for the freedom-oriented, democratic intentions of those activities—all the more so because, as it is said informally, not even one

windowpane was broken at that time. However, the economy was destroyed, with all of the material and biological effects of that on the people; the functioning of the state was paralyzed, and confrontation was a real danger. If someone has a poor memory, he will find the confirmation of this evaluation in countless archival materials that illustrated that situation and the consequent circumstances of the introduction of martial law. I also feel that we should recall many confidential and public statements by Western and Eastern politicians, as well as by many foreign publications.

In light of all those facts, one can only be surprised at the decision of the previous Sejm, which started proceedings in the Constitutional Responsibility Committee. A dramatically complex problem, which will be disputed by historians for decades, has been subjected to a procedure that is burdened with political emotions. Instead, in line with the wise Spanish model, shortening the distance and linking, we will recreate historical antagonisms and divisions in modern wrappings. This will not be beneficial either to Poland, or even to the political circles that have inherited the oppositional ethos. The hearing of evidence will reveal and recall many issues that I believe the extremist circles of the Solidarity of that period would rather forget. Who, then, needs this?

[Lukasiewicz] Let us, however, revert to the present. Do you think the democratic mechanisms, which have no doubt been implemented by the Solidarity governments, are so lasting that the next change of the governing elites will be made in an equally peaceful manner as the one on 19 September?

[Jaruzelski] I fully appreciate the role of the Solidarity governments in the process of implementing democratic mechanisms. I think that the Polish people, despite the fact that they are critical of some manifestations of the parliament's activities, have really been bitten by the bug of democracy. Therefore, any nondemocratic moves would have been evaluated critically. Frequent elections and changes of parliaments and governments, even due to the costs of these operations, are not received enthusiastically. There are not many people left who believe in slogans and promises. Tired of the turmoil of not really understandable disputes and conflicts, people want some stabilization. No authorities can enjoy their honeymoon periods for a long time. The popularity of politicians is changeable, all the more so because there is enough fuel for social tensions. The tensions can primarily be found in the difficult living conditions of many people in Poland. The Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity" can see a chance for itself there. It is a union that particularly willingly employs the instrument of protests and strikes. The political reality has changed, but they still say "bad government" and "down with communists." The All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement, even though more numerous and often treated as a postsocialist relic, did not create as many problems even to the Solidarity governments as Solidarity is creating now. Its destabilizing moves, politically backed by radically rightist circles, may disturb the rhythm of the functioning and of the normal changes of the democratically elected state authorities.

Also, the conflict between the president and the parliament adds to this situation. The statement made by Deputy Jerzy Jaskiernia in the Sejm seemed to me to be more convincing than the arguments put forward by Minister Lech Falandysz. However, it was also wrong and unseemly to reject the president's motion without forwarding it to the committees and without a debate that might have resulted in some compromise solution. Even though the rules of democracy were not slighted, the president may have perceived this decision as an act of disrespect and arrogance. This may have been the reason for such an emotional response, which, however, was rather exaggerated to the rank of the event. However, Lech Walesa is a realist. He plays roughly, to be sure, and not always fairly; he goes especially far in rhetoric. In practice, however, he does not go beyond the playground thatc is called democracy. I am also convinced that the other party to the conflict will have enough composure and restraint. Therefore, we should only hope that the present situation will not turn into a "war in high places," which would be detrimental primarily to Poland. No one can really gain anything in such a war. Everyone will be defeated.

[Lukasiewicz] Apologizing right after the elections in rather general terms to all those who suffered under the old system, Aleksander Kwasniewski announced that there would be no comeback either to the communist past, or to the republic of "Solidarity buddies." However, what we have recently been witnessing in the cadre policy does look like the recreation of the "republic of buddies," the only difference being that they are from "a different shelf." What do you think about that? Slogans are only slogans, but a concrete policy is carried out by concrete people.

[Jaruzelski] Aleksander Kwasniewski told the truth—there is no going back to the past system, and there is no retreating from the road of democratic and free-market-oriented transformations. This is the most important assumption. It is confirmed by practice. Personnel moves, however important they are, are not able to change the generally accepted direction. Actually, there is no such intention. The differences in views on the transformations concern the technology, not the foundations. Of course, the people in the administration quite considerably influence the implementation process. Therefore, I understand the sensitivity to personnel decisions. Over the four years of the Solidarity governments a thorough change, especially in the people in managerial positions, was made. The substantive criteria were often not taken into account. Apart from justified decisions, most of them were dictated by the political past and membership. This was often accompanied by revenge and looting. This must not be repeated in the new situation. However, I believe that lifelong anathemas imposed on people active before 1989, and consequent nervous reactions to the present personnel moves cannot block the changes. Of course, if the necessary

requirements concerning their qualifications, competence, loyalty, and morale are satisfied.

I do not know exactly the scale of the personnel changes that are being made now, nor do I know to what extent they can be said to be controversial from the viewpoint of qualifications. I believe, however, that too far-reaching generalizations should be avoided. This does not mean, of course, that we should close our eyes to such moves which, being a play of various pressures, would lead to clique configurations, weaker than their predecessors as far as their competence and functioning are concerned. The most important criterion must be the potential and real efficiency of the persons' activities.

[Lukasiewicz] How long do you think the so-called left wing will govern the country, especially after the recent crisis in the governing coalition, and after the increasing differences within the leftist parliamentary clubs have become visible?

[Jaruzelski] I am a supporter of the left wing. I hope it will stay in power for a long time, at least until the end of the term. It must be remembered that a complex program of transformations can only be implemented over three or four years; I mean a program of transformations that would harmonize the mechanisms of economic growth with social goals, which is extremely difficult. This coalition has the greatest chance to do this. Both components of the coalition know that a different composition is not very real (PSL) and entirely unreal (SLD). This should also have a soothing influence on internal factional-centrifugal trends within the parties. However, even possible factions do not necessarily have to lead to the disturbing of the fundamental potential of each of the groupings. However, there will be no idyll. The differences are quite considerable in some areas. However, "first, do not disturb." Being in a coalition is an art of compromise, the ability to be above the parochial interests in the name of higher issues. All the more so because after all no one in the coalition will become stronger only because someone else will be weaker—in this way the whole is weaker. I believe in the intelligence, pragmatism, and the feeling of responsibility of Waldemar Pawlak and Aleksander Kwasniewski. These young leaders—age being their great advantage—are quite different, but for this reason they complement each other. I think that in the long run they can gain a strategic victory only if they stick together. This is not easy. However, whoever has agreed to carry the burden of power, whoever treats the interest of the state as the most important thing, must have the courage and wisdom to walk this proverbial line.

[Lukasiewicz] Finally, let us go beyond Polish reality. How do you evaluate the recent years of the Polish foreign policy, and do you share the opinion that only the closest possible relations of Poland with the West can assure us security? The Russian elections and the statements not only by Zhirinovskiy, but also recently by Yeltsin himself and persons related to him, such as Grachev or Kozyrev, reveal increasingly clearly the imperial appetites of Russia. It seems that it would have nothing against including us in its zone of influence once again.

[Jaruzelski] This is a broad and extensively discussed subject. I will, therefore, confine myself to several general remarks, because I do not feel entitled to evaluate the Polish foreign policy as a whole; I have too little information and up-to-date knowledge. Its most important elements are hidden in the safes of appropriate chancelleries, headquarters, and ministries. However, as I look at it from a certain distance, I can say that my evaluation of the policy pursued by Andrzej Olechowski is higher than the evaluation of the policy of his predecessor, whom I know very well and highly value for his activeness between 1986-89, when he was a member of the Consultation Council of the Chairman of the State of PRL. I think that the communicativeness and dynamics of the present foreign policy are much bigger. Apart from the understandable involvement and anchorage in the West, the activities in the eastern direction have increased; the economic aspect is also stressed.

For a few years now Poland has felt the comfort of relations with its great eastern neighbor, relations based on equal rights. I believe that this allows us to lower the temperature of reactions to historical events. There is no doubt that as far as the issues of national security are concerned, one can never stand at ease. However, emotions are a bad adviser as well. In other words, we must open our eyes wider than we open our mouths. Historical-psychological factors should not take precedence over cool, substantive analysis. I have the military, professional habit of getting to the core of a matter; I usually start with the evaluation of the forces, the possibilities, and probable intentions of the other side, let us say. Then one's own forces and possibilities should be evaluated. This is supplemented by an analysis of other accompanying conditions; as a result, by seeing the difference between the possible and the real threat, one can draw the right conclusions: For today, for tomorrow, and for the day after tomorrow. I believe that a quiet, substantive analysis of the international situation, a pragmatic calculation of the gains and losses would allow us to have more options, adequate to the actual and forecast situation. Of course, the problem is extremely important. Therefore, both the official stance of the authorities and the published materials show the world our options and expectations. At the same time they enrich the knowledge and the feeling of joint responsibility of the people for the future of the country. This should be one of the most important levers strengthening the political, economic, and defense condition of Poland.

"Hell is paved" with treaties and guarantees. They are really credible only when they are in agreement with the broadly understood interests of the state that issues the guarantees. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, director of the Stockholm Institute of Peace Research (SPIRI), writes that right now no one in the West can see a "danger from the East," but only "danger in the East," and in addition, of

an unpredictable character. Only a Poland that is socially stable, economically healthy, and politically predictable will be a valuable and really protected link in the European order and security.

One more conclusion is to be vigilant and ready, but, at the same time, to do everything to have friends not only far, but also near.

Solidarity Strike 'Could Last Weeks'

LD0703171894 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1450 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Lodz, 7 Mar—Piotr Zak, press spokesman of the National Commission of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity [NSZZ], declared today that the union was ready for a strike "that could last weeks".

Zak refused to divulge details of Monday's debates by Solidarity's national section for the metallurgical industry, which were held in Lodz. He reported that there would a session of the National Commission of NSZZ Solidarity in Lodz on 9 March.

"We have presented our areas of negotiation to the government, and we intend to talk exclusively about specific matters—for example, about how the profamily tax system is to be introduced and about the price increases by energy carriers," Zak told a PAP journalist.

The National Commission spokesman said: "The union is examining the possibility of making life difficult for those governing the country." Solidarity wants social disruption caused by the strike to be as limited as possible. It is for that reason, for example, that Solidarity's national section for the power industry plans first to cut electricity in public offices and among those industrial customers who owe the industry money.

Zak said that payments from the Solidarity strike fund would also be received by those taking part in the Solidarity strike who were not union members and who were members of other trade union federations.

Strikes Intended To Spur Negotiations

LD0803113194 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0830 GMT 8 Mar 94

[Text] Warsaw, 8 Mar—In the opinion of Marian Krzaklewski, Solidarity is now concentrating on spreading the protest action according to the snowball principle. The Solidarity leader said on the Polish Radio Third Programme on 8 March that the action would be implemented with all force to "make the government sit down at the negotiating table at last."

According to him, consensus is possible, although the government decision has made talks difficult. "I think that consensus is a real possibility, but the political decision made by the government has made talks with the union impossible," Krzaklewski said, adding that "some leaked information had reached him on the subject" because some union members tried to mediate in order to bring about talks with the government.

Krzaklewski did not want to comment more on the "leaks." He only added that this was an "initiative of people of goodwill" who wanted to bring about mediation by talking to high-ranking state officials, from whom they got a reply that the government would not be discussing the demands that had been put forward. "I am surprised about this, and I think it is a clear challenge for Solidarity and an attempt to test the union," Krzaklewski said.

Steelworks Stage Solidarity-Led Strikes

LD0803113994 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0919 GMT 8 Mar 94

[Text] Katowice, 8 Mar—A two-hour warning strike was organized on Tuesday by the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union [NSZZ] Solidarity Steelworks National Division [SKH NSZZ Solidarity] as part of a nationwide Solidarity protest action, Wlodzimierz Lewandowski, deputy chairman of the SKH NSZZ Solidarity, told PAP.

Lewandowski said that the strikes were taking place in a variety of forms. The protest action is to draw attention to the financial problems of employees and their families. The teams from the raw material departments have not discontinued the technological processes so as not to make the financial situation of their steelworks even worse. The strike action has been joined by the workers of the Bankowa, Zawiercie, Baildon, Batory, Bobrek, and 1 Maja steelworks, among others. At the Katowice steelworks, the protest action had been limited to collecting money for the strike fund, Renata Bytomska, the steelworks press spokeswoman, told PAP.

Status of Polish Steel Industry Viewed

PM0803100094 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 28 Feb 94 p 2 of Business Section

[Interview with Dr. Henryk Kunik, chairman of the Board of the Katowice Chamber of the Metallurgical Industry and Trade, by correspondent Henryk Nykiel; place and date not given]

[Text] [Nykiel] The past year was not the worst that the Polish metallurgical industry has know to date. Does this mean that it is on the way up from its worst depression?

[Kunik] Unfortunately not. Although it is true that, after a few years of recession, we have noted a slight increase in the output of steel and rolled steel products, as well as some improvement in the industry's economic situation, the condition of our sector is still critical. Our steel mills face the threat that the banks will block their accounts and that their supplies of power, gas, coal, and scrap metal will be discontinued. The majority of our steelworks show an adverse balance of payments. Exporting their goods often proves unprofitable, while the chances

of selling them in the domestic market decrease steadily because there are not enough potential—and solvent—customers.

[Nykiel] Are there no better prospects for 1994?

[Kunik] There are no indications of any surge of activity in investment projects. Unless this happens, it is certain that we will witness a decrease rather than an increase in production. Sales dropped already in both January and February. In addition, our steelworks have found themselves caught in a costs-and-prices dilemma. The prices of energy and raw materials, which influence the costs of production, are dictated by official state monopolyholders. Consequently, to balance their accounts, steelworks are forced to raise the prices of their products. But, by the same token, they become less competitive and lose potential clients in both the free domestic market and abroad.

[Nykiel] We also hear of the danger of competition from outside....

[Kunik] ...which is most serious. Despite all of its official declarations, the government still does not treat the metallurgical industry as a strategic sector of the economy. There is practically no protection extended to the internal market (because imports tariffs alone are decidedly insufficient). As a result, the domestic market is swamped with cheap products from former CEMA countries as well as similar goods from Western countries. At the same time, the European Community, acting through Eurofer [European association of steel companies], imposes on us trading quotas that serve exclusively to protect the interests of EEC states. The EC's declared interest in restructuring the Polish metallurgical industry is more ostentatious than real, and it is largely restricted to making empty promises clothed in winsome gestures. In reality, major steel concerns have been preparing aggressive sales programs in order to reinforce their position in the Polish market by setting up whole networks of agencies selling their steel products here.

[Nykiel] Is the Chamber of Metallurgical Industry and Trade unable to force the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the government to make and implement decisions that would allow you to throroughly restructure and modernize your sector?

[Kunik] We notified successive ministers and prime ministers many times of our alarm at the deteriorating condition of our sector; we told them of the dangers threatening the metallurgical industry, and, at the same time, we suggested possible solutions that could avert these dangers. The central administration arrogantly left all of our messages and alarm signals unanswered. Recently, acting in conjunction with individual steelworking plants, our Chamber prepared a restructuring and modernization project, complete with a timetable of recommended implementation and consistent with all of the provisions written into the ministry's own study document. We submitted this project to the Industry Ministry and the government. We also drafted a proposal for setting up a dedicated institution that could direct the implementation of the project, as well as a separate proposal for creating a strong organization, Polish Steel SA [joint-stock company], to be endowed with the necessary powers and decisionmaking competence to protect the interests of the Polish metallurgical industry. Again, we have had no reaction at all to our proposals. This silence is surprising even to certain bodies within the European Community, which certainly expected the Polish Government to demonstrate greater readiness to help one of their more important state industries.

[Nykiel] We often hear allegations that Polish steelworkers demand huge sums of money from the government—money the government simply does not have.

[Kunik] That is not true. The main sources of funds for the financing of our restructuring operations will be bank loans and steelworks' own resources. We are first and foremost interested in persuading the government to introduce appropriate tax and investment policies and securing government guarantees on our loans because, without such guarantees, we will be unable to obtain funds for modernization and development from foreign banks. On the other hand, we pin our hopes on obtaining the necessary funds for social welfare provisions associated with restructuring the employment profile of the sector from both the budget and the World Bank—as we were promised according to a provision written into the ministry's study document. We estimate that, during the next six years, some 80,000 employees will leave the metallurgical sector. This problem cannot be solved by individual plants and their management on their own. The only thing is that we do not know who will end up with that particular milestone tied to his neck and dragging him into deep water.

Vacaroiu on Ties With Slovakia, Foreign Policy

AU0703143794 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 4 Mar 94 pp 1,21

[Interview with Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu by Jan Skoda in Bratislava on 3 March: "We Will Not Discuss Borders"]

[Text] Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu arrived in Bratislava yesterday for a one-day working visit to Slovakia. He met in Bratislava with the republic's most senior constitutional representatives—Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic—and he was received by Slovak President Michal Kovac. During his visit, the Romanian prime minister granted our daily an exclusive interview.

[Skoda] Could you compare the standard of Romania's relations with Slovakia and with the other Visegrad Group countries? Are they better or do they lag behind in any respect?

[Vacaroiu] We have traditionally good relations with Slovakia. A general agreement on friendship and cooperation between Romania and Slovakia and a whole series of important agreements—for example, a memorandum on whose basis an agreement on creating a free trade zone will be drafted—have come into force. We have signed an agreement on preventing dual taxation and on protecting investments and payments as well as other agreements concerning culture and tourism. A consular agreement is under preparation. The important thing is that we have formed a basis for intensifying cooperation between our business entities. So, the dynamism of our bilateral relations is very good on all levels.

[Skoda] Our countries are coordinating their foreign policy and their policy toward the ethnic minorities within the framework of the Romanian-Slovak agreement on friendship and cooperation. Some political forces in neighboring Hungary have described the signing of this agreement as "a step oriented against the interests of Hungary." How do you now assess this coordination?

[Vacaroiu] We are especially concerned about harmonizing certain steps of common interest. Dealing with the issue of the Hungarian minority in Romania, however, is our internal affair. We are merely interested in ensuring that all the citizens of our states have the same rights and responsibilities, but not privileges. Our laws guarantee them rights. Certain circles in Hungary and in our country are coming up with demands that are unacceptable to us as a sovereign state. For example, we will not discuss borders; otherwise, this could lead to destabilization. The ethnic minorities—and not only the Hungarians—enjoy the same rights as other citizens, and they are not discriminated against thanks to the principles by which we are governed. In any case, in resolving these issues, it is essential to follow a correct path.

[Skoda] In essence, our two countries are pursuing the same aims in foreign policy—to join the North Atlantic pact and to become integrated as fast as possible into West European economic structures. How is Romania approaching the Partnership for Peace? Have you already drafted a specific program for Romania's involvement in NATO's military maneuvers and in the UN "peace-keeping" operations in Europe?

[Vacaroiu] At the moment, we are going through the first, transition stage of the economy's radical transformation and of establishing a law-governed state. Therefore, in foreign policy we are striving to secure stability and peace in our region. For this reason, we have signed the Partnership for Peace, and were the first country to do so. Adapting to the structures of the NATO armies is proceeding concurrently with the reform of the Romanian Army. Of course, we envisage that we will also take part in some NATO exercises and UN peace-keeping operations. However, this will also depend a great deal on the financial resources....

[Skoda] In connection with recent developments in the Balkans and the increased diplomatic activity by Moscow to bring about peace in Bosnia, what is your assessment of the signing of an agreement on the creation of a Muslim-Croatian Confederation?

[Vacaroiu] Romania has good relations with all the republics of the former Yugoslavia. We believe, however, that the involvement of all three sides in the Bosnian conflict is necessary to bring about a lasting peace. Greater involvement by the international community is essential in order for it to supervise for a certain period the outcome of the peace process .

Mohora: PSM 'Not Involved' in Reshuffle

AU0703181994 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] The Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] is not involved in the current government reshuffle, which was fully carried out by the ruling party, PSM Vice President Tudor Mohora said at a news conference held in Bucharest today. We consider this reshuffle to be a measure taken in accordance with constitutional standards. This is not only the result of the choice of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], but also of the pressure applied by the parties of the parliamentary coalition, including the PSM, which demanded that urgent steps should be taken to improve the overall governmental activity. We will only support this government if concrete steps are taken to implement a coherent governmental program, Mr. Mohora said.

In connection with the elections in the Republic of Moldova, Senator Adrian Paunescu [PSM vice president] said: We must examine the newly created situation with lucidity and realism. In this respect, he pointed out that, quote, we are also to be partly blamed for this situation because of our inability to unite on major

issues; therefore, it is necessary to work out a sole national strategy, which goes beyond party interests, Mr. Paunescu said.

In another order of ideas, the participants in today's news conference told the journalists that a PSM delegation participated as guests in the 25-27 February Congress of the Socialist Party of the Working People of Russia. On that occasion the delegation also participated in a roundtable on the following subject: The Socialist Idea Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow.

UDMR Declaration on Ethnic Rights Summarized

AU0403154594 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 1 Mar 94 p 3

[Unattributed article: "The UDMR Offensive"]

[Text] The 26-27 February meeting of the Council of Representatives of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], which was held in Miercurea Ciuc, adopted a declaration regarding the way in which Romania's obligations stipulated by the amendments of the Council of Europe with respect to the status of ethnic minorities should be complied with.

Assessing that "Romania's authorities are not observing these amendments and are not displaying the political will to accept and implement them," the signatories of the declaration reassert the ethnic minorities' right to have their own local self-administration bodies and a special status in the areas where they represent the majority of the population, and recommend that local administration bodies should be summoned within two months to decide upon the forms of autonomy that should be applied, as formulated in the UDMR program and in its draft bill on the status of the ethnic minorities and autonomous communities. The declaration also protests the draft bill on education, which has already been accepted by the Education Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, as well as the measures taken by certain county prefects annulling the decisions of local bodies regarding bilingual inscriptions, and requests that in the areas preponderantly inhabited by ethnic minorities they should be allowed to use their mother tongue in justice and administration.

In that context the declaration asks Romania's Parliament to sign the European Charter on Local Self-Administration, accept the UDMR amendments to the education bill, and put on the agenda the draft bill on the status of ethnic minorities and autonomous communities.

Zelenco Appointed Head of Privatization Agency

AU0803071094 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 5 Mar 94 p 4

[Liana Simion report: "Iacob Zelenco, Former Counselor of the Prime Minister, Has Been Appointed Chairman of the Privatization Agency"]

[Text] Yesterday at around noon Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu signed the appointment of the chairman of the Privatization Agency, an office that is equivalent to that of a state secretary. The person who was appointed is Iacob Zelenco, who from September 1993 to 3 March 1994 was the prime minister's counselor.

Iacob Zelenco worked for over 17 years at the Ministry of Finance, where he used to coordinate the work of the state budget income departments, while after the revolution [December 1989] he led the department for prices at the same ministry. For a while he was the deputy of Nicolae Vacaroiu.

In a brief statement that he made yesterday exclusively for our paper, Zelenco stressed: "I hope I can do some concrete things to boost privatization. Over the past three years there has been a great deal of talk about it, but we need to make privatization become tangible for our citizens."

Minister Denies 4th Army Commander Replaced

AU0403132594 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] Lieutenant General Niculae Spiroiu, Romanian national defense minister, in a statement to our reporters today, has denied the report published by the AR-PRESS news agency according to which General Paul Cheler had been replaced as commander of the 4th [Transylvanian] Army.

Spiroiu said that General Cheler is still commander of that army and there are no problems whatsoever. This report is false, the defense minister asserted, after which he assessed that such misleading information is also intended to create an unfavorable atmosphere around the leadership of the ministry.

UNPROFOR Controls Tuzla Airport

AU0803160594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 8 Mar 94

[Report by Enes Osmancevic from Tuzla]

[Text] Early this morning units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army left the area of Dubrave [Tuzla] Airport and at 1300 Tuzla airport was officially handed over to the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR]. This was done by signing an agreement between the representatives of our republican authorities and UNPROFOR, that is to say, UN officials.

Although members of the Nordic Battalion took over control of Tuzla airport yesterday, UNPROFOR will be officially accountable for the safety of the airport, which has been under its control for several hours, as of today.

To recap, approximately 300 soldiers of the Nordic Battalion took up positions to secure the airport in the course of yesterday. Six Leopard tanks are positioned in the vicinity of the runway, which have the authority to protect this airport by force if need be, that is to say, to respond to possible fire from the Serbian aggressor's positions with fire.

It is worth mentioning once again that the runway has been ready to receive aircraft for over 18 months. We have learned unofficially that as of today all other preparations to make Tuzla airport operational have been accelerated.

Official forecasts say that this should happen on 18 March; however, sources close to UNPROFOR anticipate that it might happen before this date.

UN Forces Clearing Mines

AU0803132494 Paris AFP in English 1304 GMT 8 Mar 94

[Report by Alain Bommenel]

[Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 8 (AFP)—UN peacekeepers now guarding Tuzla's military airport must clear the area of mines and tighten security before the resumption of aid flights in a few weeks, officers said on Tuesday.

Barely 24 hours after taking control of the airfield, the 140 Swedish and Danish troops under the command of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) have deployed across the north-east base, ensuring around-the-clock security along the 2,400-metre (3,000-yard) runway.

The bid to open the airfield to humanitarian flights for the first time in 23 months of war, in an operation codenamed Pegasus, is to officially begin at noon Tuesday. It follows an agreement by Bosnian Serbs encircling the area to allow two air corridors into the Moslem-held city airport.

Backed by machinegun-mounted armoured troop carriers and six Leopard tanks, they have been instructed to watch movements by Bosnian Serb forces dug in eight kilometres (five miles) away but in a direct line with the runway, which can take heavy transport aircraft.

The men must also pinpoint attempts to infiltrate the airfield perimetre, seven kilometres (4.2 miles) long. "I don't want to see flocks of sheep on the runway when the planes begin to land," an officer said.

But one of the top priorities for now is to clear the field of mines. "This military base has been mined three times," said the Swedish commander Magnus Lavman.

The army of former Yugoslavia laid mines, especially anti-tank devices, when the airport was built. It has remained in disuse since 1992 when troops avacuating the field booby-trapped the airport and commandeered its technical equipment and fighter planes, including MIGs. Last year, troops from the mainly-Moslem Bosnian army fearing attacks from enemy Bosnian Serbs laid new mines in the woods surrounding the field. French bomb disposal experts have already been ordered to the base.

A first military plane carrying technical equipment is expected within five to seven days. "We must move swiftly. The UN's credibility is at stake," one western officer said. During the first stages of the operation, UNPROFOR planes alone will land on the runway. The Russian-built Ilyushin 76s, Antonov 32s and Yakovlev 40s are to transport electronic, fire-fighting and loading and unloading equipment to be used for the relief flights.

Once this part of the operation is complete, within several weeks, UNPROFOR will have to establish flight approach routes to avoid over-flying combat zones. When the field has been secured and equipped, transport planes carrying aid for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will be able to start bringing in relief. The relief flights will enable much-needed supplies to reach some 700,000 people, most of them refugees who fled from other areas and have been surviving on deliveries made by road convoys that cover only 30 percent of their needs. Aid flights are to come in from Zagreb and the Croatian port of Split under an agreement between the United Nations and the Bosnian Serbs. The airport is located about 15 kilometers (nine miles) from Tuzla.

Bosnian-Croat Cease-Fire Reportedly Holding

AU0803112694 Paris AFP in English 1056 GMT 8 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, March 8 (AFP)—A ceasefire accord between Bosnia's Moslems and Croats was holding Tuesday as UN troops patrolled 350 kilometres (210 miles) of front lines and collected heavy weaponry, Radio Sarajevo reported. [passage omitted]

Sarajevo radio said that both Moslems and Croats were pulling back heavy weapons 10 kilometres (six miles) from the front lines in central and southern Bosnia and tanks and artillery weapons were pulled back 20 kilometres (12 miles.) UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) officials said however that it would take them several more days before all the weapons were withdrawn or placed under UN control.

The ceasefire agreement, patterned after a similar truce for Sarajevo, was signed last week in Washington and is part of an overall accord between Bosnia's Moslems and Croats to form a loose federation.

The two sides on Monday also agreed to a prison exchange in the central Bosnian tows of Busovaca, Travnik and Vitez, the radio said without providing a specific date for the exchange or the number of prisoners involved. [passage omitted]

The Moslem-Croat negotiations meanwhile that started at the US Embassy in Vienna last Friday resumed there Tuesday. The head of the Moslem delegation, Bosnian Justice Minister Kasem Trnka, said talks were being held in a "good atmosphere" and "the question of the constitution (for the new federation) should be concluded tonight."

Croats Protest Muslim Cease-Fire Violations

LD0703210994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1933 GMT 7 Mar 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, March 7 (TANJUG)—The Bosnian Croat army command in Vitez, central Bosnia, on Monday protested with the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) against the local Moslems' violations of the February 25 ceasefire agreement.

Moslem forces have disregarded the Monday noon deadline for withdrawal and have not placed their heavy weapons under control, Zagreb-based Croatian radio quotes a statement released by the Croat command as saying.

The radio said that Moslem troops had torched six Croat houses in the vicinity of Vitez on Monday. Fierce fighting between Moslems and Croats, erstwhile allies against Bosnian Serbs, has been raging since early 1993 in the central and southern parts of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Representatives of Bosnian Croats and Moslems and of neighbouring Croatia, acting under strong U.S. pressure, signed a framework agreement in Washington on March 1 undertaking to form a Moslem-Croat federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the agreement has failed to curb the Moslem-Croat war.

Croats Protest Inaction on Weapon Withdrawal

LD0703220894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Report by Zdenko Vranjes]

[Excerpts] Mostar has been completely peaceful today. [passage omitted]

Croatian Defense Council [HVO] formations in the Lasva river valley have placed their heavy guns under UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] supervision at the UN base in Bila, in the municipality of Vitez, but HVO military sources said that the same action was not taken by Muslim soldiers. The command of the HVO Vitez operational zone lodged a protest with UNPROFOR because the Muslim side in that area had not placed a single gun under UNPROFOR supervision. [passage omitted]

Herceg-Bosna Prime Minister Jadranko Prlic and Chamber of Deputies President Ivan Bender had talks with French Ambassador Henri Jacolin today. In their talks they put forward a demand for Mostar not to be placed under European Union administration but to be included in the Croat Grand County, with a separate Muslim municipality within it. They also put forward a proposal by the Croat side that the Croat Grand County be given a land link with Herzegovina.

HVO Implements Agreement for Weapon Withdrawal

LD0703152594 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] By 1200 the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] units had fully implemented the agreement between [Bosnian Croat army commander] General Roso and [Bosnian Army commander General Rasim] Delic. Under the agreement, all heavy weapons of more than 12.7-mm caliber are to be placed under control of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] or redeployed at an agreed distance from the line of separation. Part of the weapons have been moved to the agreed location, which is under the control of UNPROFOR and HVO soldiers, while the other location is under HVO control only. After 1200 UNPROFOR members began a tour of artillery positions and the line of separation, HVO spokesman Veso Vegar has reported.

Foreign Minister Welcomes Croat-Muslim Accord

AU0703201994 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 7 Mar 94 pp 1,3

[Interview with Bosnian Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic by A.J. in Trieste; date not given: "We Are Trying To Convince the Serbs With a Swiss Model"]

[Text] *Following the Trieste conference of the Central European Initiative, Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic gave an interview to MAGYAR NEMZET.*

[A.J.] At this conference in Trieste, an impression has been formed that you are much more optimistic about the chances of Bosnian peace than you were before. On what do you base this?

[Ljubijankic] We have indeed become more optimistic, which is mainly due to two developments. First, the deployment of the NATO planes, and because the Atlantic Alliance has given an ultimatum to the Serbs. The other factor giving hope to us is the Washington agreement between the Croatians and Bosnians on the structure of Bosnia and the division of responsibility, and the agreement on the confederation between Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[A.J.] How can these agreements promote peace?

[Ljubijankic] This way, we will be in a better position on the front against the Serbs; this way, we have gained a stronger position against the Serbian expansion that we have seen over the past three years.

[A.J.] Do you think that this way you will be able to drive back the Bosnian Serbs from the areas that they have occupied illegally?

[Ljubijankic] These areas are not theirs and have never been theirs. We continue to emphasize that this is not a civil war and it is a big mistake to see it as such. This has always been an aggressive war in the course of which pseudo-states have been set up in Croatia and Bosnia as a first step to annexing them to Serbia. The international community has to recognize this intent. Now, as a result of these developments, we can negotiate from a better position than before. This is how I mean our stronger position: As NATO has at long last begun to talk language that the Serbs understand, it will be easier to negotiate with them.

[A.J.] Does the Croatian-Bosnian confederation mean a tacit acceptance of Bosnia's division and giving up the country's unity?

[Ljubijankic] We will never give up Bosnia's unity. However, this way, we establish a high-level example of local governments and local autonomy, thus even creating a kind of model that can be found in Switzerland or perhaps in other European countries, for example Belgium.

[A.J.] Are you trying to "recapture" the Serbs through this model so that they will join you in the future in a new Bosnia?

[Ljubijankic] I am not as optimistic as this regarding the Serbs, but we have to continue the practice that convinces them and the rest of the world that this viral infection of national socialism has to be defeated. In my view, without proving this, no one will be able to convince the Serbs to live in Bosnia. The Serbs have never been in the Vojvodina, but they are there now; they have never been on the left bank of the Drina River, and now they are there, too. This expansion should be stopped.

[A.J.] Do you therefore believe that the peace that can now be achieved is only temporary and not a final settlement?

[Ljubijankic] I would prefer to use the term creating an example to temporary peace. However, real peace does not exist if it is not just. Therefore, this is the first step toward establishing a just peace.

[A.J.] Shall we just call this a cease-fire?

[Ljubijanic] Yes, this can be seen as a kind of cease-fire.

Federation Agreement Seen as 'Too Optimistic'

AU0403215994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Interview with Professor Kasim Begic, chairman of the Economic Council of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government and participant in the work of the Transitory Committee for Developing and Implementing the General Agreement on establishing the federation, by Mehmed Agovic on 4 March; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Begic] From an economic viewpoint, the general agreement on establishing the federation deserves support at this stage of the talks because these solutions are basically on the verge of achieving two general effects. First, regarding the allocation of economic authority between the center and the cantons, accepted are those solutions that are typical for a usual federal setup of modern states—on the one hand, kept at the central level are those solutions that ensure an unified economic-social system with unified money, freedom of the flow of goods, factors of economic operations, monetary and fiscal policy, and so on, and on the other, in allocating economic authority solutions also typical for federal states in the modern times are accepted, which means that apart from the separate powers of the center and the cantons, also accepted are joint engagements of the two levels of authority. Second, such solutions also create a basis for adequately realizing agreements with political, social, and other non-economic characteristics, which means that a basis is also thereby created for outlining the draft of the constitution of the federation, the work of which should start today.

[Agovic] What does this economic concept mean for the third side, which is not included in this agreement—the Serbian side? Can (?this) be a kind of integrative (?link)?

[Begic] I must stress that the solutions that have been envisaged in this agreement are to a great extent identical to solutions that were offered at the initial Geneva negotiations by the legitimate bodies of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Namely, our official proposal within the framework of the peace plan was to try a federal setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, these solutions are to a great extent identical to our proposal from July 1993 and these solutions were offered for the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina, which means that such solutions from this agreement are also creating a basis for this so-called third

side, for it to be able to join this agreement in a way and do so in a very short period.

[Agovic] The Republic of Croatia is also included in this entire arrangement. What is this problem like?

[Begic] I must say that the framework of the preliminary agreement, which envisages the founding of a confederation between the Bosnian federation—that is, Bosnia-Herzegovina—and Croatia in an economic aspect and seen from present angle of vision, above all, contains a lot of optimistic and, I could even say, unrealistic content. Namely, this preliminary agreement, among other things, envisages the creation of a customs-monetary union, which already addresses elements of a special state entity. The fact that it sounds too optimistic as the prerequisite for joining a confederation between two sovereign states is, above all, an adequate constitutional setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, only when the work on the constitution of the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is near completion will it be possible to assess the scope of the offered preliminary agreement on creating a confederation between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

[Agovic] You are leaving for Vienna this evening to take part in the work of the committee for drafting these documents. Would this be a sufficient basis for doing so?

[Begic] The basis is good. I hope that the Transitory Committee, in whose work I will take part, will be able to continue along this good path that the Washington papers have offered and I hope that this will be a key to peace for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Ganic, U.S. Delegation View Embassy Possibility

AU0703171194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today received a 10-member delegation of the U.S. State Department. During the meeting, which was also attended by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they discussed the possibility for a U.S. embassy to be opened in Sarajevo.

Turkish Envoy Assesses Talks With Izetbegovic

AU0703203194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today received Sukru Tufan, the Turkish ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I am honored that Mr. Izetbegovic found time to receive me and I am satisfied with the very useful talks today on the current events concerning the denouement of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis. This was stated by Ambassador Tufan for B-H Press. We exchanged views of the Washington agreement and the cease-fire in Sarajevo. We also discussed the participation of the Turkish forces as part of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] units. We will soon establish the mechanism for permanent political consultations between the leaderships of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkey, the Turkish ambassador said. Ambassador Sukru Tufan expressed the hope that the numerous positive steps taken recently would lead to the final peace.

We consider the agreement between the Bosniaks and the Croats as a major and significant step. We hope that the talks in Vienna will continue in the direction of preserving a pluralist character of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the Serbs will be enabled to join such a community. Of course, you must decide on the future of your country. Turkey will support the stand of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities, as has been the case from the very beginning, Turkish Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina Sukru Tufan said.

Views Federation Accord

AU0703173894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Mirko Pejanovic, member of the state presidency, today held talks with Sukru Tufan, Turkish ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the denouement of the situation in our country. After the talks, Ambassador Tufan briefly stated that they discussed the new, real denouement of the situation, especially after the signing of the federation agreement between the Bosnian and Croatian sides. Tufan stressed that attempts are being made to find a model according to which the Serbian side would also be included in the agreement on the federal organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina that has already been signed.

Mirko Pejanovic, member of the state presidency, stressed the need for the further involvement of Turkey as a friendly country in the settlement of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Pejanovic said the following:

I believe that the (?talks) with the Turkish representatives will be of great importance for the implementation of the federation agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina and confederation with the neighboring Republic of Croatia, as well as a possible participation of the Serbian people in the implementation of the agreement.

This was stated by Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency.

Izetbegovic Seeks Protection for Srebrenica

AU0703200894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] President Izetbegovic has sent a letter to the UN Security Council regarding the situation in Srebrenica.

Srebrenica, which was declared a protected zone by Security Council Resolutions 824 and 836, had been quiet for some time. However, the Serbian aggressor has

recently started attacking the town again and is brutally violating the obligations contained in these resolutions.

Exploiting the changeover of two contingents of peace forces, Karadzic's Serbs occupied the villages of Tjeskovici, Ursici, Jasenovo, and Podravanje on 2, 3, and 4 March. These villages are inside the protected zone. On the night of 4-5 March, they attacked the camp settlement in Slapovici. The settlement is being built with the donations of the Swedish and Norwegian Governments. In doing so, they killed and captured a fairly large number of civilians. Approximately 1,000 people who moved in in the finished part of the settlement were forced to flee toward the town.

It transpires from the aforementioned facts that the Serbian aggressor is continuing to ignore all the decisions of the international community. On the other hand, UNPROFOR [United Nations Protected Forces] is unable to effectively protect the civilian population in the demilitarized zone of Srebrenica.

Esteemed sir, we beg you that the Security Council take appropriate measures so that the units of Karadzic's Serbs withdraw to the previous lines of the protected Srebrenica zone and ensure firmer control of the situation on the ground so that the refugees could at least be guaranteed elementary safety in their settlements.

Departure of Canadians Blocked

LD0703164794 Montreal Radio Canada International in English 1430 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Bosnia's Muslim leaders are trying to end the protest against the departure of Canadian peacekeepers from Srebrenica. The Canadians have ended their tour of duty in the mainly Muslim enclave (?and been relieved) by Dutch troops. But protesting Muslims kept the Canadians from leaving their compound this weekend. The Muslims see the Canadians as their protectors and don't want them to leave.

The departure of the Canadians is also being blocked by Serbs surrounding Srebrenica. They claim the Canadians' heavy-duty vehicles will tear up the road and are preventing a UN convoy sent from Visoko from reaching the area. [passage omitted]

Izetbegovic: Maglaj Situation 'Critical'

AU0703151494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Following the continuation of the Serbian forces' offensive on Maglaj, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, sent a letter to the chairman of the UN Security Council, in which he says the following:

The Security Council's Resolution 900 is undoubtedly useful. We believe that it will encourage the process of calming the armed conflict throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina even more. However, it has not yet protected Maglaj, which has been under a siege for nine months and has been subjected to a general offensive by the Serbian forces in the past month.

The aggressor is constantly increasing pressure by introducing new weapons withdrawn from around Sarajevo. Several tens of thousands of people in the besieged town will not be able to put up resistance for much longer against the technically incomparably much stronger attacker.

The situation is critical and requires an urgent action of the Security Council. It is necessary to halt the attacks immediately and send international observers and peacekeeping troops to the besieged town. Otherwise, there will be another genocide.

If the international community allows this to happen through its passivity, all progress made in the past month would be devalued. If, on the other hand, the tragedy of Maglaj is prevented with a resolute action, this will give a new impetus to the process of establishing peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Esteemed sir, I beg you that the Security Council immediately adopt a decision appropriate to the gravity of the situation.

Serbs Deny Bombing Maglaj

LD0603154994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1421 GMT 6 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Banja Luka, 6 Mar (TANJUG)—Maglaj has not been bombed and the so-called army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in line with its common practice, has been setting old tires ablaze to create an impression that the town was bombed, the information service of the First Krajina Corps of the Serb Republic Army said in today's statement in Banja Luka.

It is a question of the offensive which the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Army began after the Croat-Muslim agreement was signed in Washington. The offensive had also been announced on several occasions in the media by the chief of their General Staff, Army General Rasim Delic, and the chief of the Supreme Command, General Sefer Halilovic.

The Serb army statement adds that in the past few days the Muslim army stepped up the concentration of its forces from the 117th Muslim brigade, 208th shock Muslim brigade, and of new units brought in from Kakanj to the areas of Gracanica and Lukavac. Offensive actions have already started against Ozren, Trebava, and Doboj. [passage omitted]

The statement also warns of a link between the commands of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], and also representatives of the EU observer mission staying at the Internacional Hotel in Zenica.

Izetbegovic Letter to Cochairmen on Sandzak

LD0403230394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, today sent a letter to Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, the cochairmen of the peace conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which he informed them that representatives of the Sandzak Muslim National Council—as the legal and legitimate representative of the Bosniak people living in the Sandzak Province—had requested of the Bosnia-Herzegovina president that they be included in talks on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Bosniaks in Bosnia and Sandzak are one people and have been living in the same state since the Berlin Congress in 1878. This congress had passed a decision whereby the Bosnia-Herzegovina borders were redrawn, Sandzak was separated from Bosnia and divided between Serbia and Montenegro. From 1878 to 1945 the people of Sandzak were under various forms of pressure and emigrated to Bosnia and Turkey. The pressure on Muslims in Sandzak increased after the disintegration of Yugoslavia and reached its peak during the war in Bosnia. Organized state terror against the Bosniak minority has caused a new wave of emigration of Muslims from Sandzak not dissimilar to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The focus of world attention on the tragedy in Bosnia has pushed our people outside Bosnia into the background. These people are exposed to the terror of the same forces and people who had planned and carried out the genocide in Bosnia.

Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia are actively involved in the Geneva talks on Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this way conditions are created for a global settlement of the national status of Serbs and Croats, as well as the status of Muslims in former Yugoslavia. It is obvious that the issue of the Bosniak people outside Bosnia cannot be resolved by temporarily sending a working group from Sandzak, which took part in the Conference on Former Yugoslavia in London, The Hague, and Geneva. Therefore, I think it necessary to accede to the demand of the Sandzak Muslim National Council to include representatives of this council in the talks on Bosnia-Herzegovina as an interested party, we read in President Izetbegovic's letter to the cochairmen of the Peace Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Serbs Continue Attacks on Maglaj, Bihac, Cazin

AU0703163894

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1400 GMT on 7 March carries within its regular 30-minute newscast several reports on the combat situation in the republic:

According to Maglaj correspondent Hajrudin Cermic, "instead of a cease-fire arranged to exchange the dead bodies of the soldiers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and those of the Serbian aggressor, Maglaj is being subjected to artillery fire. After unsuccessful attacks on [words indistinct], the attacks were directed exclusively on civilian targets. Some 70 57-mm shells were fired from Bofors, while tanks are opening intermittent fire from [name indistinct]. One civilian was wounded."

Correspondent Mirudin Aldobasic reports from the 7th South Operations Group that "the aggressor early this morning suddenly shelled with heavy artillery Kalosevici and the lines of defense of the 207th Brcko Brigade and [word indistinct]. The shelling is continuing, although infantry attacks have been successfully repelled." Aldobasic also says that "the aggressor is constantly" attacking defense lines in the Teslic region with heavy arms.

Reporting on the shelling of Bihac, correspondent Mirza Sadikovic says that "one shell alone killed three and wounded five persons while they were performing their duties and jobs. Regarding the new material damage, no one is talking about it any longer. The final number of the victims of today's shelling is still unfortunately unknown, considering that the killing from the hills around Bihac is still going on. In addition to Bihac, Cazin and the surrounding area are also being targeted with howitzers and mortars."

Zavidovici correspondent Viktor Boban reports that "the chetniks this afternoon launched attacks on the defense lines in several sectors." He also says that the "defenders are fiercely responding, not allowing the aggressor to advance even a millimeter."

Boban concludes his report by saying that three civilians have been killed.

Serbs Claim FRG Refugees To Join Muslim Army

LD0703202094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1833 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, March 7 (TANJUG)—Apart from expelling Serbs from its territory, Germany is gathering Moslem refugees to organize their departure for the ex-Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to join the Bosnian Moslem Army.

Citing Bosnian Serb military sources, the news agency of the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS)—SRNA, says that the German authorities are in this way getting rid of the Moslem refugees and, at the same time, enabling the Moslem side to take better military positions in the almost two-year civil war in Bosnia.

It is clear, a Bosnian Serb military statement said, that the entire action was completely agreed by Bonn and the Moslem authorities in Sarajevo and is carried out in synchronization with Bonn's and Washington's efforts to re-establish the Moslem-Croat military and diplomatic coalition with unconcealed anti-Serb intentions.

The Bosnian Croats and Moslems, former allies against the Bosnian Serbs, clashed a year ago over territories with a mixed population.

Last week the two sides met in Washington, at the insistence of the United States, and signed a draft agreement on setting up a joint federation in Bosnia and a subsequent confederation with neighbouring Croatia.

On Monday Germany announced it would begin expelling 100,000 people with Yugoslav passports who are illegally in Germany.

Commentary on Tudjman's 'Greed for Territory'

AU0503151294 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 25 Feb-4 Mar 94 p 2

[Commentary by Rasim Cerimagic: "A Hostage to His Own Greed"]

[Text] The copy has become more clear than the original. Tudjman has outdone his own ideal, and Milosevic has become owner of not only the Serb souls but "the father of all Croats," too. Tudjman has become more of a Serb than Milosevic—not because he wants to, on the contrary. However, he was caught in the net he and Milosevic had woven in Karadjordjevo, intending it for Bosnia.

Like Milosevic, the leader of the Croats did not even mention the number one world event until his visit to the "friendly state of Romania," during which he condescendingly stated that the ultimatum may play a certain role in the Bosnian conflict, but that the bombing of the Serb positions would lead to an escalation of the war—no less and no more than that. In front of the entire international community, including the Serb Orthodox mother Russia, Tudjman sides with the almost abandoned Karadzic. The Croat leader has irretrievably become hostage to Milosevic's stratagem and his own greed for the territory of someone else's internationally recognized country. Paradoxical or not, the fact is that he now has to save Milosevic by defending his part of their joint plan—wiping Bosnia off the world political map. With the removal of the Serb artillery (by hook or by crook) from the positions at the Sarajevo encirclement, certain—possibly crucial—instruments of dividing Bosnia in the way that the two had planned and carried it out have been taken to pieces.

It took the international political and military giant two years of unprecedented brutal killing of a small state and a people—the Bosniak one—to move. Slow reactions are characteristic of the internal logic of a huge mechanism. However, once the machinery is started, it is constantly accelerated and is difficult to bring to a standstill. Tudjman feels that the end to the international community policy that indifferently acknowledged new "realities on the ground" is near. The ultimatum to the Serbs hangs over Croatian policies in Bosnia as a heavy lead cloud, too. However, its president, who has long ago put everything on one card—the division of Bosnia into two parts—has gone too deep into its blood-stained mire to be able to get out of it. This is why, in a state of panic, he gave the statement in Bucharest.

Franjo Tudjman must do what is impossible: save the now questionable job of breaking Bosnia in two, which is well under way, while, with the new, changed attitude of the international community, which has been getting into full swing of stopping the bloodshed, avoiding economic sanctions or an ultimatum similar to the Serb one. Another possibility is going a few years back, breaking off the ghostly engagement with Milosevic, and giving up on the so-called exclusive Croatia at the expense of the neighboring Bosnia.

What he is going to opt for can best be discerned in his program address to the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] Presidency and HDZ representatives in the parliament. Those who may still have had illusions or doubts were finally given a first-hand answer to the question who the real creators or the Croatian policies toward Bosnia are and who are the executors. Tudjman did not directly respond to Miko Tripalo's [official of the Croatian National Party] accusations, which said that three years ago, he had arranged a dual division of Bosnia with Milosevic, but said that, regarding Bosnia, he "carried out the only possible policy," that he "anticipated and realized," and that "our people in Herceg-Bosna and Boban and everyone else carried out and will carry out this policy." He swung his rhetorical sword before the parliament representatives and pointed it even at the pope himself, reproaching him for the desire for the establishment of a new community of the Southern Slavs. Moreover, says Tudjman, "the pope claims that the cause of all the evil in the present-day world is the exaggerated and extremist nationalism, for which leaders rather than the people are to blame, that nationalism has led to a new paganism—the deification of the state." In that context, Tudjman recognizes himself. The pope supporting sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina and expressing solidarity with its people who have suffered so much suits his politics even less.

By imputing this to the Vatican, Croatia is losing its last friend. It, therefore, seems that there is no going back for Tudjman and Croatia. He has chosen the same loner's way as his model Slobodan Milosevic. They are faced with the same future. Disputed and isolated by the world, they will be each other's only support and solace.

Abdic Tells Tudjman of Support for Accord

LD0703153394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman received Fikret Abdic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, in the presidential palace in Zagreb today. The meeting was also attended by Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister. They discussed the details of the Washington agreement and the course of the Vienna negotiations conducted by the transition committee for the preparation of a final agreement between Croats and Bosnian Muslims on entering a federation as two equal and constituent nations and on setting up a confederal union with the Republic of Croatia.

It was said during the talks that the Vienna negotiations are expected to end by 15 March, when the final agreement should be signed. President Tudjman stressed that the agreement is not directed against the third side, but that the Bosnian Serbs are invited to join the negotiations.

Lending his support to the Washington agreement, Abdic stressed that he has always advocated close cooperation between the Croat and Muslim nations, and that he opposed the elements in the Muslim leadership which fomented Croat-Muslim clashes. Abdic particularly stressed the importance of President Tudjman's efforts to involve the Serb side in the negotiations in order to restore peace.

News Conference by President Tudjman

LD0703171194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 7 Mar 94

[News conference by President Franjo Tudjman with domestic and foreign correspondents in the presidential palace in Zagreb—live]

[Text] [Tudjman] Despite the fact that the preliminary Washington agreement has been received by all people of goodwill and all responsible political factors both in the country and in the world not only with understanding but also with the assessment that it is of great importance—this agreement to bring the war to an end and create the preconditions for a lasting peace in this area and create a new international order—there are those who, either for reasons of political opportunism or because they do not understand or because of a malicious interpretation, want to belittle this agreement and even ascribe to it a significance that it does not have [as heard].

It could be said that there are two main criticisms. One is that this is a turnabout in previous Croatian state policy and the policy of the Croatian president, and the second is that Croatia has in this way accepted the U.S. diktat. What is our position here? Is this a turnabout?

Although I have said something about this in my statements, nevertheless, precisely because this is being repeated, I too will repeat: Croatian state policy, and my own personal policy, in fact has consistently prepared for such a solution. Remember: We recommended, and I personally did so—to representatives of the Croatian people and to the representatives of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] who were elected at the first democratic elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina—that the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina should take part in a referendum for an independent (?Bosnia).

After this we did not accept everything and sign everything ostensibly offered to us just like that—as some have said—but we sought solutions which might be in the interests of the Croatian people as a whole, in the interests of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, of the Croatian state, and also of the international community in creating peace on the territory of the former Yugoslavia in this part of southeast Europe. So we were the ones who proposed and gave impetus to acceptance from the beginning of a cantonal solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, this was not accepted because the Serb side, especially the Serb side, and the Muslim side, did not accept this cantonal system.

Then it was we who, seeking a solution in those circumstances, suggested and accepted Bosnia-Herzegovina's organization as a set of provinces, meaning a community or an organization of provinces which would suit all three peoples. This was not acepted either. This means that on our part it was a matter of seeking solutions within the framework of Bosnia-Herzegovina which would satisfy all three peoples. This was not accepted either.

We then went on to find a solution which would be accepted—as the world has always said and is still saying today—which would satisfy all three peoples. Later on, in the framework of the European conference on the former Yugoslavia, a proposal was tabled whereby Bosnia-Herzegovina would be organized as a union of three republics. Consequently, in this context of resolving the problems, far from being passive observers, we were active factors, active subjects in the course of such a solution which would save Bosnia- Herzegovina and which would also be in the interest of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole and in the interest of the protection of the Croatian state's strategic interests.

From this point of view—given that solutions were being postponed and given that the Croats first faced Serbian aggression and then when the Serbian aggression was over and when the Serbs had conquered 70 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory, when the Muslims turned against the Croats partly because of the influence of extremist elements, we were supporting and organizing the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout all that time so that they could put up resistance to aggression and safeguard Croat interests.

Consequently, we also supported the creation of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna as opposed to the secession of the so- called Serb republic and as opposed to the Muslim leadership's ambition—an ambition that was clearly expressed at some stages—to create their independent Muslim state in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Consequently, we supported the creation of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna and this was not in the least at odds with our continuing initiatives. On the contrary, this was geared toward securing Croat interests, toward the creation of—both in a political and a military sense—a situation whereby the interests of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be taken into account on the basis of what the Croat people had achieved in defending themselves from the aggression.

That is enough on whether this is a turnabout or whether acceptance of the Washington agreement is in line with the Croatian policies Croatia has been pursuing since day one.

After all, that can be seen from my letter to President Clinton of more than a year ago, from my repeated suggestions during talks with Messrs Izetbegovic and Silajdzic and from written proposals tabled in Bonn and Petersburg. Therefore, this is no turnabout, but a consistent policy implemented by the main Croat party in Bosnia-Herzegovina—which won absolute majority of the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina—and by the Croatian state leadership and me personally.

Concerning the other piece of criticism, that Croatia allegedly accepted a diktat, I think that I have already answered that too. Croatia has definitely not accepted a diktat and, as alleged, sold its interests for some $500 million. Croatia's policy has since the very beginning been too consistent to accept anyone's diktat or to sell itself for any amount of money. But, Croatia's policy and I personally accepted with gratitude the involvement by the United States and main European countries, and we especially appreciated and viewed as a historic event the fact that the United States managed to reach an agreement with the main European states and that it has taken over the initiative to find this solution of the preliminary Washington agreement.

The Washington agreement on the creation of a Croat-Bosniak-Muslim federation in Bosnia and on federal Bosnia-Herzegovina entering a confederal union with Croatia is no diktat, but it is in line with the policy we have been implementing, which has been and remains in the interest of the Croatian people as a whole and the Croatian state.

This is all I wanted to say at the beginning of the news conference. Feel free to ask me questions.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, you have said that this agreement in Washington has received a great deal of attention. I would nevertheless like to ask something from a journalistic point of view. It has also received a great deal of attention from the world media, over 60 TV networks carried shorter or longer excerpts from your address. The majority of international news agencies did the same. What is your comment on this really high level of interest on the part of the world media? And also what do you say about the Serb comments which say that Croatia has played a winning card and taught the Serbs a lesson about how national interests should be protected? Thank you.

[Tudjman] I have not yet heard these Serb comments. Obviously, there is sometimes common sense there too, so things are seen as they should be seen. The fact that people in the world demonstrate such a high level of interest proves that this Yugoslav crisis threatened to fuel the spread of war, that the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis in objective terms was and still is one of the most complicated in today's world, and that the world sighed with slight relief as the principal factors of the world - the European Union [EU] states, the leading states of the EU, and the United States in its capacity as the main world power—have at last realized that some more determined steps should be taken, that they have agreed on these steps and that, consequently, the world has welcomed this agreement as a way out of this war and crisis that have been threatening not only to spread the method of settling accounts by means of war but also to bring about a conflict of civilizations.

This is the significance of the agreement not only for us, who are directly involved, but for the world too. After all, the involvement of the world's and Europe's powers, the United States on the one hand and the Russian Federation on the other, made it evident that this is not only a matter of drawing borders between Croatia and Serbia; Serbia and the Muslims. This is therefore also in a sense a matter of drawing borders between the worlds and civilizations which have existed here on this soil since the break-up of the Roman empire, including the well-known Yalta agreement, and so forth.

Consequently, this is a matter of decisive and fateful solutions which will reverberate, not only reverberate but they will also have a decisive influence on the future development of relations in southeast Europe and, consequently, in the world too.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, how do you comment on the fact that Mr. Alija Izetbegovic has so yet made no direct comment on the Washington agreement? In the latest issue of LJILJAN [Bosnian Muslim newspaper] we could read Alija Izetbegovic's seven theses which show that he has not given up on the concept of a unitary civic state.

[Tudjman] I think that Mr. Izetbegovic had to agree with Mr. Silajdzic before Silajdzic put his signature on the Washington agreement. The fact that he has so far not spoken in public could perhaps be explained by Mr. Izetbegovic not being as quick as he usually was, which resulted in his search for a solution occasionally showing inconsistencies or attempts to pass the blame for the clashes between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina on Croatia.

Someone has drawn my attention to his recent statement on fascism from the left and right, and it is obviously not clear what he referred to.

However, I think that it is important that Mr. Izetbegovic had to give his approval to the Washington agreement, and that in the talks we have held, Mr. Izetbegovic agreed that there is a need for coexistence of Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have also signed public and—I can say this today—secret agreements on a confederal solution such as this one. However, after that he also signed other agreements, for example the famous agreement with the Serbs in which he accepted the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina because the agreement specified that in the event of the division, that is, if Serbia [as heard] opted out, the rights of an international entity—that is the right to UN membership—would pass on to the Muslim republic.

Anyhow, all these events took place in the very complex circumstances of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis. In my opinion, it is important today that we have this solution which Mr. Silajdzic already signed, and which I believe to have Mr. Izetbegovic's approval.

[Correspondent] [name indistinct], VJESNIK editor. Mr. President, will a referendum be held in Croatia on the confederal relationship or a federation between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina? And is there a possibility that this confederation might also be joined by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]? Thank you.

[Tudjman, laughing] A referendum will certainly be held because this is envisaged in the Croatian Constitution. But where you got the idea that this confederation will be joined by Yugoslavia—this I really do not know. I do not think there will be such a referendum in Croatia. Allow me—as I said in my message—we are continuing to adhere to the policy of the need and necessity for the normalization of relations between Croatia and Serbia and Yugoslavia.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, if I can ask a question. Something which is not looking as far into the future as my colleague (Sejakovic) suggested: What would happen—would there be a confederation of the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Croatia or the Republic of Croatia? To what extent would the Bosnian Serbs agree to a federative or rather a cantonal system in Bosnia? As far as I know Mr. Redman has just come up with this idea in Belgrade today. I have another question which is more important—perhaps you could answer this first. You probably already know the vague outlines of the future super-counties or cantons in Bosnia. What will happen with the canton or what will happen to the Croatian part of Bosnian Posavina? Is there a possibility that this might cut through the Serb corridor with the western part of Bosnia? Thank you.

[Tudjman] What might happen and what will happen if the current so-called Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina agrees to remain in a federal or confederal relationship with Bosnia-Herzegovina—I would not like to speculate on this. It is difficult to imagine something like this. It also seems to me that this proposal and initiative by the main international factors starts from the fact that there will not be such a thing. However, in any event responsible people in Bosnia-Herzegovina must consider this but, of course, from a Croatian point of view this represents a new element which we will consider with full responsibility and bearing in mind the interests of the Croatian people as a whole and the Croatian state.

Understandably, Posavina, the territory of Bosnian Posavina was—as everyone knows—purely Croatian in historic terms. It was envisaged as a Croat canton. This issue will be solved as a whole in the organization of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation, that is between the Muslims and the Croats and even the Serbs. As you said yourself, I believe that the emphasis, that the efforts will now be focused on persuading the Serbs—something that is indicated by Mr. Redman's visit to Belgrade—to accept a solution that would be acceptable to the other two peoples.

[Redzep] Diana Redzep, Deutsche Welle. Mr. President, the Serbian press, citing Mr. Simic's statements, are heralding Slobodan Milosevic's visit to Zagreb in the near future or, alternatively, your visit to Belgrade. Are you getting ready for such a visit—which inevitably leads to the question: Why is Croatia sending its official representative to Belgrade at a time when foreign diplomats have left it, and what is the country he has been sent to? Thank you.

[Tudjman] As far as foreign diplomats are concerned, as far as I know they are just coming back to Belgrade. They left Belgrade at the moment when it was being debated whether the ultimatum and air strikes would incite large-scale flames of war, so they would be threatened. As far as I know, they are coming back.

Croatia is sending its representative, it is opening its office in Belgrade in order to bring about the normalization of relations, a normalization of relations that is not only in the interest of the Croatian people, so we can integrate as soon as possible the Croatian territories under the protection of the peace forces without warfare, but also because the normalization of relations between Croatia and Serbia is also a precondition for the creation of the new world order in the area of the former Yugoslavia in this part of southeast Europe.

Consequently, this was and still is our policy. But this is also the policy of the responsible world factors, Europe and even the United States, as you can see even in the fact that President Clinton's envoy is also visiting Belgrade. Consequently, it is impossible to rule out negotiations with Belgrade. We welcome the fact that the international community, headed by the United States, has at last realized that more decisive steps should be taken if these negotiations fail, if there is no success.

[Correspsondent] HRVATSKI VJESNIK, Vinkovci. Mr. President, the result of your continuous policy of cooperation and friendship with Croats of Islamic faith, or Bosniak-Muslims will be the signing of the federal and confederal agreements. I would like to know whether you will accept and whether you can accept Mr. Izetbegovic's view that the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina are the occupying force and that they are not a constituent people any more, but a national minority, which has been confirmed on Croatian Television by Bosnia- Herzegovina's ambassador to Croatia.

[Tudjman] I will first refer to the previous question and then I will return to yours. I have not heard so far that we had already announced my trip to Belgrade or Milosevic's arrival in Zagreb. In any case that has not been discussed and that cannot happen before our relations are normalized, until Croatia is diplomatically recognized in its borders. I would welcome such a meeting, but only provided that we have first achieved a peaceful solution, reintegrated Croatian territories into the constitutional and legal system of Croatia, and provided Belgrade has given up the occupation of these territories. Belgrade is still involved in the occupation of Croatian territories through providing weapons and through including Knin and so-called Krajina in its monetary system etc. When our relations are normalized in such a way I will accept such a meeting. As I have once said: For the sake of peace and in order to stop the bloodshed of Croat people, to enable Croats to live normal lives, I am willing to go even to hell and back. I have said this once before and I stick to it.

And now your question. It is clear that the Serbs were aggressors, first through the Yugo-communist army, and then through Serbia's expansionist policy, in their attempts to create Greater Serbia. They first occupied a third of Croatia's territory, or rather that third of the territory that remained in their hands—they had, with the Yugoslav army, held the whole of Croatia. They were holding one third, and then we liberated a part of it—there is still a quarter of our territory under the protection of the peace-keeping forces, or under Serb occupation.

It is also a fact that they are holding two thirds of Bosnia-Herzegovina under their authority, and—clearly, it can be said—under their occupation. But it is also a fact that the Serbs are one of the three constituent peoples there and that the international community accepts this fact and has negotiated with representatives of the Bosnian Serbs so far, as well as with Belgrade. In conducting our policy we have to take this reality into consideration, and we have to adjust our policy to the real state of affairs and to the facts of international politics.

[Paradzic] Zeljko Paradzic, GLAS SLAVONIJE. Mr. President, can you comment on statements by Assembly Deputy Speaker, Mr. Djukic, that the Serbs will never accede to being a national minority in Croatia; also, which guarantee is the world community offering to ensure that the occupied Croatian areas—that Belgrade will give them up? Thank you.

[Tudjman] The position of Serbs in Croatia is set out in the Croatian constitution and in a special constitutional law which we adopted in agreement with the EC arbitration commission and the European conference on the former Yugoslavia, so statements by individuals along these lines cannot change anything.

Your other question—on guarantees. The statements by the most responsible world factors, the heads of almost all main states, not only foreign ministers but also state statesmen, and the most important European states and the United States [words indistinct]. However, the guarantee of the world organization of the United Nations—which in all its resolutions, especially resolution 871, confirms and guarantees the territorial integrity of independent Croatia—is more important.

In these circumstances Croatia has demonstrated that it is an effective factor in precisely these international attempts to resolve all sober questions in the modern world in a peaceful way and in not allowing individual national minorities to cause the destruction of sovereign states and the provocation of general war chaos.

In these circumstances when Croatia has on its side both the EU and the main world great power of the United Nations, when our agreement is also being welcomed by the Islamic countries, in these circumstances we can really be sure that we will have the support of all these international factors and that we will realize the incorporation of these Croatian territories under UN protection into the constitutional and legal system of Croatia in a peaceful way. If this is not successful, then we would have the political support for those steps which we would have to take—and it is in this that the success of Croatian state policy and the far-reaching nature of the agreement which we have signed is reflected.

[Skugor] Milana Skugor, HINA. Mr. President, how far has the process of dividing [former] Yugoslavia's assets gone, and can we see what Croatia will get? My second question is about preparations for the tourist season. What is the Croatian government doing to bring back tourists who used to come before the war?

[Tudjman] Okay, please, can you ask just one question at a time from now on? I cannot remember two.

Tourism. The Croatian Government is already taking steps. You could have read that there have been echoes of this [Washington] agreement at the Berlin tourist congress, whatever that gathering is called. It is certain that the agreement in itself, and especially its implementation, will have a considerable impact not only on the revival but also on the development of tourism in Croatia at a level higher than before.

Your first question referred to the succession.

Concerning the Croatian delegation and the delegations of the other countries—from Slovenia to Macedonia—

they have made quite a good progress in solving all those problems with the help of the EU negotiators taking part in negotiations on the division of assets. However, the Serb—that is Yugoslav—delegation obstructed the negotiations and prevented them from reaching an agreement.

This step in the search for peace, in forcing all those—and primarily Belgrade—who are in one way or another involved in the overall crisis, and consequently in the problem of the succession will be forced to solve that problem [as heard]. Both we and the world understand that the solving of the problem of the succession—as well as the occupation of the Croatian areas—cannot be postponed for a long time, because that means that Belgrade has the assets which belonged to the former Yugoslavia. That problem needs to be put on the agenda to be solved as soon as possible.

Besides, in connection with this, there is a question of a practical nature. The UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] in Bosnia-Herzegovina is now placing part of the heavy weaponry under its control. It would probably be very useful if those weapons did not come again—for any purpose—into the hands of the aggressor and the Serbian army, the Serbian side in whose possession they have been until now, but were instead destroyed or put at the disposal of the others. Personally, I prefer the destruction and a financial deal to solve that part of the succession, which to a large extent involves weaponry.

[Ggorgyi] Orban Gyorgyi, Hungarian Radio. Mr. President, is there a certain fear that a confederal resolution of state relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia could serve the Serbs in the so-called Krajina in their demand for a confederation with Serbia, and unfortunately also statements by Mr. Churkin indicate the complexity of possible parallels [as heard]. What do you think about this?

[Tudjman] First of all, one cannot compare the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina - the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia- Herzegovina—with the Serbs in Croatia. The Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina are three constituent peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas the Serbs in Croatia—the ethnic Serb community—are a minority in Croatia. Their position is set out in the Croatian constitution and constitutional law. So they do not have any right to self-determination; and it is clearly stated in international conventions that minorities do not have the right to self-determination, and this is the case in practice in the world as well, because if this were recognized, if the right of all minorities to self-determination and separation were recognized, no international order would be possible and general chaos and general war would ensue.

[Ramljak] Olga Ramljak, SLOBODNA DALMACIJA. Will we have a referendum on establishing of confederal relations with the Bosnia- Herzegovina federation before the Bosnian Serbs decide where they want to be—whether they will remain in the Bosnian federation or join Yugoslavia? And which part of Bosnia can the Bosnian Serbs take out with them, and what consequences does this have, bearing in mind that Croatia has a narrow coastal strip?

[Tudjman] We certainly will not hold a referendum until the Serb question in Bosnia-Herzegovina is resolved, for the final confederal agreement cannot be reached until that issue is clear. As you know, the Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina at their meeting in Mostar yesterday and before that put forward a justified demand—that they can agree to a confederation within Bosnia-Herzegovina only if a confederation with Croatia is subsequently to be founded.

I believe this demand is justified, although the draft constitution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation also guarantees complete equality to the Croats and full sovereignty on the territories where they are the majority population. The cantons are envisaged to have their own constitutions, their legislative authorities, their own budget, police, president. It is also envisaged that the cantons where Croats are in the majority should form a Croat council for coordination of the Croat policy in federal organs. Full equality is guaranteed to the Croats within the federal organs of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is envisaged that the president and vice president of the federation are elected every four years, that one is a Croat and the other is a Muslim, and that the president's nationality changes every four years. Full equality is also guaranteed in the government. At least one-third of ministers have to be of Croat nationality, although the Croat population in the federation is not as large. The prime minister, deputy prime minister, and ministers also have deputies, one is Croat, the other Muslim. Therefore, full equality and participation is guaranteed to the Croats in the whole of the state administration of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation.

The important issues, if they may be in the government, because the government will reflect the composition of the population, but perhaps if the government includes a larger number of ministers of other nationalities, the Muslim nationality or others that would remain in the Bosnian federation, decisions on the important issues can only be taken by a consensus [sentence as heard]. Therefore, nothing can be imposed on the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina that would contravene their interests.

This is envisaged both as regards the president and the vice president of the federation, as regards both chambers of the parliament, the government, judiciary, the state prosecutor and so on. Therefore, with this solution the Croats are gaining not only what they now have in their hands, what they have managed to defend from the Serb aggression, and managed to preserve in this conflict with the Muslims, but also all the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are gaining an opportunity to secure not only their national survival, but also an opportunity to be involved in the state administration throughout

Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is then particularly included that, the confederal alliance with Croatia is also creating favorable conditions [as heard].

Of course, this does not mean that the Muslims are thus being put in an inferior position. Full equality is being secured between the Bosniak-Muslim and the Croat nations regarding their equality in interests in the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation and in the confederation with Croatia, which is also in the interest, as I said in my address to the nation, which is in the interest of the Western democratic world. To exclude nationalist or extremist fundamentalist elements and to streamline this federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina toward the Western world, the Western democracy in the sense of eternal (?watersheds) in this part of Europe by relying on Croatia and through the cooperation between the Croat and the Bosniak-Muslim nations [sentence as heard].

[Correspondent] I asked [words indistinct] will go to Yugoslavia?

[Tudjman] This remains to be seen. Anyway, our interests are one thing and Serbia's interests are another. Still, I believe it is evident that in this case we have reached a stage where agreement has been reached between Croatian views and the views of major European states and even the United States as the world's main superpower. Once we have reached this stage we can say that the issue is not just our issue but that of those main world powerlines and factors and that it will be examined from this point of view too.

On my part I have suggested, as I put forward proposals in the past, I have now again put forward some proposals which are regarded from precisely this world and strategic point of view as very interesting and which will be considered by these factors who are being preoccupied with resolving the crisis and who will take final decisions.

[al-Isa] Nada al-Isa, Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio and TV. I would like to ask you to comment on the increasingly frequent rumors, at least that is what you can read in the Croatian press, originating in Herzegovina, Herceg-Bosna, according to which the message is as follows: We are not going to stay in any kind of Bosnia-Herzegovina union, whatever its name, unless the Serbs are there too, that is in the event of the Serbs joining the so-called Yugoslavia. Your comment, please.

[Tudjman] I believe that these views were in evidence when the talk was of a union of three republics. At yesterday's meeting the presidential council of Herceg-Bosna and the political leadership of Herceg-Bosna generally welcomed this preliminary Washington agreement. Their only condition stipulates that a Bosnia-Herzegovina federation is in a confederation with Croatia. Consequently, this is my answer to your question.

[Correspondent] [words indistinct] the Serbs were the first to violate the cease-fire again yesterday when they shelled Gospic. What is your comment on this?

[Tudjman] You have already seen—especially in that air attack by Serb planes on the factories in Bugojno and Novi Travnik and also in some provocations on Croatian soil—that in the Serb ranks there are those who oppose a peaceful solution and who particularly want to provoke a renewal of the war in Croatia in order to draw attention away from the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the face of the resolve of the international community to find a solution to Bosnia-Herzegovina before going for the decisive incorporation of Croatian territory under control of the peacekeeping forces in Croatia, they wanted to thwart this or rather provoke war, and the renewal of the war.

Such things will happen and it is to be expected on the Serb side too—both in the protected areas and especially in Belgrade—that reason will prevail and that we will reach a general solution precisely with what we have achieved.

[Nareshkin] Nareshkin, ITAR-TASS. Mr. President, what can be expected from Mr. Granic's visit to Moscow on 9 March? Thank you.

[Tudjman] Well, the invitation sent by Minister Kozyrev to our foreign minister indicates that the government of Russia has hitherto tried to act constructively and has acted constructively to resolve the crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and, regardless of the fact that many consider that it has one-sidedly placed itself on the side of Serbia, we can say with our experience that the government of the Russian Federation has come out in favor of the territorial integrity of Croatia and that it has proposed to Belgrade that it recognize Croatia and establish diplomatic relations on this basis.

Mr. Churkin—during his stay here in Croatia and in his talks with the Serbs in Knin—also proposed that they begin to have talks to find a peaceful solution to the Serb question in Croatia. So we see the invitation to our foreign minister, Granic, to visit Moscow as the continuation of Russia's positive policy, i.e. Russia is not one-sidedly on the side of Serbia or what it has achieved through its aggression, but Russia wants to have a positive influence in the sense that, in agreement both with the EU and the United States, Russia will also play a positive role in finding a lasting solution.

[Modric] Franja Modric, NOVI LIST. Please, Mr. President, to what extent would this powerful international community led by the United States succeed in forcing the Bosnian Serbs into a Bosnian federation? Would you say in this case that Croatia should enter a confederation with such a Bosnia-Herzegovina or not? In other words, if you were to support entry at that time what would Croatia's interest be in joining a confederal union?

[Tudjman] I said that we would consider this question if and when this might happen. In any event, it is one kind

of confederation if there is to be only a federation of Croats with Bosniak Muslims, and it is another kind of confederation if it is also to include Serbs. I do not rule out that Croatia could have an interest in this if this were to happen, but of course, as I said, this would be in a different kind of confederation.

In any event it is in Croatia's interest that conditions are created to prevent a Serb expansionist policy aimed at creating a Greater Serbia and conquering even Croatian territory—and this kind of Serb expansionist policy—and to this end we have strong guarantees not only for the organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina but also from the international community.

[Kuzmanovic] Jasmina Kuzmanovic, AP. Mr. President, if the decision on a confederation with the Bosnian republic is implemented....

[Tudjman, interrupting] I do not understand, if?

[Kuzmanovic] Mr. President, if the confederation begins truly to function in real life, is there a possibility that the Bosniaks and Croats together might recover some territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina? For example, they could set out to regain the north, the corridor where the Bosnian Serbs seem to have been rather nervous over the past few days and are launching a counteroffensive in the area. Thank you.

[Tudjman] The agreement which we signed, toward which we are aspiring, is not an agreement to continue the war, but to end the war. We believe that the international community—as it is oriented today, including major European states and the United States—must play the main role in solving the issues of borders in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Tudjen] Branko Tudjen, VECERNJI LIST. My question will not have such political overtones, something that is a little unusual. For the second time I am recalling the fact that I was a sports reporter for a number of years. There are a great deal of sports problems which in my view are not negligible. This one is about football, about coaches, selectors, Markovic, Blazevic, Ivic, and so forth. The newspapers are full of that. I am saying this as the editor of a newspaper which finds this issue very important. Your name is being plugged in a way into this issue among the public—as if you are taking part in this, you have decided in favor of one person or another. This whole crisis is being linked to you, too. I would like you to comment on this?

[Tudjman] Yes, there is no such evil. Sometimes it is good that it is ascribed to me. I am interested in having Croatian sports based on sound foundations. As far as the national team is concerned, it is a fact that today we have a number of European and world-class footballers in the world. This means that the Croatian national team could be an ambassador of this new democratic Croatia just as Ivanisevic and athletes in other fields are. Internal competitions in Croatia are organized in line with Croatian potentials. In this way Croatian clubs could represent Croatia in Europe on a long-term basis and be present as representatives of a people who have won their international recognition, something to which athletes can contribute in all areas.

At the same time machinations and swindles are being prevented from taking place as well as, above all, unsupervised spending in professional sport, and to a degree Croatia, as it is, cannot bear [as heard]. This is how much I am interested in my capacity as president of state. Not to mention that I know the importance of sport, that I like sport very much and that I know the importance of sport for the health of the young and even the entire people.

I have no connection with individual cases, whether this or that person will be. I do not want to take part in this.

Tudjman Shuffles Military Officer Posts

LD2802195394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 28 Feb 94

[Text] Republic of Croatia President Franjo Tudjman has passed a decision relieving Brigadier Stjepan Hadanic of his duty as assistant defense minister and appointing him head of the Military Office of the President, it has been announced from the president's office. Franjo Tudjman also relieved Brigadier Mile Cuk of his duty as military aide to the president, and appointed him commander of the 1st Croatian Guards Corps. Franjo Tudjman also relieved Brigadier Kresimir Kaspar of his duty as head of the Military Office of the President, and appointed him military aide to the president.

Two Major Left-Wing Parties Merge

LD2802211894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 28 Feb 94

[Text] At a session last night of the Social Democratic Party [Socijal Demokratska Partija—SDP] executive, a protocol on unification of the Social-Democratic Party of Croatia and the Social-Democratic Party of Croatia [Socijal Demokratska Stranka Hrvatske—SDH] was signed by SDP President Ivica Racan and SDH president Antun Vujic, the SDP announced today.

Departing from their identical programs and commitments and closely related political views, the SDP and the SDH maintain that their unification is in the interest of both parties and particularly the left-wing of social-democratic orientation, its [SDP] statement says. Both parties regard this move as the first and necessary step toward a broader association of Croatia's left-wing democratic forces, it is stated in the protocol agreed by the presidents of the two parties. It will go in effect once it has been endorsed by the relevant bodies of both parties.

The united party is the political and legal successor of the SDP and SDH. Its official name is the Social-Democratic Party of Croatia [Socijal-Demokratska Partija Hrvatske]. According to the protocol, the post of president will be performed by Ivica Racan. Antun Vujic

will act as president of the council. This change at the helm of the SDP council was carried out in agreement with, and with the support of, the present president of the council, Zdravko Tomac. The party's top bodies will include members of the hitherto top leaderships of both parties. A unification congress, or a convention, is expected to take place by the end of April, the statement says.

Granic in Talks With Swedish Foreign Minister

LD0703192894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of the Republic of Croatia, today received Margaretha af Ugglas, foreign minister of the Kingdom of Sweden.

Foreign Minister Granic briefed the Swedish foreign minister on the negotiations which resulted in the signing of the Croat-Muslim agreements in Washington, on the contents of the signed documents, and on the work of the joint committee in Vienna, which is drafting several agreements envisaged by the Washington agreement.

Foreign Minister Granic thanked the Kingdom of Sweden for its substantial humanitarian aid, for accepting large numbers of refugees, and for the participation of Swedish units in the UN peacekeeping operation in the occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia.

Foreign Minister Margaretha af Ugglas expressed the Swedish Government's satisfaction with the Washington agreements and pledged support for the peace process and aid for the reconstruction of the Republic of Croatia. She invited Granic to visit Sweden. It was agreed that Granic will visit Sweden in the second half of March.

Krajina Fighters Claim Success on Gospic Front

AU0703165594 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Report by Danko Peric]

[Text] For the third day in a row, the majority of entries in the bulletin of the Serbian Krajina army press center refers to the activities of Krajina fighters in expelling Croatian combatants who had attacked a section of the region of Teslingrad in Lika. This morning, the report that the Cupovac region has been regained was confirmed. Yesterday's report said that what is in fact involved is the area between Jurkovic and (Bartic) Poljana, which was briefly occupied by the Croatian combatants. UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] troops should have control over it, as was precisely stated in the Vance plan.

The headquarters of the Serbian Krajina army has announced the liberation of the (?facility) of (Trlo), also on the Teslingrad front. In the battles, Krajina fighters suffered no losses, but Croatian losses are claimed to be great. It is interesting to note that Croatian radio does not report on these battles, but has even carried reports that it is allegedly calm on the Gospic front.

According to the press center of the Serbian Krajina army headquarters, there have also been some Croatian Army provocations on the (Plascan) section of the Lika front, and attacks on Kricko and Zitnic near Drnis, as well as Otesic in the Vrlika region. These provocations by the Croatian Army drew a response.

Diplomatic Relations With Slovakia Established

AU0703202294 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 7 Mar 94

[Unattributed report: "Established Diplomatic Ties With Slovakia"]

[Text] Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski met in Trieste, March 4, with the deputy president of the Republic of Slovakia Government Jozef Prokes, exchanging notes on establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. Minister Crvenkovski and Deputy Prime Minister Prokes pointed out the mutual desire and readiness for a future intensive development of relations and co-operation between the Republics of Macedonia and Slovakia.

Leader of Banned Party on Interethnic Struggles

AU0703181394 Sofia PODKREPA in Bulgarian 1 Mar 94 p 4

[Interview with Ilija Ilijevski, chairman of the Human Rights Party of FYROM, by Galya Nikolova; place and date not given: "Our Party Was Banned Because of Its Good Relations With Bulgaria"]

[Text] [Nikolova] Mr. Ilijevski, when and why was your party banned?

[Ilijevski] It was banned a month and a half ago. The decision of the Okrug Court in Stip became binding over a week ago. Its sentence was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. It is interesting to note that the court in Stip banned us because we were described as a threat to the country's constitutional order. However, we think that the old constitution is not binding any longer, because there is a new Constitution. It bans violent anticonstitutional actions, but our party has not been accused of any such actions. When Macedonia's Supreme Court discovered this paradox it amended the legal basis of the ban. We were accused of fanning international and interethnic hatred. We cannot even utilize our constitutional right to appeal against this judgment any longer because the reason for it has been changed, and our appeal was based on the previous reason.

We sought the protection of Macedonia's chief prosecutor and demanded that the Constitutional Court cancel the ban because it violates the Constitution. We have informed international legal organizations and the governments of many countries. We most fervently appeal to official Bulgaria, because we think that it has the greatest reason to help us. Our party was banned because of its good relations with Bulgaria.

[Nikolova] How did the Bulgarian authorities react to this?

[Ilijevski] Unfortunately, before and after 10 November 1989 Sofia's policy toward the Bulgarians in Macedonia did not change. We were left in the hands of the Serbian state and Serbian denationalization. After 50 years of oppression we hoped that under the new conditions of pluralism we would have the opportunity to state our rights clearly. However, this did not happen. We think that it is high time that Bulgaria took care of its children outside her borders. There will be nothing unusual in this, because all the countries in the world do it.

[Nikolova] Have you met any official Bulgarian representatives to discuss this issue?

[Ilijevski] Over the last six months I have had many useful contacts in Sofia. I have had talks with [National Assembly Chairman] Aleksandur Yordanov and with President Zhelev's advisers. I have also had meetings at the Agency for Bulgarians Abroad and many political party leaders. However, most of my meetings have been with journalists. Thus, the problems of the Bulgarians in Macedonia have been presented to the Bulgarian and world public. Unfortunately, official Bulgaria continues to keep silent. It is high time that Bulgaria announced its position on the so-called Macedonian issue.

[Nikolova] Our country was the first to recognize Macedonia's independence. Do you think that Sofia is afraid to declare openly its support for the Bulgarians in the former Yugoslav republic?

[Ilijevski] There is no reason to be afraid, but I think that the old understandings still prevail. Unfortunately, the good relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia are at the expense of the Bulgarians who live there. There used to exist an unwritten treaty between Sofia and Skopje that there are no Bulgarians in Macedonia. Good relations between the two countries could and can exist only if Bulgaria does not look after us.

I do not think that this is either good or moral. If I may use a metaphor, it means that the Bulgarians in Macedonia have a mother who is alive but does not look after them. Let me ask the following: If a mother does not think about her children across the border, how will it help those who live here?

[Nikolova] Bulgaria offered Macedonia its ports when Greece announced its trade blockade. How do you think the conflict with Greece will develop?

[Ilijevski] I cannot forecast anything, but I think that there could be a positive result. Both Greece and Macedonia could make concessions. However, it is a different matter as to whether Greece is right. Many states throughout the world have already denounced it, while its neighbors are keeping silent in an attempt to maintain good relations with it.

It is true that official Macedonia, led by Kiro Gligorov, defends Macedonism. However, this involves twisting historical facts and distorting the history of Bulgaria and Greece. In such a case it was normal on the part of the Greeks to react in such a sharp manner.

[Nikolova] How will the Yugocrisis develop and will there be a war in Macedonia?

[Ilijevski] I do not think that there will be war if there is no military intervention and the problems are peacefully resolved, unless we ourselves do something to ourselves. In order to avoid this, the Balkan states are called upon to be law abiding and democratic states and respect human rights. In this way international conflicts could be avoided.

Economy Faces Worsening Conditions

AU0703202094 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 7 Mar 94

[Unattributed report: "Bad Economic Situation"]

[Text] The economic system in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is not functioning completely, and the parts of it that do function are faced with conditions worse than last year's. These are the global evaluations of the Macedonian Chamber of Commerce, which is following the realization of the 1994 stabilization program of the government. The situation in certain segments, as for example in the monetary policy, is even worse than last year and threaten to prove disastrous for the economy.

The companies, besides on the Greek embargo and reduced foreign markets, also bitterly criticized the domestic factors smothering the realization of the stabilization program. They point out the low percentage of using of the available capacities, the heavy burden of public expenditures, the low accumulative capacity of the economy, and the unemployment. The January break of the planned 8 percent to even up to [passage indistinct] end of the year is realistic. Therefore, they appealed to the bankers not to introduce a rapid increase of the interest rates. The restrictive monetary policy threatens to grow into a real war between the banks and the companies, since it gives little opportunities for the weakened Macedonian economy. The companies claim the interest rates are not in the function of stabilizing and stimulating the production.

Additional problems are also the delayed privatization process, the too large exposure of the domestic market to liberalization, etc. In such conditions it is hard to expect that the economy will function property, and a cooperation between the proposer—the Government and [passage indistinct].

Privatization Minister Seeks European Investors

AU0703103894 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 7 Mar 94 p 13

[Article by Irene Miller: "Macedonia Does Not Want To Be a Victim"]

[Text] Vienna—"We are not giving our companies away, we are selling them. And everybody can buy them, no matter whether he is a foreigner or a Macedonian." In a lecture at the Austrian Economic Chamber, Jane Miljovski, privatization minister of the Yugoslav successor republic Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], was looking for helpers on the difficult path into an economic future.

Currently, Macedonia is suffering from the UN sanctions against what remains of Yugoslavia and from the crumbling of Yugoslavia as a whole: In the past, 70 percent of Macedonian exports went to the other Yugoslav republics, 60 percent of that to Serbia; now deliveries to Serbia are prohibited by the UN sanctions.

Goods that are exported elsewhere can be brought to their destination only with great difficulties: The roads lead through the rump Yugoslavia, which is closed to transit, or though Greece, which has closed its borders to its small neighbor. With this, Athens wants to force Macedonia to change the name of its state.

Privatization Has Started

Miljovski explains that the new privatization law has been in force just for three months and has not yet had a great effect. About 1,400 companies are to be transferred from "social" to private ownership. Generally, a buyer for 51 percent of the companies searched first. With this it is intended to make sure that the company is taken over by a responsible owner and is managed with an orientation toward profits and that there are no speculations.

In Skopje, it is known that the domestic savings assets cover only about 10 percent of the value of the companies. Therefore, the state wants to lend the owner 41 percent of the company's value for five years, if the new owner fulfills two conditions: He must create jobs and pay taxes.

Skopje is also aware of the fact that foreign investors are not particularly lining up to buy, because the infrastructure—high rents, bad telephone lines, a lack of electricity, to give just a few examples—is still a few steps away from European standards even though improvements are underway.

Foreign trading partners also complain that Slovenia can export self-imported goods to Macedonia practically without customs duties—in contrast to that, the other countries have to overcome very high customs barriers. Miljovski explains that this is due to the UN request not to erect any trade barriers for the ex-Yugoslav area during the search for peace. The discrepancy will certainly be abolished soon, Miljvoski says.

Zhirinovskiy Denied Entry; Leaves for Moscow

AU0703161794 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] President of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party Vladimir Zhirinovskiy at 1400 departed from Ljubljana airport on a regular flight by the Russian air carrier Aeroflot to Moscow.

Because the Slovene authorities did not allow him entry into the country, he spent the night at the airport, together with his three companions. He was visited by Yuri Girenko, charge d'affaires of the Russian Federation Embassy in Ljubljana.

The Slovene Foreign Ministry has reported that it did not allow entry to Zhirinovskiy because of violations of public law and order during his visit in Slovenia at the end of January. On that occasion the Foreign Ministry merely advised him to leave the territory of the Republic of Slovenia as soon as possible.

President, Defense Minister Trade Accusations

LD0503220094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2130 GMT 5 Mar 94

[Text] Ljubljana, March 5 (TANJUG)—Slovenian Defence Minister Janez Jansa accuses President Milan Kucan of running illegal para-intelligence services and spy groups, the LJUBLJANSKI DNEVNIK daily wrote on Saturday.

The accusation comes at a time when the activity of these services in this breakaway Yugoslav republic, which has recently been made public by Kucan, is being traced back to Jansa's ministry.

Commenting on Kucan's statement that para-intelligence services and spies are keeping under surveillance leading Slovenian state officials, prominent citizens and individual reporters and are prepared to liquidate them if necessary, Jansa told LJUBLJANSKI DNEVNIK that the president "probably has in mind the various detective agencies ruled" by members of the State Security Service from the Communist times, "most of whom he knows personally." The agents were officially subordinated to Kucan while he was Slovenia's communist leader, "and are today probably unofficially" subordinated to him, averred Jansa.

The defence minister for the first time mentioned that he has received "numerous threats of physical liquidation," but did not elaborate.

"Liquidation threats should be taken seriously, especially after the murder of Ivan Kramberger," killed in the finale of the 1992 presidential campaign, said Jansa.

The quarrel between Kucan and Jansa, who have traded accusations also in a scandal involving arms smuggling for the interests of Bosnian Moslems, has been joined by the leadership of the United List, the second most influential parliamentary party, which has announced its intention to demand the resignation or recall of Jansa in the ruling coalition next week, on the grounds that "he is unfit for this position of authority."

Public Debt Rises to $4 Billion

LD0403122494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1021 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] Ljubljana, March 4 (TANJUG)—Slovenia has a public debt of nearly four billion dollars, the Bank of Slovenia (central bank) has said, making it clear this is only an unofficial estimate. This figure does not include the sum owed to depositors in neighbouring Croatia by the former Zagreb-based branch of Ljubljanska Banka, which Croatia insists exceeds 600 million dollars.

On Thursday, Slovenia gave its first intimation that it has no intention of beginning to pay off its debt to the Croatian depositors this year.

Political and banking circles in Ljubljana expect the delay in paying money back to the Croatian depositors to provoke fresh differences in the already strained relations between the neighbours. Difficulties in relations between the two former Yugoslav republics, which have violently seceded from Yugoslavia, have become apparent earlier this year.

Trouble first surfaced because of Slovenia's refusal to deliver electricity from the jointly-built Krsko nuclear power plant because of Croatia's tardiness with the payments. Another bone of contention has been the Slovenian-Croatian common border in Istra. Last week, Slovenian police seized a Croatian boat in the Bay of Piran, for allegedly poaching in Slovenian territorial waters.

Federal

Kontic Calls for 'Urgent' Lifting of Sanctions

LD0703170194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1600 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, March 7 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic said on Monday that the establishing of a peace in the territory of the former Yugoslavia is his government's priority and that the urgent lifting of the U.N. sanctions would considerably speed up this process.

The sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia border on a genocide against a nation and their consequences have acquired the proportions of war operations, Kontic said during talks in Belgrade with a delegation of the Greek committee for humanitarian aid to the people of the former Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav Information Ministry announced that Kontic said that the sanctions are counterproductive and are an expression of the inability of the international community to resolve regional conflicts. Underscoring Greece's objective approach to the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, Kontic said that the tragedy in the former Yugoslavia would not have occurred if the other members of the European Community had taken the same stand.

Kontic expressed gratitude to the Greek delegation, headed by the honorary president of the World Council for Peace and the president of the Greek Anti-War Committee, Evangelos Makheras, for everything Athens and the Greek people have done for the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and in sending the humanitarian aid which has saved many lives and reduced the suffering of the people.

"We believe that Greece, as the chairman of the European Union, will do everything towards reaching a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis, and this will be the biggest humanitarian aid," Kontic said.

Makheras pointed out that the lifting of the sanctions is a priority of the Greek Anti-War Committee and the committee for aiding the people of the former yugoslavia. "We are opposed to all forms of sanctions because they are aimed against the people," he said. Makheras informed Kontic that his humanitarian organization had three months ago requested from the U.N. sanctions committee permission to send an additional 550 tonnes of relief aid, but has received no answer so far. Although humanitarian aid is exempt from the sanctions, it arrives in Yugoslavia infrequently and in insufficient quantities due to the inefficiency of the U.N. sanctions committee.

The almost two-year strict blockade of Yugoslavia has gravely affected the health and living standards of the 10.5 million Yugoslavs and some 600,000 registered refugees from the former Yugoslav republics.

Official Says Sanctions Violate Human Rights

LD0703214394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2115 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, March 7 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Minister of Human and Minority Rights Margit Savovic said on Monday that the U.N. Human Rights Commission was unwilling to have a discussion on sanctions against Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro), because the United Nations had violated the Yugoslavs' basic human rights by voting for the sanctions in the first place.

Minister Savovic said Yugoslavia was being accused of violating human and minority rights, while the rights of its citizens were being violated by the U.N. sanctions, and its population was surviving in inhuman conditions through a sheer will to live.

The Yugoslav Government has filed countless memoranda with the United Nations, apprising it about the difficult position of the children, women, the ill and the elderly in the country and making it clear that "our people have virtually been deprived of the right to live, and the sanctions have violated a host of U.N. conventions, but nothing has been done about it," she said in a statement to Serbia's Radio Jagodina.

"The United Nations is well aware that a discussion on the anti-Yugoslav sanctions would call in question their further justifiability since Yugoslavia has complied with all requirements for their lifting. It would also broach the highly unpleasant question of why the United Nations is violating its own conventions," she said.

The United Nations imposed comprehensive and mandatory sanctions on Yugoslavia in May 1992, because of its alleged military involvement in civil war in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is being waged among Bosnia's Moslems, Serbs and Croats.

Margit Savovic said that more than 180,000 Serbs were living in Albania, Hungary and Romania, and their position there "is far different from that of the minorities in Yugoslavia."

"They are deprived of rights in all fields, from the right to education in their mother tongue, to information, cultural development and power-sharing, to being assimilated," she said.

Yugoslavia "has no intention of insisting on reciprocity, but wants its minorities to retain their rights, and the rights of the Serbs in the neighbouring countries to be enhanced to correspond to those the national minorities have here," she explained.

Request for More UN Troops in Bosnia Assessed

AU0503174794 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 5 Mar 94

[Commentary by Slavoljub Susic]

[Text] The latest request for additional UN troops in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina could be understood more as the confirmation of the assessment of the better informed analysts that the Balkans is a special experimental arena of the creators of the new world order than an indication that this hotbed of crisis would soon be mollified. Here is a military-political commentary by Slavoljub Susic:

[Susic] It is indicative that almost all new peace proposals for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina are followed by requests to increase the UN military contingent to supervise the implementation of these proposals. Does this mean that there is an a priori doubt about the effectiveness of the offered solutions that are drafted most frequently according to the interests of foreign factors?

Let us recall that the failure of Cutiliero's plan in Lisbon in 1991 was followed by the dispatch of the first battalion of the UN Blue Helmets to Sarajevo—consisting of soldiers from France, Ukraine, and Egypt—with the task of securing the airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid. After the London conference on the former Yugoslavia in August of the same year, NATO's offer to protect relief convoys in Bosnia under the UN mandate was accepted. By the end of 1992, there were about 7,000 UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] troops in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina from 10 member countries of the Western military alliance.

After Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, and Srebrenica were declared protected zones in May 1993, the Security Council decided to increase the existing contingent with an additional 7,600 troops. This was not fully realized. After the well-known Geneva plans for the settlement of the crisis in Bosnia, offered during 1993, there were about 12,000 Blue Helmets in Bosnia and more than 26,000 troops on the territory of the entire former Yugoslavia. That year, more than $1 billion was spent on their mission.

In order to ensure the implementation of the Security Council resolutions adopted so far and the agreements reached by the warring parties, including the agreement reached on the creation of the Muslim-Croat federation in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina in Washington this week, with a possibility of including it in a confederation with Croatia, Mr. Akashi, special envoy of the UN secretary general, and General Cot, the chief commander of the peace forces, are asking for an additional 10,650 troops. If this request, which is also strongly favored by British General Michael Rose, commander of the peace forces in Bosnia, is met, then the mission on the territory of the former Yugoslavia with nearly 40,000 deployed troops and other staff would be the largest and the most expensive peace operation by the United Nations since its founding.

Judging by the mood in Europe and on the other side of the Atlantic, it appears that the request for additional forces will not be met. Russia has offered to send another 300 troops to Bosnia in addition to the 400 troops already deployed there. This has been received with visible uneasiness in the West.

The United States, on the other hand, sees its contribution in support to the air force's mission, remaining consistent with its view not to send land forces to the Bosnian nightmare before an effective peace agreement acceptable to all three sides in the conflict has been reached. One could not object to this at all if the U.S. policy was in line with this stand. However, it is known that Washington favors the Muslims and the Croats in particular. This is confirmed by the latest separate agreement between these two sides without the participation of the third, the Serbian side.

Thus, the fear of the possible renewal of the Muslim-Croatian coalition, which, supported by powerful protectors, could renew and even expand territorial and other demands to the detriment of the Serbs, is justifiable. The old slogan that there are many Russians and us will not be of much help to the Serbs, because one must take into account the fact that Russia as an indisputably big and influential power has strategic interests in the Balkans as a whole, as well as partnership relations with the United States and other developed countries in the West. Therefore, our expectations should not exceed the level of that reality.

Russia would do enough if it contributes to the halting of further experimenting with the peoples in this region by the creators of the new world order and if it helps in finding a compromise solution acceptable to all sides. In that case even a symbolic contingent of UN peace forces would be sufficient.

Serbia

Redman in Belgrade for Talks With Milosevic

LD0803114294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1056 GMT 8 Mar 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, March 8 (TANJUG)—U.S. President Bill Clinton's special envoy Charles Redman arrived in Belgrade on Tuesday morning and, as it has been learned, is shortly to meet with President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia.

Redman, it has been learned, has not brought with him any concrete proposals, and obviously means only to hear Belgrade's position on the U.S. initiative for the creation of a Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The question of the Bosnian Serb side has been left open in that context.

An answer has, however, come from Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, who has said that "only political illiterates can expect the Serbs in Bosnia to accept a confederative model with the Muslims and Croats," and who has underscored that only two possibilities exist as

far as the Bosnian Serbs are concerned—"an independent Serb state in Bosnia or the unification of the Bosnian Serbs with the other Serbs into a single state."

It is believed that Milosevic and Redman will exchange views on the enhancement of the Bosnia-Herzegovina negotiating process, which is to produce a comprehensive settlement acceptable to all three warring sides in the former Yugoslav republic.

According to unconfirmed reports, Redman will meet in Belgrade also with Vice-President of the Bosnian Serb Republic Nikola Koljevic.

FRG's Plan To Expel Refugees Criticized

LD0703190494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1829 GMT 7 Mar 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, March 7 (TANJUG)—Serbia's Deputy Commissioner for Refugees Slobodan Popovic said on Monday that Germany's decision to expell refugees who hold Yugoslav passports was uncalled for, in view of the fact that the refugee status is regulated under international law which protects refugees everywhere in the world.

In a statement made to TANJUG, Popovic specified that, since the outbreak of war in former Yugoslavia, between 17,000 and 20,000 refugees from the breakaway Yugoslav Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia have transited through Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) on their way to Germany as well as to America, Asia and Australia.

"German authorities appear to see the refugees in only one light—viz, as Yugoslavs," Popovic said.

Germany has announced its intention to begin expelling the refugees from Serbia and Montenegro in three days' time. The local press estimates that the decision will affect about 200,000 refugees, mainly Bosnian Serbs and ethnic Albanians from the Serbian province of Kosovo-Metohija—holders of Yugoslav passports.

The Serbian commissioner for refugees believes that this unprecedented move on the part of Germany is meant to provoke a reaction from Yugoslavia which would then be taken as a pretext to continue to pursue the present anti-Yugoslav policy.

The German weekly DER SPIEGEL estimates there are about 350,000 refugees from former Yugoslavia in Germany, 230,000 of whom have come from Serbia and Montenegro. This number obviously includes Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia who have refused to renounce their Yugoslav citizenship at the time of the disintegration of the Balkan federation and take the citizenship of the newly-proclaimed states.

Kosovo

Serb Policeman Kills Ethnic Albanian

LD0703182694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1435 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Pristina, 7 Mar (TANJUG)—Slavisa Nikolic, a trainee policeman, killed Faik Maljoku and wounded Bejzak Dzevat after a short argument in a restaurant in Kosovo Polje, a TANJUG reporter learned today from the regional prosecution office in Pristina.

According to the reports from the prosecution office, Officer Nikolic fired two bullets from his service gun at Maljoku, who died in a Pristina hospital soon afterwards. Dzevat, who was injured during the shooting incident, is stable. Nikolic has been detained. An official investigation is under way.